(Market Entry Deterrence): NSG is considering entry into the local phone market in the Bay Area. The incumbent S&P, predicts that a price war will result if NSG enters. If NSG stays out, S&P earns monopoly profits valued at $10 million (net present value, or NPV of profits), while NSG earns zero. If NSG enters, it must incur irreversible entry costs of $2 million. If there is a price war, each firm earns $1 million (NPV). S&P always has the option of accommodating entry (i.e., not starting a price war). In such a case, both firms earn $4 million (NPV). Suppose that the timing is such that NSG first has to choose whether or not to enter the market. Then S&P decides whether to “accommodate entry” or “engage in a price war.” a. Model this as a dynamic game and draw the game tree. b. What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome to this sequential game?

(Market Entry Deterrence): NSG is considering entry into the local phone market in the Bay Area. The incumbent S&P, predicts that a price war will result if NSG enters. If NSG stays out, S&P earns monopoly profits valued at $10 million (net present value, or NPV of profits), while NSG earns zero. If NSG enters, it must incur irreversible entry costs of $2 million. If there is a price war, each firm earns $1 million (NPV). S&P always has the option of accommodating entry (i.e., not starting a price war). In such a case, both firms earn $4 million (NPV). Suppose that the timing is such that NSG first has to choose whether or not to enter the market. Then S&P decides whether to “accommodate entry” or “engage in a price war.” a. Model this as a dynamic game and draw the game tree. b. What is the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium outcome to this sequential game?

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter16: Bargaining

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 16.1IP

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16-1. Two equal sized newspaper have an overlap in circulation of 10% (10% of the subscribers subscribe to both newspaper). Advertisers are willing to pay $10 to advertise in one newspaper but only $19 to advertise in both , because they’re are unwilling to pay twice to reach the same subscribers. What’s the likely bargaining negotiation outcome if the advertisers bargain by telling each newspaper that they’re going to reach an agreement with the other newspaper so the gains to reaching agreement are only $9? Suppose the two newspaper merge. What is the likely post merger bargaining outcome?
16-1 Newspaper Bargaining Two equal-sized newspapers have an overlap in circulation of 10% (10% of the subscribers subscribe to both newspapers). Advertisers are willing to pay $10 to advertise in one newspaper but only $19 to advertise in both, because they’re unwilling to pay twice to reach the same subscribers. What’s the likely bargaining negotiation outcome if the advertisers bargain by telling each newspaper that they’re going to reach an agreement with the other newspaper, so the gains to reaching agreement are only $9? Suppose the two newspapers merge. What is the likely post-merger bargaining outcome? these would be most advantageous from a bargaining position?
1.Microsoft is one of the leading software companies. Prior to 2000, Microsoft’s share of the market for personal computer operating systems stood above 80 per cent. However, since the twenty-first century Microsoft’s market share has steadily declined to 40 per cent. This is due to the rise in competing software producers such as Apple macOS (10%), Google's Android OS (35%), Linux Operating System (35%), and Apple iOS (5%). The market share of each company is provided in parentheses. Google and Linux have decided that it would be in their best interest to work together to serve the market. This is not common knowledge to the person’s outside of the companies. i. Draw how equilibrium price and quantity are determined in this industry. Hi does this refer to the monopoly market structure diagrams? 2. Allsmart’s demand curve is given by Q=10-P for its dishwashers. The marginal and average cost is $3 per dishwasher produced. Complete the following table. Photo below concerns…
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Youngstown-Warren Regional Airport (YNG) has had a difficult time securing passenger service from a commercial airline. a.) A few years ago, the Port Authority offered an incentive to United with guaranteed revenue equal to approximately $1.5 million, but United declined saying it was not sufficient. Suppose United anticipated that it would cost $1 million to offer flights from Youngstown, so with a guaranteed revenue of $1.5 million, their anticipated profit would equal $500,000. Given that they still chose to decline offering service from YNG, what do you know must be true? Put this in terms of implicit costs and economic profit. b.) In 2019, YNG’s only commercial carrier, Allegiant Air stopped offering service from YNG, despite the fact that it was known to be profitable. Allegiant Air’s service from YNG was known to be profitable. Why would Allegiant Air pull service from YNG even if it had been their service from YNG had been generating a profit? Note, Allegiant started…
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Suppose the European Union (EU) is investigating a proposed merger between two of the largest distillers of premium Scotch liquor. Based on some economists’ definition of the relevant market, the two firms proposing to merge enjoyed a combined market share of about two-thirds, while another firm essentially controlled the remaining share of the market. Additionally, suppose that the (wholesale) market elasticity of demand for Scotch liquor is –1.3 and that it costs $16.20 to produce and distribute each liter of Scotch. Based only on these data, provide quantitative estimates of the likely pre- and postmerger prices in the wholesale market for premium Scotch liquor. In light of your estimates, are you surprised that the EU might raise concerns about potential anticompetitive effects of the proposed merger? Explain carefully.
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A monopolist earns $70 million annually and will maintain that level of profit indefinitely, provided that no other firm enters the market. However, if another firm enters the market, the monopolist will earn $70 million in the current period and $32 million annually thereafter. The opportunity cost of funds is 12 percent, and profits in each period are realized at the beginning of each period.a. What is the present value of the monopolist’s current and future earnings if entry occurs? Note:- Do not provide handwritten solution. Maintain accuracy and quality in your answer. Take care of plagiarism. Answer completely. You will get up vote for sure.