Question 2 (Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium Consider the following sequential game of imperfect information. E 5,5 P2 (c) soning. T 0,6 P1 L P2 B ( 6,0 R 2,0 P2 I P1 T e 1,1 5,1 b 0,2 P2 P2 A' R 0,0 P1 B' { 0,0 P2 1,5 (a) How many information sets does this game have? What constitutes a strategy in a sequential game of imperfect information? (b) Find all the pure strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of this game. Remember to write them down properly. Could this game support a SPNE in mixed strategies? Explain your rea- (d) Suppose this game were a game of perfect information. What would the game tree look like? What would be the SPNE outcome?
Question 2 (Subgame-Perfect Nash Equilibrium Consider the following sequential game of imperfect information. E 5,5 P2 (c) soning. T 0,6 P1 L P2 B ( 6,0 R 2,0 P2 I P1 T e 1,1 5,1 b 0,2 P2 P2 A' R 0,0 P1 B' { 0,0 P2 1,5 (a) How many information sets does this game have? What constitutes a strategy in a sequential game of imperfect information? (b) Find all the pure strategy subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of this game. Remember to write them down properly. Could this game support a SPNE in mixed strategies? Explain your rea- (d) Suppose this game were a game of perfect information. What would the game tree look like? What would be the SPNE outcome?
Chapter8: Game Theory
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 8.1P
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