The following table shows how three voters ranked Policy A, Policy B, and Policy C. Which policy is preferred by themajority?Voter 1Voter 2Voter 3Policy APolicy BPolicy CFirst ChoicePolicy BPolicy CPolicy APolicy CPolicy APolicy BSecond ChoiceThird ChoiceSelect the correct answer below:O Policy BO Policy Cone policy is not preferred by the majorityO Policy A

The following table shows how three voters ranked Policy A, Policy B, and Policy C. Which policy is preferred by the majority? Voter 2 Policy B Policy C Policy A Voter 1 Voter 3 First Choice Second Choice Policy A Policy B Policy C Policy C Policy A Policy B Third Choice Select the correct answer below: Policy B Policy C one policy is not preferred by the majority Policy A

The following table shows how three voters ranked Policy A, Policy B, and Policy C. Which policy is preferred by the majority? Voter 2 Policy B Policy C Policy A Voter 1 Voter 3 First Choice Second Choice Policy A Policy B Policy C Policy C Policy A Policy B Third Choice Select the correct answer below: Policy B Policy C one policy is not preferred by the majority Policy A

Principles of Microeconomics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781305971493

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 7PA

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4.10. A social choice function satisfies the weak Pareto criterion if,whenever every voter places one candidate above another, say rankingcandidate A over candidate B, then candidate B cannot be the uniquewinner. (This differs from the Pareto property owing to the words “theunique”.)(a) Explain why any method that satisfies Pareto also satisfies weakPareto.(b) Explain why the antiplurality method satisfies weak Pareto.(c) Explain why the agenda method violates weak Pareto.
4.1. The vote-for-two method works as follows: Candidates get apoint whenever a voter ranks them first or second. The candidate withthe most points is declared to be the winner (or if several candidates tiefor the most points, they are all declared to be winners).(a) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the Condorcet criterion?(b) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the anti-Condorcet criterion?(c) Does the vote-for-two method satisfy the Pareto property?(d) Is the vote-for-two method independent?
Answers to all 4 partsAssume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-rightspectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the mostright leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jonesin an upcoming election.Assuming the following voter preferences:Voter ID Preference (1-9)A 4B 5C 6A. True/False Explain: If the median voter theorem holds, candidates Smith and Jones willeither both adopt preference 5 OR one will adopt preference 4 while the other adoptspreference 6.B. Suppose the electorate becomes more polarized; A moves from 4 to 1 while C moves from 6to 9. B remains at 5. How does the median voter model predict candidates Smith and Joneswill change their preference?C. Keeping the assumptions from…
Assume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-right spectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the most right leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jones in an upcoming election. Assuming the following voter preferences: True/False Explain: If the median voter theorem holds, candidates Smith and Jones will either both adopt preference 5 OR one will adopt preference 4 while the other adopts preference 6. B. Suppose the electorate becomes more polarized; A moves from 4 to 1 while C moves from 6 to 9. B remains at 4. How does the median voter model predict candidates Smith and Jones will change their preference? C. Keeping the assumptions from B, how does the election result change if a tax on non-voters doubles the number of voters while preserving the distribution of preferences? D. If the tax in C induces 100% compliance (everyone votes), did this tax…
Answer to Part AAssume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-right spectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the most right leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jonesin an upcoming election.Assuming the following voter preferences:Voter ID Preference (1-9)A 4B 5C 6A. True/False Explain: If the median voter theorem holds, candidates Smithand Jones will either both adopt preference 5 OR one will adopt preference 4 while the other adopts preference 6.
Political Economy Assume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-right spectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the most right leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jones in an upcoming election. Voter Id Preference(1-9) A 4 B 5 C 6 True/False Explain: If the median voter theorem holds, candidates Smith and Jones will either both adopt preference 5 OR one will adopt preference 4 while the other adopts preference 6. Suppose the electorate becomes more polarized; A moves from 4 to 1 while C moves from 6 to 9. B remains at 5. How does the median voter model predict candidates Smith and Jones will change their preference? Keeping the assumptions from B, how does the election result change if a tax on non-voters doubles the number of voters while preserving the distribution of preferences? If the tax in C induces 100%…
Political Economy Assume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-right spectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the most right leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jones in an upcoming election. Voter Id Preference(1-9) A 4 B 5 C 6 True/False Explain: If the median voter theorem holds, candidates Smith and Jones will either both adopt preference 5 OR one will adopt preference 4 while the other adopts preference 6. Suppose the electorate becomes more polarized; A moves from 4 to 1 while C moves from 6 to 9. B remains at 5. How does the median voter model predict candidates Smith and Jones will change their preference? Keeping the assumptions from B, how does the election result change if a tax on non-voters doubles the number of voters while preserving the distribution of preferences? If the tax in C induces 100%…
Political Economy Assume there are three voters: A, B and C. Voter preferences can be ranked along a left-to-right spectrum that ranges from 1-9; 1 being the most left leaning preference and 9 being the most right leaning preference. Suppose these voters will choose between candidates Smith and Jones in an upcoming election. Voter Id Preference(1-9) A 4 B 5 C 6 True/False Explain: If the median voter theorem holds, candidates Smith and Jones will either both adopt preference 5 OR one will adopt preference 4 while the other adopts preference 6. B) Suppose the electorate becomes more polarized; A moves from 4 to 1 while C moves from 6 to 9. B remains at 5. How does the median voter model predict candidates Smith and Jones will change their preference? C) Keeping the assumptions from B, how does the election result change if a tax on non-voters doubles the number of voters while preserving the distribution of preferences? D) If the tax in C induces…
2.9. The following informal descriptions of voting methods do not represent social choice functions as we have defined them. Explain why not.(a) (Mini-quota) Any candidate with at least 25% of the votes is declareda winner.(b) (Approval voting) Every voter answers a yes-or-no question abouteach candidate: “Is she acceptable?” Whichever candidate is acceptable to the most voters is declared the winner.(c) (Copeland without ties) The winners of the Copeland method become our finalists. If there is more than one finalist, the tie is resolvedby drawing straws.(d) (Condorcet candidate) Pick the candidate who defeats each of theother candidates in a head-to-head election
Based on the theory of rational ignorance, what should we expect to happen to voter turnout as the internet makes information easier to obtain?
1.17. Jones and Smith are running for public office. There are 99 voters.(a) Suppose the rules say that Jones wins if she receives 50 or morevotes; otherwise Smith wins. Is this method neutral?(b) Suppose the rules say that a candidate wins if he or she receivesa number of votes that is between 60 and 89. (If neither candidategets a winning number of votes, then the election is a tie.) Is thismethod monotone?(c) Suppose the rules say that a candidate wins if he or she receives anodd number of votes. (If neither candidate gets a winning numberof votes, then the election is a tie.) Is this method decisive?(d) Suppose that the rules say that Smith wins the election no matterwhat. Is this method anonymous?
4.12. A social choice function satisfies the bottom criterion if, whenever a candidate is not at the bottom of the preference list of any voter,that candidate is a winner.(a) Does the plurality method satisfy the bottom criterion?(b) Does the antiplurality method satisfy the bottom criterion?(c) Explain why it is impossible for a social choice function with three ormore candidates to satisfy both the bottom criterion and the Paretocriterion.