There is a monopolist manufacturer (e.g the car maker) in the wholesale market with the marginal cost at 40, MCM = 40 ( no fixed costs), and a monopolist retailer (e.g., the car dealer) in the retail market with the retail demand equation, p = 360-q. And they work separately from each other. First the manufacturer sets the wholesale price, w, in the wholesale market; second after observing the wholesale price w, the retailer will decide the retail price, p, in the retail market. Suppose now the manufacturer and the retailer still work separately from each other. Design a franchise contract so that (1) together they can achieve the total profit as in the integration case (Part II) and (2) it will make the manufacturer's profit triple the retailer's profit, i.e., \pi M = 3\pi R. (Q2 E). How to design this franchise contract?
There is a monopolist manufacturer (e.g the car maker) in the wholesale market with the marginal cost at 40, MCM = 40 ( no fixed costs), and a monopolist retailer (e.g., the car dealer) in the retail market with the retail demand equation, p = 360-q. And they work separately from each other. First the manufacturer sets the wholesale price, w, in the wholesale market; second after observing the wholesale price w, the retailer will decide the retail price, p, in the retail market. Suppose now the manufacturer and the retailer still work separately from each other. Design a franchise contract so that (1) together they can achieve the total profit as in the integration case (Part II) and (2) it will make the manufacturer's profit triple the retailer's profit, i.e., \pi M = 3\pi R. (Q2 E). How to design this franchise contract?
Chapter14: Monopoly
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 14.2P
Question
![There is a monopolist manufacturer (e.g
the car maker) in the wholesale market
with the marginal cost at 40, MCM = 40 (
no fixed costs), and a monopolist retailer
(e.g., the car dealer) in the retail market
with the retail demand equation, p
= 360-q. And they work separately
from each other. First the manufacturer
sets the wholesale price, w, in the
wholesale market; second after
observing the wholesale price w, the
retailer will decide the retail price, p, in
the retail market. Suppose now the
manufacturer and the retailer still work
separately from each other. Design a
franchise contract so that (1) together
they can achieve the total profit as in the
integration case (Part II) and (2) it will
make the manufacturer's profit triple the
retailer's profit, i.e., \pi M = 3\pi R. (Q2
E). How to design this franchise
contract?](/v2/_next/image?url=https%3A%2F%2Fcontent.bartleby.com%2Fqna-images%2Fquestion%2F59419ab1-a6d3-4478-b94c-6db0f2625ecb%2F0e7128b7-2914-4a12-b62c-699e29247262%2Floa1124_processed.jpeg&w=3840&q=75)
Transcribed Image Text:There is a monopolist manufacturer (e.g
the car maker) in the wholesale market
with the marginal cost at 40, MCM = 40 (
no fixed costs), and a monopolist retailer
(e.g., the car dealer) in the retail market
with the retail demand equation, p
= 360-q. And they work separately
from each other. First the manufacturer
sets the wholesale price, w, in the
wholesale market; second after
observing the wholesale price w, the
retailer will decide the retail price, p, in
the retail market. Suppose now the
manufacturer and the retailer still work
separately from each other. Design a
franchise contract so that (1) together
they can achieve the total profit as in the
integration case (Part II) and (2) it will
make the manufacturer's profit triple the
retailer's profit, i.e., \pi M = 3\pi R. (Q2
E). How to design this franchise
contract?
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