Suppose R(q) = 4q − q2 is a function that describes the revenue an individual can earn. Obviously, revenue depends on quantity q. Further suppose that C(q) is a function that describes the cost associated with q. (a) Consider a private ownership scenario where the individual can maximize profits. Compute the optimal level of q.

Suppose R(q) = 4q − q2 is a function that describes the revenue an individual can earn. Obviously, revenue depends on quantity q. Further suppose that C(q) is a function that describes the cost associated with q. (a) Consider a private ownership scenario where the individual can maximize profits. Compute the optimal level of q.

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach

5th Edition

ISBN:9781337106665

Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor

Chapter16: Bargaining

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 2MC

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Suppose R(q) = 4q − q2 is a function that describes the revenue an individual can earn. Obviously, revenue depends on quantity q. Further suppose that C(q) is a function that describes the cost associated with q.(a) Consider a private ownership scenario where the individual can maximize profits. Compute the optimal level of q.(b) Now consider a scenario where the individual is unable to maximize profits due a lack of private ownership. In fact, nothing is private and all resources are public and shared by all. Compute the appropriate level of q the individual chooses now.(c) Graph your solution from (a) and (b) Note:- Do not provide handwritten solution. Maintain accuracy and quality in your answer. Take care of plagiarism. Answer completely. You will get up vote for sure.
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Sean is a community college student and has been saving his tips from his job waiting tables at a restaurant for months to see Hamilton. He is willing to pay $705 for a ticket. Anca has seen Hamilton five times already, but wants to see it again before heading to Europe for a month. She is willing to pay $1,250 for a ticket. There is one ticket left, and the seller is charging $700. Does Sean or Anca buying the ticket lead to a more economically efficient outcome?