Suppose that speeding imposes externalities on other people resulting in a social cost of $50. A town is considering hiring an extra police officer to give out speeding tickets. If we want to maximize social welfare (absent enforcement costs), which of the following statements are true? (Assume risk neutral drivers.) a) If the probability of detection with the extra police officer is 10%, then a speeding ticket should cost $55. b) If the probability of detection with the extra police officer is 10%, then a speeding ticket should cost $500. If the probability of detection with the extra police officer is 100%, then no one c) will speed. d) If the probability of detection with the extra police officer is 90%, then a speeding ticket should cost $59 e) None of the above

Suppose that speeding imposes externalities on other people resulting in a social cost of $50. A town is considering hiring an extra police officer to give out speeding tickets. If we want to maximize social welfare (absent enforcement costs), which of the following statements are true? (Assume risk neutral drivers.) a) If the probability of detection with the extra police officer is 10%, then a speeding ticket should cost $55. b) If the probability of detection with the extra police officer is 10%, then a speeding ticket should cost $500. If the probability of detection with the extra police officer is 100%, then no one c) will speed. d) If the probability of detection with the extra police officer is 90%, then a speeding ticket should cost $59 e) None of the above

Principles of Economics, 7th Edition (MindTap Course List)

7th Edition

ISBN:9781285165875

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 6PA

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#3. Hannah gets 50 utils from visiting her family for Thanksgiving. But there is a 1% chance that she will get the coronavirus from them. If she gets the coronavirus, her utility is -6000 utils. Her total utility would be -5950 (i.e. 50 – 6000). She gets 0 utils from staying healthy (total utility = 50 + 0 = 50). If Hannah doesn't visit her family for Thanksgiving, then she gets -25 utils from eating turkey cold cuts alone in front of the TV. In that case, there is no risk of getting sick. What will Hannah do? a. Visit her family for Thanksgiving b. Not visit her family for Thanksgiving c. Visit her family if she is risk-loving, not visit if she is risk-averse d. Visit her family if she is risk-averse, not visit if she is risk-loving
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