Determine if it is a fixed ratio , variable ratio schedule , fixed interval schedule,variable interval schedule. SCENARIO 3• A weekly paycheck. The employee receives reinforcement every seven days, which mayresult in a higher response rate as payday approaches.Fixed RatioVariable-RatioFixed-IntervalVariable-IntervalSCENARIO 4Typically, you check your email at random times throughout the day instead of checkingevery time a single message is delivered. The thing about email is that in most cases, younever know when you are going to receive a message. Because of this, emails roll insporadically at completely unpredictable times. When you check and see that you havereceived a message, it acts as a reinforcer for checking your email.

Fixed interval If the employee is getting a paycheck every seven days of interval and employees…

SCENARIO 3 A weekly paycheck. The employee receives reinforcement every seven days, which may result in a higher response rate as payday approaches. Fixed Ratio Variable-Ratio Fixed-Interval Variable-Interval

SCENARIO 3 A weekly paycheck. The employee receives reinforcement every seven days, which may result in a higher response rate as payday approaches. Fixed Ratio Variable-Ratio Fixed-Interval Variable-Interval

Microeconomics: Private and Public Choice (MindTap Course List)

16th Edition

ISBN:9781305506893

Author:James D. Gwartney, Richard L. Stroup, Russell S. Sobel, David A. Macpherson

Publisher:James D. Gwartney, Richard L. Stroup, Russell S. Sobel, David A. Macpherson

Chapter14: Investment, The Capital Market, And The Wealth Of Nations

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 10CQ

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