= Two firms sell substitutable products; the market price is: P = 90 - Q, where Q Q₁ + Q₂ is the total market quantity, which consists of Q₁ (the quantity produced by Firm 1) and Q2 (the quantity produced by Firm 2). The firms choose their quantities simultaneously. Firm 1's costs are C₁ = 10- 6Q₁+Q². Firm 2's costs are C₂ = Q². Which is the best response function for Firm 2? Q₂ O = 15. O Q₂ = 30 - ²0₁₁ 2 Q₂ = 42 + ²/ Q₁₁ 3 Q₂ = 45. What is the equilibrium market quantity Q? Q = 15.25. Q = 30. Q = 46.5. Q = 50. What is the equilibrium market price P? P = 90. P = 60. P = 43.5. P = 10.

= Two firms sell substitutable products; the market price is: P = 90 - Q, where Q Q₁ + Q₂ is the total market quantity, which consists of Q₁ (the quantity produced by Firm 1) and Q2 (the quantity produced by Firm 2). The firms choose their quantities simultaneously. Firm 1's costs are C₁ = 10- 6Q₁+Q². Firm 2's costs are C₂ = Q². Which is the best response function for Firm 2? Q₂ O = 15. O Q₂ = 30 - ²0₁₁ 2 Q₂ = 42 + ²/ Q₁₁ 3 Q₂ = 45. What is the equilibrium market quantity Q? Q = 15.25. Q = 30. Q = 46.5. Q = 50. What is the equilibrium market price P? P = 90. P = 60. P = 43.5. P = 10.

ENGR.ECONOMIC ANALYSIS

14th Edition

ISBN:9780190931919

Author:NEWNAN

Publisher:NEWNAN

Chapter1: Making Economics Decisions

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 1QTC

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