Suppose a municipality were considering a ban on sugary soft drinks. They estimate that 20% of the obesity in the city can be attributed to sugary soft drinks, and thus the ban would be expected to reduce obesity by 20%, citywide. Which measure corresponds to '20%? a. Odds ratio b. Population attributable proportion

Suppose a municipality were considering a ban on sugary soft drinks. They estimate that 20% of the obesity in the city can be attributed to sugary soft drinks, and thus the ban would be expected to reduce obesity by 20%, citywide. Which measure corresponds to '20%? a. Odds ratio b. Population attributable proportion

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter18: Asymmetric Information

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 18.5P

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