See page 561 02 Question John and Daniel greatly enjoy each other's company but have different tastes regarding the best form of entertainment. John prefers the lowbrow entertainment of professional wrestling that disgusts Daniel. Meanwhile, Daniel likes highbrow opera, which bores John. However, each finds it preferable to spend the evening together rather than disagree about what to do and end up staying home angry. This interaction is modeled in the normal-form game below: Evening Entertainment John Part 1 Wrestling Opera Daniel Wrestling 12.00, 4.00 0,0 A. (wrestling, wrestling) B. (wrestling, opera) Part 2 Identify any pure strategy equilibria of this game. Choose one or more: Opera 0,0 6.00, 18.00 OC. (opera, wrestling) D. (opera, opera) OE. There are no pure strategy equilibria. Find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of this game. In it, John will choose wrestling with probability choose wrestling with probability (Give your answers to two decimal points.) See See Hil ,and Daniel will

See page 561 02 Question John and Daniel greatly enjoy each other's company but have different tastes regarding the best form of entertainment. John prefers the lowbrow entertainment of professional wrestling that disgusts Daniel. Meanwhile, Daniel likes highbrow opera, which bores John. However, each finds it preferable to spend the evening together rather than disagree about what to do and end up staying home angry. This interaction is modeled in the normal-form game below: Evening Entertainment John Part 1 Wrestling Opera Daniel Wrestling 12.00, 4.00 0,0 A. (wrestling, wrestling) B. (wrestling, opera) Part 2 Identify any pure strategy equilibria of this game. Choose one or more: Opera 0,0 6.00, 18.00 OC. (opera, wrestling) D. (opera, opera) OE. There are no pure strategy equilibria. Find the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of this game. In it, John will choose wrestling with probability choose wrestling with probability (Give your answers to two decimal points.) See See Hil ,and Daniel will

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.5P

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

. Find the Nash equilibrium of the following modified Rock-Paper-Scissors game: • When rock (R) beats scissors (S), the winner’s payoff is 10 and the loser’s payoff is −10. • When paper (P) beats rock, the winner’s payoff is 5 and the loser’s payoff is −5. • When scissors beats paper, the winner’s payoff is 2 and the loser’s payoff is −2. • In case of ties, both players receive 0 payoff. You are suposed to create a system of equations and then solve for them and find 3 probabilities- please show how to do that
Two farmers have unlimited access to a common plot of land and can let their cows graze on it. The matrix below shows the benefits they get from grazing either 1 or 2+ cows on the land. Farmer 2 Farmer1 1 cow 2+ cows 1 cow 8,8 2,10 2+cows 10,2 4,4 What kind of game is this? What is/are the Nash equilibrium/equilibria? What is/are the Pareto efficient outcome(s) in this game? (Hint: Remember that Pareto efficiency occurs when no one person can be made better off without someone else being made worse off) The government offers a reward or subsidy for communities where farmers only allow 1 cow to graze on the common field, resulting in a new payoff matrix:…
please discuss the separation eqilibrium in details 1. Assume that two players play the Tinder game. There are two types of potential boyfriends: the gentleman (25% of the population) and the douchebag (75% of the population), and they can decide on the different level of effort: low, medium, and high. For the first type, the respective costs are 30, 50, and 80. For the second type, the respective costs are 50, 75, and 120. For the potential boyfriend, the payoff from being in relationship is 130, and the payoff associated with being dumped is 70. The girl can get 60 if she stays single, 100 if she is in relationship with the gentleman, and 25 if she dates the douchebag (credits to Owen Sims) a) Present the game in the extensive form b) Calculate the expected pay-off for the girl. Should she date at all? c) Discuss whether the game has a separating equilibrium
Consider the following simultaneous move game where player 1 has two types. Player 2 does not know if he is playing with type a player 1 or type b player 1. Find the all the possible Bayesian Nash Equilibriums (BNE) of this game.
Consider the following game. There are two payers, Player 1 and Player 2. Player 1 chooses a row (10, 20, or 30), and Player 2 chooses a column (10/20/30). Payoffs are in the cells of the table, with those on the left going to Player 1 and those on the right going to player 2. For example, a payoff 100/200 would mean Player 1 receives 100 and Player 2 receives 200.What is [are] the Nash Equilibrium [Equilibria] of this game?A) (10/10) and (20/20)B) (30/30)C) (10/20) and (20/10)D) (20/20)E) (30/30)