Q4. If the cost expended in an intervention is 160m, cost saved due to averted diseases is 35m, cost saved due to productivity lost averted is 23m, outcome of health intervention is 65 and outcome of health without intervention is 24. Determine; i. Cost effectiveness ratio ii. Cost saved iii. Net health outcome iv. Net cost

Q4. If the cost expended in an intervention is 160m, cost saved due to averted diseases is 35m, cost saved due to productivity lost averted is 23m, outcome of health intervention is 65 and outcome of health without intervention is 24. Determine; i. Cost effectiveness ratio ii. Cost saved iii. Net health outcome iv. Net cost

EBK HEALTH ECONOMICS AND POLICY

7th Edition

ISBN:9781337668279

Author:Henderson

Publisher:Henderson

Chapter4: Economic Evaluation In Health Care

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 5QAP

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Consider the following steps Celia chooses how much care, x ∈ [0,1], to take in programming her robot. This effort costs her x^2/2. Nature chooses whether the robot steps on Peter’s pet salamander, leading to emotional harm to Peter of H > 0 (with probability 1 - x). If the robot does step on the salamander then there is a chance of π that Celia will be identified as the culprit. If there is no accident (the salamander is not stepped on), then Celia’s payoff is V - x^2/2. Peter and Luke both get zero. If there is an accident, but Celia is identified as the culprit, then Celia gets V - x^2/2. Peter gets -H. Luke gets zero. If there is an accident, and Celia is identified as the culprit, then Like (the judge) decides a level of compensation D ∈ R+ for Celia to pay Peter. Celia gets V - x^2/2 - D. Peter gets D - H. Luke gets −(βH - D)^2. b) Write down Celia's expected payoff when she chooses x in step 1.