Two men run on the ski track to meet each other. Each has 2 strategies: give the opponent the wall or not. Those who lose the road lose 2 seconds, and if they collide, then both will unravel for 10 seconds. The loss of the participants is determined by the time lost. Suppose the 2nd runner has a better speed of reaction than the 1st. What type of the game is it?
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- Paramter y = 0 If ⟨a, d⟩ is played in the first period and ⟨b, e⟩ is played in the second period, whatis the resulting (repeated game) payoff for the row player?Cameron and Luke are playing a game called ”Race to 10”. Cameron goes first, and the players take turns choosing either 1 or 2. In each turn, they add the new number to a running total. The player who brings the total to exactly 10 wins the game. a) If both Cameron and Luke play optimally, who will win the game? Does the game have a first-mover advantage or a second-mover advantage? b) Suppose the game is modified to ”Race to 11” (i.e, the player who reaches 11 first wins). Who will win the game if both players play their optimal strategies? What if the game is ”Race to 12”? Does the result change? c) Consider the general version of the game called ”Race to n,” where n is a positive integer greater than 0. What are the conditions on n such that the game has a first mover advantage? What are the conditions on n such that the game has a second mover advantage?answer the ff: Suppose that each company cancharge either a high price for tickets or a low price. Ifone company charges $300, it earns low profit if theother company also charges $300 and high profit ifthe other company charges $600. On the other hand,if the company charges $600, it earns very low profit ifthe other company charges $300 and medium profitif the other company also charges $600.a. Draw the decision box for this game.b. What is the Nash equilibrium in this game?Explain.c. Is there an outcome that would be better than theNash equilibrium for both airlines? How could itbe achieved? Who would lose if it were achieved?
- Consider the following coordination game: Player 2P1 Comedy Show Concert Comedy Show 11,5 0,0 Concert 0,0 2,2 a. Find the Nash equilibrium(s) for this game.b. Now assume Player 1 and Player 2 have distributional preferences. Specifically, both people greatly care about the utility of the other person. In fact, they place equal weight on their outcome and the other person’soutcome, ρ = σ = ½. Find the Nash equilibrium(s) with these utilitarianpreferences.c. Now consider the case where Player1 and Player2 do not like each other. Specifically, any positive outcome for the other person is viewed as anegative outcome for the individual, ρ = σ = -1. Find the Nashequilibrium(s) with these envious preferences.Consider the game with the payoffs below. Which of the possible outcomes are MORE efficient than the Nash Equilibrium (NE)? Note, they do NOT need to be Nash equilibria themselves, they just need to be more efficient than the NE. Multiple answers are possible, but not necessary. You need to check ALL correct answers for full credit. JILL High Medium LowMAGGIE Left 3,4 2,3 2,2Center 4,8 9,7 8,7Right 7,6 8,5 9,4Group of answer choices (Left, Low) There is no strategy combination that is more efficient than the Nash equilibrium for this game. (Right, Medium) (Left, High) (Center, Medium) (Center, High) (Center, Low) (Left, Medium) (Right, Low) (Right, High)What is Ann's maximin strategy? Game Bob L RAnn U 10,-1 4, 4 D 4, 1 8, -1 Select one: a.none of the other answers b.4/7 U + 3/7 D c.2/5 U+ 3/5 D d.2/7 U + 5/7 D e.3/5 U + 2/5 D
- Consider Bernard \ Mary Left Center Right Top 0,5 1,0 2,2 Bottom 1,0 0,3 2,2 The first number in a cell denotes the payoff to Bernard and the second number denotes the payoff to MaryForexample: πB(B,L)=1and πM(T,L)=5. a Give all pure strategy Nash equilibria of this one-shot game, if any. Briefly explain.Let Bernard play Top with probability p and Bottom with probability 1 − p; let Mary play Left with probability qL , Center with probability qC and Right with probability qR = 1 − qL − qC . b Give all mixed strategy Nash equilibria of this game.Consider the strategic form game shown. a. Assume that both players are rational. What happens?b. Assume that both players are rational and that each believes that theother is rational. What happens?c. Find the strategies that survive the ISDS.Consider the following variation to the Rock (R), Paper (P), Scissors (S) game:• Suppose that the Player 1 (row player) has a single type, Normal.• Player 2 (column player) has two types Normal and Simple.• A player of Normal type plays this zero-sum game as we studied in class whereas a player of type Simple always play P.• Player 2 knows whether he is Normal or Simple, but player 1does not.a) Suppose player 2 is of type Normal with probability 1/3 and of type Simple with probability (2/3). Find all pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibria.b) Suppose player 2 is of type Normal with probability 2/3 and of type Simple with probability (1/3). Find all pure strategy Bayesian Nash Equilibria.
- A game is played as follows: First Player 1 decides (Y or N) whether or not to play.If she chooses N, the game ends. If she chooses Y, then Player 2 decides (Y or N) whetheror not to play. If he chooses N the game ends. If he chooses Y, then they go ahead and playanother game with the payoffs shown below. A player who opts out by choosing N gets 2 andthe other player gets 0. Draw the tree of this game and then find the two subgame-perfect Nashequilibria.H2. One day, Sam and Ryan play odds/evens to see who gets the last doughnut. On command, they each extend one or two fingers. If the sum is odd Sam wins the doughnut, if the sum is even Ryan wins the doughnut. Suppose the payoff from winning the doughnut is 1 and the payoff from losing is 0. a) Illustrate this interaction as a game in matrix form. b) Suppose that Sam thinks that Ryan will play one finger for sure? What will Sam play? Does Sam have reason to think that Ryan will play one finger for sure? c) Do either of them have a strictly dominated strategy? d) Find the pure strategy Nash equilibria of the game, if any. e) Suppose that Sam thinks that Ryan will play one finger or two fingers with even odds. Will Ryan play one finger for sure, play two fingers for sure or play each strategy with even odds? Does Sam have good reason to believe that Ryan will play one finger or two fingers with even odds?Consider the extensive form game portrayed below. The top number at aterminal node is player 1’s payoff, the middle number is player 2’s payoff,and the bottom number is player 3’s payoff.a. Derive the strategy set for each player. (Note: If you do not want to listall of the strategies, you can provide a general description of a player’sstrategy, give an example, and state how many strategies are in thestrategy set.)b. Derive all subgame perfect Nash equilibria. c. Derive a Nash equilibrium that is not a SPNE, and explain why it isnot a SPNE.