Q. 2. Consider the game of voters participation. Two candidates A (with two suporters) and B (with remaining three voters supporting him) compete. Voters have the option of voting for the preferred candidate or abstain. If a voter decides to vote then her payoffs are 2-e, 1- c and - c if her preferred candidate wins, ties or loose respectively. Her payoffs are 2, 1 and 0 for the above outcomes if she abstains. Show that there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which both supporters ofA votes with probability p (0

Q. 2. Consider the game of voters participation. Two candidates A (with two suporters) and B (with remaining three voters supporting him) compete. Voters have the option of voting for the preferred candidate or abstain. If a voter decides to vote then her payoffs are 2-e, 1- c and - c if her preferred candidate wins, ties or loose respectively. Her payoffs are 2, 1 and 0 for the above outcomes if she abstains. Show that there is a mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in which both supporters ofA votes with probability p (0

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.9P

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