Samsung wants to prevent Whirlpool from entering the market for high-priced, front-load washing machines. Front-load washing machines clean clothes better and use lesser water than conventional top-load machines. Even though front-load machines are more costly to manufacture than top-loaders, Samsung is nonetheless earning economic profit as the only firm making front-loaders for upscale consumers. Plan the appropriate strategic moves that can be applied by Samsung in order to deter Whirlpool from entering the market of front-load washing machines.

Samsung wants to prevent Whirlpool from entering the market for high-priced, front-load washing machines. Front-load washing machines clean clothes better and use lesser water than conventional top-load machines. Even though front-load machines are more costly to manufacture than top-loaders, Samsung is nonetheless earning economic profit as the only firm making front-loaders for upscale consumers. Plan the appropriate strategic moves that can be applied by Samsung in order to deter Whirlpool from entering the market of front-load washing machines.

Managerial Economics: Applications, Strategies and Tactics (MindTap Course List)

14th Edition

ISBN:9781305506381

Author:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Publisher:James R. McGuigan, R. Charles Moyer, Frederick H.deB. Harris

Chapter16: Government Regulation

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 11E

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Assume Waterland and Aquataste make a nonbinding, informal agreement that each will produce 250 gallons of water, charge $1.50 per gallon, and evenly split the profit of $750. If Aquataste sticks to the agreement, Waterland has an incentive to renege on the agreement by producing 350 gallons because Waterland’s profits would then increase from $375 to $______ . (Provide your answer to two decimal places.)
Assume Waterland and Aquataste make a nonbinding, informal agreement that each will produce 250 gallons of water, charge $1.50 per gallon, and evenly split the profit of $750. If Aquataste reneges on the agreement and produces 350 gallons, Waterland has an incentive to renege on the agreement by producing 350 gallons because Waterland’s profits would increase to $_____ , which is better than the $312.50 Waterland would earn by sticking with the agreement. (Provide your answer to two decimal places.)
Suppose that the pricing strategies for FiberOne and of Starlink are shown in the table below. They have to decide whether to charge a high or low price for their internet service. The four pairs of payoff values show what each company expects to earn or lose in millions of dollars, depending on what the other company does.FiberOne’s Price StrategyStarlink’s Price StrategyHigh Price Low PriceHigh Price Starlink+$200 FiberOne +$200 Starlink+$500 FiberOne - $100Low Price Starlink-$100 FiberOne + 500 Starlink+$100 FiberOne +$100If it’s expected that the incomes of people living in rural Nigeria is expected to increase, what will the equilibrium outcome be, ceteris paribus?a) a) Starlink will charge a low price; FiberOne will charge a high price.b) b) Starlink will charge a high price; FiberOne will charge a low price.c) c) Both Starlink and FiberOne will charge a low price.d) d) Both Starlink and FiberOne will charge a high price.
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The figure below shows the market conditions facing two firms, Brooks, Inc., and Spring, Inc., in the domestic market for large utility pumps. Each firm has constant long-run costs, so that MC0 = AC0. As competitors in a duopoly, there are a number of models to determine output and prices. Assume that the Bertrand duopoly model applies, so that they both set price equal to their marginal cost. Initial output in this market will be 16,000 per year (this is split between the two firms), at a price of $300. (a) At the initial equilibrium, what is total surplus (consumer surplus plus producer surplus)? Suppose that Brooks, Inc. and Spring, Inc. form a joint venture, River Company, whose utility pumps replace the output sold by the parent companies in the domestic market. Assuming that River Company operates as a monopolist and that its costs equal MC0 = AC0, what is: (b) The price? (c) The output? (d) Total profit? (e) The resulting deadweight loss from River Company operating as a…
The figure below shows the market conditions facing two firms, Brooks, Inc., and Spring, Inc., in the domestic market for large utility pumps. Each firm has constant long-run costs, so that MC0 = AC0. As competitors in a duopoly, there are a number of models to determine output and prices. Assume that the Bertrand duopoly model applies, so that they both set price equal to their marginal cost. Initial output in this market will be 16,000 per year (this is split between the two firms), at a price of $300. Suppose that Brooks, Inc. and Spring, Inc. form a joint venture, River Company, whose utility pumps replace the output sold by the parent companies in the domestic market. Assuming that River Company operates as a monopolist and that its costs equal MC0 = AC0, what is: (b) The price?
The figure below shows the market conditions facing two firms, Brooks, Inc., and Spring, Inc., in the domestic market for large utility pumps. Each firm has constant long-run costs, so that MC0 = AC0. As competitors in a duopoly, there are a number of models to determine output and prices. Assume that the Bertrand duopoly model applies, so that they both set price equal to their marginal cost. Initial output in this market will be 16,000 per year (this is split between the two firms), at a price of $300. Suppose that Brooks, Inc. and Spring, Inc. form a joint venture, River Company, whose utility pumps replace the output sold by the parent companies in the domestic market. Assuming that River Company operates as a monopolist and that its costs equal MC0 = AC0, what is: (e) The resulting deadweight loss from River Company operating as a monopoly?
The figure below shows the market conditions facing two firms, Brooks, Inc., and Spring, Inc., in the domestic market for large utility pumps. Each firm has constant long-run costs, so that MC0 = AC0. As competitors in a duopoly, there are a number of models to determine output and prices. Assume that the Bertrand duopoly model applies, so that they both set price equal to their marginal cost. Initial output in this market will be 16,000 per year (this is split between the two firms), at a price of $300. Suppose that Brooks, Inc. and Spring, Inc. form a joint venture, River Company, whose utility pumps replace the output sold by the parent companies in the domestic market. Assuming that River Company operates as a monopolist and that its costs equal MC0 = AC0, what is: (c) The output? (d) Total profit?
Table 17-6 Two home - improvement stores (Lopes and HomeMax) in a growing urban area are interested in expanding their market share. Both are interested in expanding the size of their store and parking lot to accommodate potential growth in their customer base. The following game depicts the strategic outcomes that result from the game. Increases in annual profits (in millions of dollars) of the two home - improvement stores are shown in the following figure. Refer to Table 17-6. Increasing the size of its store and parking lot is a dominant strategy for Question 8 options: Lopes, but not for HomeMax. HomeMax, but not for Lopes. both stores. neither store.
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Assuming there are two companies selling personal computers,Company Jackfruit Computers and Company Mangoes Computer. They both have an inventory of personal computers that they would like to sell before a new generation of faster, cheaper machines is introduced. The question facing each competitor is whether or not they should widely advertise a “close out” sale on these discontinued items, or instead let excess inventory work itself off over the next few months. The net revenue to each firm in millions of $, is depicted in the payoff matrixbelow: Mangoes Jackfruit Advertise Don’t advertise Advertise M: $5 J: $5 M: $2 J: $20 Don’t advertise M: $20 J: $2 M: $10 J: $10 1. Determine the dominant strategy for each firm 2. Would collusion work in this case? Explain.