In a principal-agent problem, if the contract implies that the more risk-averse agent will bear less risk, we can say that this contract exhibits A.risk sharing is not optimal because the less risk-averse (or risk-neutral) agent should bear none of the risk. B.efficiency in risk-bearing. C.risk sharing is not optimal because risk-neutral agents should face no risk. D.risk sharing is not optimal because all risk should be transferred to the most risk-averse agent.

In a principal-agent problem, if the contract implies that the more risk-averse agent will bear less risk, we can say that this contract exhibits A.risk sharing is not optimal because the less risk-averse (or risk-neutral) agent should bear none of the risk. B.efficiency in risk-bearing. C.risk sharing is not optimal because risk-neutral agents should face no risk. D.risk sharing is not optimal because all risk should be transferred to the most risk-averse agent.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter7: Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7.4P

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