Suppose US Air has two classes of potential customers, holiday travellers and business travellers. There are 100 of each type of customer. Willingness to pay - Holiday travellers Willingness to pay - Business travellers Marginal cost per passenger Economy class $200 $250 $100 Business class $250 $800 $150 If US Air it can provide only one class of travel at one price, then the profit maximising class of travel is [Select] , charging a price of [Select]

Suppose US Air has two classes of potential customers, holiday travellers and business travellers. There are 100 of each type of customer. Willingness to pay - Holiday travellers Willingness to pay - Business travellers Marginal cost per passenger Economy class $200 $250 $100 Business class $250 $800 $150 If US Air it can provide only one class of travel at one price, then the profit maximising class of travel is [Select] , charging a price of [Select]

Essentials of Economics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781337091992

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter7: Consumers, Producers, And The Efficiency Of Markets

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 10PA: A friend of yours is considering two cell phone service providers. Provider A charges 120 per month...

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