Problem 5 Consider an exchange economy with two people: Will and Bob; and two goods: apples and bananas. Will's initial endowment is 10 apples and 5 bananas. Bob's initial endowment is 5 apples and 10 bananas. Will likes apples and hates bananas. Bob likes both apples and bananas. The preferences of both Will and Bob are strictly convex. (a) Draw an Edgeworth Box with apples on the horizontal axes. Put Will at the bottom left corner and Bob at the top right corner. Show the initial endowment and label it with W.

Problem 5 Consider an exchange economy with two people: Will and Bob; and two goods: apples and bananas. Will's initial endowment is 10 apples and 5 bananas. Bob's initial endowment is 5 apples and 10 bananas. Will likes apples and hates bananas. Bob likes both apples and bananas. The preferences of both Will and Bob are strictly convex. (a) Draw an Edgeworth Box with apples on the horizontal axes. Put Will at the bottom left corner and Bob at the top right corner. Show the initial endowment and label it with W.

Principles of Microeconomics

7th Edition

ISBN:9781305156050

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8PA

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A husband and wife would produce incomes Yh and Yw in their fallback situations. The utility each derives in any circumstance is just equal to his or her consumption expenditure in that circumstance. In their fallback situations, their consumption expenditure levels are just equal to their incomes. Thus their fallback levels of utility are Yh and Yw. If they cooperate, they produce Z>Yh + Yw. They engage in Nash cooperative bargaining to determine how to allocate Z across the consumption of the husband, Ch, and consumption of the wife, Cw, subject to the budget constraint that Ch + Cw = Z. Under any bargained allocation, the two would derive utilities of Ch and Cw. a) The surplus associated with cooperation is S = Z − Yh − Yw. Show that each spouse consumes his or her fallback income plus half the surplus in the Nash cooperative bargaining solution. Please do fast ASAP fast please.
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