ns more than the cartel amount, I can increase my profit even though her profit goes down. I will do that starting tomorrow." usashi implements his new plan, the price of water 's profit becomes $ to per gallon. Given Rina and Musashi's productic and Rina's profit becomes $ e Musashi has deviated from the cartel agreement and increased his output of water to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount, Rina de e will also increase her production to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount. na increases her production, Musashi's profit becomes $ Rina's profit becomes $ , and total profit (the fits of Musashi and Rina) is now $ False: Based on the fact that both Musashi and Rina increased production from the initial cartel quantity, you know that the output effe than the price effect at that quantity. O True O False nat Musashi and Rina started by behaving cooperatively. However, once Musashi decided to cheat, Rina decided to cheat as well. In other output decisions are based on Musashi's actions.

Principles of Economics, 7th Edition (MindTap Course List)
7th Edition
ISBN:9781285165875
Author:N. Gregory Mankiw
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Chapter15: Monopoly
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 7PA
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Suppose that Musashi and Rina have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopoly price and sell half of the monopoly
quantity. Then one night before going to sleep, Musashi says to himself, "Rina and I aren't the best of friends anyway. If I increase my production to
35 gallons more than the cartel amount, I can increase my profit even though her profit goes down. I will do that starting tomorrow."
After Musashi implements his new plan, the price of water
to $
per gallon. Given Rina and Musashi's production levels,
Musashi's profit becomes $
and Rina's profit becomes $
Because Musashi has deviated from the cartel agreement and increased his output of water to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount, Rina decides
that she will also increase her production to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount.
After Rina increases her production, Musashi's profit becomes $
Rina's profit becomes $
and total profit (the sum of
the profits of Musashi and Rina) is now $
True or False: Based on the fact that both Musashi and Rina increased production from the initial cartel quantity, you know that the output effect was
smaller than the price effect at that quantity.
O True
False
Note that Musashi and Rina started by behaving cooperatively. However, once Musashi decided to cheat, Rina decided to cheat as well. In other words,
Rina's output decisions are based on Musashi's actions.
This behavior is an example of
Transcribed Image Text:Suppose that Musashi and Rina have been successfully operating as a cartel. They each charge the monopoly price and sell half of the monopoly quantity. Then one night before going to sleep, Musashi says to himself, "Rina and I aren't the best of friends anyway. If I increase my production to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount, I can increase my profit even though her profit goes down. I will do that starting tomorrow." After Musashi implements his new plan, the price of water to $ per gallon. Given Rina and Musashi's production levels, Musashi's profit becomes $ and Rina's profit becomes $ Because Musashi has deviated from the cartel agreement and increased his output of water to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount, Rina decides that she will also increase her production to 35 gallons more than the cartel amount. After Rina increases her production, Musashi's profit becomes $ Rina's profit becomes $ and total profit (the sum of the profits of Musashi and Rina) is now $ True or False: Based on the fact that both Musashi and Rina increased production from the initial cartel quantity, you know that the output effect was smaller than the price effect at that quantity. O True False Note that Musashi and Rina started by behaving cooperatively. However, once Musashi decided to cheat, Rina decided to cheat as well. In other words, Rina's output decisions are based on Musashi's actions. This behavior is an example of
3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement
Consider a town in which only two residents, Musashi and Rina, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Musashi and Rina can pump and sell as
much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water.
Price
Quantity Demanded
Total Revenue
(Dollars per gallon)
(Gallons of water)
(Dollars)
3.60
3.30
35
$115.50
3.00
70
$210.00
2.70
105
$283.50
2.40
140
$336.00
2.10
175
$367.50
1.80
210
$378.00
1.50
245
$367.50
1.20
280
$336.00
0.90
315
$283.50
0.60
350
$210.00
0.30
385
$115.50
420
Suppose Musashi and Rina form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $
per gallon, and the total output
is
gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Musashi and Rina agree to split production equally. Therefore, Musashi's profit is
%2$
, and Rina's profit is $
Transcribed Image Text:3. Breakdown of a cartel agreement Consider a town in which only two residents, Musashi and Rina, own wells that produce water safe for drinking. Musashi and Rina can pump and sell as much water as they want at no cost. For them, total revenue equals profit. The following table shows the town's demand schedule for water. Price Quantity Demanded Total Revenue (Dollars per gallon) (Gallons of water) (Dollars) 3.60 3.30 35 $115.50 3.00 70 $210.00 2.70 105 $283.50 2.40 140 $336.00 2.10 175 $367.50 1.80 210 $378.00 1.50 245 $367.50 1.20 280 $336.00 0.90 315 $283.50 0.60 350 $210.00 0.30 385 $115.50 420 Suppose Musashi and Rina form a cartel and behave as a monopolist. The profit-maximizing price is $ per gallon, and the total output is gallons. As part of their cartel agreement, Musashi and Rina agree to split production equally. Therefore, Musashi's profit is %2$ , and Rina's profit is $
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