Suppose a company offers a standard insurance contract with a premium (r) of $1,000 and a payout (q) of $8,000. Suppose that Rock earns a healthy state income of $50,000, asick state income of $20,000, and has a 12.5% chance of becoming ill.From this information, you can determine that the expected profit for the insurance company is likely:negativezerox positive

Insurance is a financial arrangement or contract where an individual or element (the policyholder)…

Answered: Suppose a company offers a standard…

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter18: Asymmetric Information

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 18.5P

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Suppose the equilibrium price for good quality used cars is $20,000. And the equilibrium price for poor quality used cars is $10,000. Assume a potential used car buyer has imperfect information as to the condition of any given used car. Assume this potential buyer believes the probability a given used car is good quality is .60 and the probability a given used car is low quality is .40. Assume the seller has perfect information on all cars in inventory. If the seller sells the buyer a poor quality car, what is the net-benefit to the seller? a. A net gain of $6,000. b. A net loss of $20,000. c. A net loss of $6,000. d. A net gain of $10,000.
Priyanka has an income of £90,000 and is a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximiser with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index . There is a 1 % probability that there is flooding damage at her house. The repair of the damage would cost £80,000 which would reduce the income to £10,000. Priyanka has an income of £90,000 and is a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximiser with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index . There is a 1 % probability that there is flooding damage at her house. The repair of the damage would cost £80,000 which would reduce the income to £10,000. What would be the highest price (premium) that she would be willing to pay for an insurance policy that fully insures her against the flooding damage?
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John wants to buy a used car. He knows that there are two types of car in the market, plums and lemons. Lemons are worse quality cars and are more likely to break down than plums. John is willing to pay £10, 000 for a plum and £2, 000 for a lemon. Unfortunately, however, he cannot distinguish between the two types. Sellers can offer a warranty that would cover the full cost of any repair needed by the car for y ∗ years. Considering the type and likelihood of problems their cars can have, owners of plums estimate that y years of guarantee would cost them 1000y, owners of lemons estimate that the cost would be 2000y. John knows these estimates and decides to offer £10, 000 if a car comes with y ∗ years of warranty, £2, 000 if a car comes without warranty. For which values of y ∗ is there a separating equilibrium where only owners of plums are willing to offer the y ∗ -years warranty? Clearly explain your reasoning.
You need to hire some new employees to staff your startup venture. You know that potential employees are distributed throughout the population as follows, but you can't distinguish among them: Employee Value Probability $65,000 0.1 $78,000 0.1 $91,000 0.1 $104,000 0.1 $117,000 0.1 $130,000 0.1 $143,000 0.1 $156,000 0.1 $169,000 0.1 $182,000 0.1 The expected value of hiring one employee is. Suppose you set the salary of the position equal to the expected value of an employee. Assume that employees will not work for a salary below their employee value. The expected value of an employee who would apply for the position, at this salary, is. Given this adverse selection, your most reasonable salary offer (that ensures you do not lose money) is (A. 65,000, B. 91,000, C. 78,000, D. 104,000)
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Solve the following problem using an excel spreadsheet. A tobacco company isinterested in hiring a salesperson to promote smoking cigarettes in nightclubs. The position pays a flat salary of $50,000, regardless of sales levels. The firm has two applicants, Predictable Patty and Risky Ricky. Predictable Patty can produce with 100% certainty $100,000 a year in sales. Risky Ricky, on the other hand, can produce $300,000 with probability of 50%. But if he turns out to spend his time drinking and dancing in the nightclubs instead of making sales, he could actually cost the firm -$100,000 per year.a) During their first year on the job, what are the expected sales of Patty and Ricky? What are the firm’s expected profits on each worker?b) Now assume both workers are currently 25, and they will work until the retirement age of 65. The firm has the option to fire its new employee after one year based on sales, but can only hire one employee. Assume that it takes only one year to discover whether…
Tess and Lex earn $40,000 per year and all earnings are spent on consumption (c). Tess and Lex both have the utility function c. Both could experience an adverse event that results in earnings of $0 per year. Tess has a 1% chance of experiencing an adverse event and Lex has a 12% chance of experiencing an adverse event. Tess and Lex are both aware of their risk of an adverse event. 1. Suppose the actuarially fair premium charge is 2600, Calculate Tess’ expected utility with full insurance if she is charged the premium. Round to two decimal places. 2. What is the premium that private insurance companies will charge for full insurance? Round to two decimal places. 3.Assume the social welfare function is the sum of the Tess’ and Lex’s utility functions. Select the correct statement regarding the explanation for what has happened in the private market and the role of social insurance. a.Adverse section has lead to market failure. The government could improve social welfare by…
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Priyanka has an income of £90,000 and is a von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utility maximiser with von Neumann-Morgenstern utility index u(x) = square root x . There is a 1 % probability that there is flooding damage at her house. The repair of the damage would cost £80,000 which would reduce the income to £10,000. a) Would Priyanka be willing to spend £500 to purchase an insurance policy that would fully insure her against this loss? Explain
Suppose that the probability of breaking a collar bone is p = .05 and the cost of breaking a collar bone is $1,000. What is the actuarially fair price for insurance against breaking your collarbone?
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