There are 80 firms of type A and 60 firms of type B in a perfectly competitive market. On one hand, type A firm faces a fixed cost (all sunk) of $12 and average variable cost is 2q. On the other hand type B firm faces a fixed cost (all sunk) of $100 and the variable cost is 3q. Market demand function is given by Q=1200-70P. Find the equilibrium quantity of a type A firm and its profit, respectively. q=4, profit-$4 q-2, profit=$4 Oq-3, profit=$6 q=5, profit-$23

There are 80 firms of type A and 60 firms of type B in a perfectly competitive market. On one hand, type A firm faces a fixed cost (all sunk) of $12 and average variable cost is 2q. On the other hand type B firm faces a fixed cost (all sunk) of $100 and the variable cost is 3q. Market demand function is given by Q=1200-70P. Find the equilibrium quantity of a type A firm and its profit, respectively. q=4, profit-$4 q-2, profit=$4 Oq-3, profit=$6 q=5, profit-$23

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter15: Imperfect Competition

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 15.4P

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