Q1) Player B secretly writes down one of the numbers (1,2,.9} and Player A tries to guess what it is with a cost of $1. If he guesses correctly, Player B pays him S10 and $8 for the odd and even numbers, respectively. If he doesn't guess correctly, he has no gain. Determine the optimal strategies of both players and the value of the game.

Q1) Player B secretly writes down one of the numbers (1,2,.9} and Player A tries to guess what it is with a cost of $1. If he guesses correctly, Player B pays him S10 and $8 for the odd and even numbers, respectively. If he doesn't guess correctly, he has no gain. Determine the optimal strategies of both players and the value of the game.

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter17: Making Decisions With Uncertainty

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 17.5IP

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