Two farmers Anil and Bala are each deciding how to deal with pest insects that destroy the crops they cultivate intheir adjacent fields. They have the choice of using either Integrated Pest Control (IPC) or Terminator (T). Thepayoffs for their choices in terms of tonnes of crop are shown in the diagram. Which of the following statements isincorrect?5Bala's payoffلنا21O0Select one:•1T.T23Anil's payoff4T.I5LI-Both use Integrated Pest Control (IPC)T.T-Both use TerminatorT, I-Anil uses Terminator, Bala uses IPCLT-Anil uses IPC Bala uses Terminatora. Pareto-efficiency does not necessarily mean that we should approve of it.b. (1, 1) Pareto-dominates (T, T).c. (1, 1) and (I, T) are Pareto-efficient.d. If Anil and Bala moving from (T, T) to (1, 1), there is Pareto-improvement as both farmers are better off.e. Pareto criterion tells us that (1, 1) is the best outcome as it is Pareto-efficient.

Pareto efficiency is a situation when no one can be made better off without making at least one…

Two farmers Anil and Bala are each deciding how to deal with pest insects that destroy the their adjacent fields. They have the choice of using either Integrated Pest Control (IPC) or Terminator (T). The payoffs for their choices in terms of tonnes of crop are shown in the diagram. Which of the following statements incorrect? Bala's payoff 4 3 2 1 a LT P TH T.T 2 3 Anil's payoff 4 T.I LI-Both use Integrated Pest Control (IPC) T.T-Both use Terminator TI-Anil uses Terminator, Bala uses IPC LT-Anil uses IPC, Bala uses Terminator Select one: • a. Pareto-efficiency does not necessarily mean that we should approve of it. b. (1, 1) Pareto-dominates (T, T). c. (1, 1) and (I, T) are Pareto-efficient. d. If Anil and Bala moving from (T, T) to (1, 1), there is Pareto-improvement as both farmers are better off. e. Pareto criterion tells us that (1, 1) is the best outcome as it is Pareto-efficient.

Two farmers Anil and Bala are each deciding how to deal with pest insects that destroy the their adjacent fields. They have the choice of using either Integrated Pest Control (IPC) or Terminator (T). The payoffs for their choices in terms of tonnes of crop are shown in the diagram. Which of the following statements incorrect? Bala's payoff 4 3 2 1 a LT P TH T.T 2 3 Anil's payoff 4 T.I LI-Both use Integrated Pest Control (IPC) T.T-Both use Terminator TI-Anil uses Terminator, Bala uses IPC LT-Anil uses IPC, Bala uses Terminator Select one: • a. Pareto-efficiency does not necessarily mean that we should approve of it. b. (1, 1) Pareto-dominates (T, T). c. (1, 1) and (I, T) are Pareto-efficient. d. If Anil and Bala moving from (T, T) to (1, 1), there is Pareto-improvement as both farmers are better off. e. Pareto criterion tells us that (1, 1) is the best outcome as it is Pareto-efficient.

Principles of Economics, 7th Edition (MindTap Course List)

7th Edition

ISBN:9781285165875

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 6PA

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

What are four responses to the claim that people should not behave in the way described in this chapter?
8. Two states, A and B, have signed an arms-control agreement. This agreementcommits them to refrain from building certain types of weapons. The agreement is supposed tohold for an indefinite length of time. However, A and B remain potential enemies who wouldprefer to be able to cheat and build more weapons than the other. The payoff table for A (player1, the row player) and B (player 2, the column player) in each period after signing thisagreement is below. a) First assume that each state uses Tit-for-Tat (TFT) as a strategy in this repeated game.The rate of return is r. For what values of r would it be worth it for player A to cheat bybuilding additional weapons just once against TFT? b) For what values of r would it be worth deviating from the agreement forever to buildweapons? c) Convert both values you found in parts a and b to the equivalent discount factor dusing the formula given in lecture and section. d) Use the answers you find to discuss the relationship between d and r:…
The prisoners' dilemma is a two-person game illus·trating thata. t he cooperative outcome could be worse for bothpeople than t he Nash equilibrium.b . even if the cooperative outcome is better than theNash equilibrium for one person, it might be worsefor the other.c. even if cooperation is better than the Nash equilibrium,each person might have an incentive not tocooperate.d . rational, seff·interested individuals will naturallyavoid the Nash equilibrium because it is worse forboth of them.
a Suppose you are given a choice between thefollowing options:A1: Win $30 for sureA2: 80% chance of winning $45 and 20% chance ofA2: winning nothing B1: 25% chance of winning $30B2: 20% chance of winning $45Most people prefer A1 to A2 and B2 to B1. Explainwhy this behavior violates the assumption that decisionmakers maximize expected utility.b Now suppose you play the following game: You havea 75% chance of winning nothing and a 25% chance ofplaying the second stage of the game. If you reach thesecond stage, you have a choice of two options (C1 andC2), but your choice must be made now, before youreach the second stage.C1: Win $30 for sureC2: 80% chance of winning $45 13.5 Bayes’ Rule and Decision Trees 767Most people choose C1 over C2 and B2 to B1 (from part(a)). Explain why this again violates the assumption ofexpected utility maximization. Tversky and Kahneman(1981) speculate that most people are attracted to thesure $30 in the second stage, even though the secondstage may never be…
2. Consider a game that game theory people refer to as the “ultimatum game.”We will refer to our two players as the “offerer” and the “decider”. How the gameworks is that the offerer proposes a way to split $1000 between the two players.While this could be done in a variety of ways, we will assume that the offerersonly has two possible proposals: Either a 50-50 split, or she offers the decider$50 and keeps the rest. The decider can either accept or reject the offer. If the offer is accepted, the money is split as proposed. If the offer is rejected, themoney spontaneously combusts and nobody gets anything. a) List the strategies for each player and write an extensive form version of thegame with payouts. b) List all the Nash equilibria of this game. c) Explain which, if any of the Nash equilibrium are not sub-game perfect. d) Write the game out in normal form and find the pure strategy Nashequilibrium. Explain how this matches with your answers to (b) and (c) . Alsoexplain why there…
1) What are the Nash equilibria? Which one is unreasonable/non-credible threat? 2) What are the subgame perfect Nash equilibria? Does SPNE concept eliminate the unreasonable Nash equilibrium?
Kayla and Kevin are friends who go together to a used textbook seller who has two copies ofthe biology book that they both need for their class this semester. The cost to the seller ofacquiring the books was $25 each and no other students will need this book. Kayla states thatshe is willing to pay $40 for the book, while Kevin says he is willing to pay $80. Which ofthe following describes the most likely conclusion to this scenario? Group of answer choices The seller will sell the books to both Kayla and Kevin for $40 each because if they tried tocharge Kevin a higher price, Kayla would engage in arbitrage. The seller will sell one book to Kayla for $40 and one book to Kevin for $80 because thismarket meets all three requirements for price discrimination. The seller will sell the books to both Kayla and Kevin for $80 each because Kevin's highervalue exceeds Kayla's willingness to pay. The seller will sell the books to both Kayla and Kevin for $25 each because that is howmuch the…
A game is played as follows: First Player 1 decides (Y or N) whether or not to play.If she chooses N, the game ends. If she chooses Y, then Player 2 decides (Y or N) whetheror not to play. If he chooses N the game ends. If he chooses Y, then they go ahead and playanother game with the payoffs shown below. A player who opts out by choosing N gets 2 andthe other player gets 0. Draw the tree of this game and then find the two subgame-perfect Nashequilibria.
1.4. Suppose you are against one of two alternatives but 90% of theelectorate disagrees with your position and favors that option. Is there avoting method that is anonymous, neutral, and monotone that preventsthat option from being selected as the winning alternative?
You and your friend will divide $4. You have agreed to use the following procedure.Each of you will name a number of dollars, either $0, $1, $2, $3, or $4. You will chooseyour numbers simultaneously. If the sum of the amounts is less than or equal to $4, theneach of you receives the amount you named and the rest of the money is thrown away.If the sum of the amounts is greater than $4 and the amounts named are different, thenthe person who named the smaller amount receives that amount and the other personreceives the remaining money. If the sum of the amounts is greater than $4 and theamounts named are the same, then each receives $2. (a)Draw the payoff matrix of this game. Let “you” be the row player and “yourfriend” be the column player.(b) Derive the best reply functions of all players.(c) Find the Nash equilibrium (or all of the equilibria) of this game using thebest reply functions you found in part (a).
53. The Indiana University basketball team trails by twopoints with eight seconds to go and has the ball. Shouldit attempt a two-point shot or a three-point shot?Assume that the Indiana shot will end the game and thatno foul will occur on the shot. Assume that a three-pointshot has a 30% chance of success, and atwo-point shot has a 55% chance of success. Finally,assume that Indiana has a 55% chance of winning inovertime.
Cameron and Luke are playing a game called ”Race to 10”. Cameron goes first, and the players take turns choosing either 1 or 2. In each turn, they add the new number to a running total. The player who brings the total to exactly 10 wins the game. a) If both Cameron and Luke play optimally, who will win the game? Does the game have a first-mover advantage or a second-mover advantage? b) Suppose the game is modified to ”Race to 11” (i.e, the player who reaches 11 first wins). Who will win the game if both players play their optimal strategies? What if the game is ”Race to 12”? Does the result change? c) Consider the general version of the game called ”Race to n,” where n is a positive integer greater than 0. What are the conditions on n such that the game has a first mover advantage? What are the conditions on n such that the game has a second mover advantage?