Municipal Energy, each produce suppose two utilities, Peoples Electric pollution per year. The government has a goal of eliminating half the pollutio nd, in turn, provides 150 pollution permits to each utility. A pollution permit is required to legally produce a ton of pollution. However, the two utilities are allowed to rade permits. Suppose the cost of eliminating one ton of pollution for People's Electric is $100 and the cost of eliminating a ton of pollution for Municipal Energy is $150. The total cost of each utility eliminating 150 tons of pollution is $ (Enter your response as a whole number.) the two utilities buy and sell permits with each other, then the minimum cost of eliminating 300 tons of pollution is $. (Enter your response as a whole number.)

Municipal Energy, each produce suppose two utilities, Peoples Electric pollution per year. The government has a goal of eliminating half the pollutio nd, in turn, provides 150 pollution permits to each utility. A pollution permit is required to legally produce a ton of pollution. However, the two utilities are allowed to rade permits. Suppose the cost of eliminating one ton of pollution for People's Electric is $100 and the cost of eliminating a ton of pollution for Municipal Energy is $150. The total cost of each utility eliminating 150 tons of pollution is $ (Enter your response as a whole number.) the two utilities buy and sell permits with each other, then the minimum cost of eliminating 300 tons of pollution is $. (Enter your response as a whole number.)

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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