Suppose there are 100 farmers each with 10 acres that overlie a common groundwater aquifer. They all have identical farmland that is more productive if wells are used to pump the groundwater for irrigation. They all face a marginal cost of $10 per well. The average productivity (in $ of crop output) of the wells of the common aquifer is given by AP = 100 – W where W is the number of wells drilled into the aquifer. 1a. Assume farmers act on their own how many wells will be drilled and how much rent will the aquifer generate. A. 45; 2025 B. 90; 2025 C. 60; 1000 D. 90; 0 E. 45; 0 F. None of the above

Suppose there are 100 farmers each with 10 acres that overlie a common groundwater aquifer. They all have identical farmland that is more productive if wells are used to pump the groundwater for irrigation. They all face a marginal cost of $10 per well. The average productivity (in $ of crop output) of the wells of the common aquifer is given by AP = 100 – W where W is the number of wells drilled into the aquifer. 1a. Assume farmers act on their own how many wells will be drilled and how much rent will the aquifer generate. A. 45; 2025 B. 90; 2025 C. 60; 1000 D. 90; 0 E. 45; 0 F. None of the above

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter19: Externalities And Public Goods

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 19.3P

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