Two players bargain over $20. They proceed as follows. Player 1 first proposes a split(n; 20-n); where n is an integer in {0, 1,.... 20 }. Player 2 can either accept or reject this proposal. If player 1 accepts it, player 1 obtains $n and player 2 obtains $(20-n) If player 2 rejects it, the money is taken away from them and both players will get $0
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Bargaining
Two players bargain over $20. They proceed as follows. Player 1 first proposes a split(n; 20-n); where n is an integer in {0, 1,.... 20 }. Player 2 can either accept or reject this proposal. If player 1 accepts it, player 1 obtains $n and player 2 obtains $(20-n) If player 2 rejects it, the money is taken away from them and both players will get $0
1. Find two subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game and state clearly each player's equilibrium strategies (recall that in a dynamic game, a player's strategy is a complete-contingent plan). Explain why the strategy profiles form a subgame perfect equilibrium.
2. Find one Nash equilibrium that is not a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. Explain why it is a Nash equilibrium and why it is not subgame perfect.
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- A game is played as follows: First Player 1 decides (Y or N) whether or not to play.If she chooses N, the game ends. If she chooses Y, then Player 2 decides (Y or N) whetheror not to play. If he chooses N the game ends. If he chooses Y, then they go ahead and playanother game with the payoffs shown below. A player who opts out by choosing N gets 2 andthe other player gets 0. Draw the tree of this game and then find the two subgame-perfect Nashequilibria.Three players (Allen, Mark, Alice) must divide a cake among them. The cake is divided into three slices.The table below shows the value of each slice in the eyes of each of the players. S1 S2 S3 Allen $7.00 $6.00 $5.00 Mark $4.00 $4.00 $4.00 Alice $5.00 $4.00 $6.00 Which of the slices does Allen deem fair? Group of answer choices S1 and S2 S1 and S3 S2 and S3 S1, S2, and S3 S1 only8. Two states, A and B, have signed an arms-control agreement. This agreementcommits them to refrain from building certain types of weapons. The agreement is supposed tohold for an indefinite length of time. However, A and B remain potential enemies who wouldprefer to be able to cheat and build more weapons than the other. The payoff table for A (player1, the row player) and B (player 2, the column player) in each period after signing thisagreement is below. a) First assume that each state uses Tit-for-Tat (TFT) as a strategy in this repeated game.The rate of return is r. For what values of r would it be worth it for player A to cheat bybuilding additional weapons just once against TFT? b) For what values of r would it be worth deviating from the agreement forever to buildweapons? c) Convert both values you found in parts a and b to the equivalent discount factor dusing the formula given in lecture and section. d) Use the answers you find to discuss the relationship between d and r:…
- Consider the two-round bargaining game. The minimum the seller will sell his home for 188,000 and the maximum the buyer is willing to pay is $200,000. Both players know these two amounts and are bargaining over the difference (M=$1200). Assume the disagreement values are zero for both players. Player 1 moves first by making a proposal and Player 2 can accept and reject. If player 2 rejects Player’s 1 proposal, then Player 2 gets to make a proposal, which Player 1 can reject and accept. The game is then over. Suppose the both players discount the future income at the rate d=0.2 per period. That is, $0.20 now is equivalent to $1,00 received next round. Find the equilibrium for this 2-round game. a) Draw the game tree b) What is the sale price of home? c)Which player gets the larger share of M?Consider the strategic voting game discussed at the endof this chapter, where we saw that the strategy profile (Bustamante, Schwarzenegger,Schwarzenegger) is a Nash equilibrium of the game. Show that (Bustamante, Schwarzeneg-ger, Schwarzenegger) is, in fact , the only rationalizable strategy profile. Do this by firstconsidering the dominated strategies of player L. (Basically, the question is asking youto find the outcome of the iterative elimination of strictly dominated strategies)You and a rival are engaged in a game in which there are three possible outcomes: you win, your rival wins (you lose), or the two of you tie. You get a payoff of 50 if you win, a payoff of 20 if you tie, and a payoff of 0 if you lose. What is your expected payoff in each of the following situations? (a) There is a 50% chance that the game ends in a tie, but only a 10% chance that you win. (There is thus a 40% chance that you lose.) (b) There is a 50–50 chance that you win or lose. There are no ties. (c) There is an 80% chance that you lose, a 10% chance that you win, and a 10% chance that you tie.
- (a) Find all the Nash Equilibria, if there is any. (no explanation needed for this part (b) Does player 1 (choosing rows) have any dominant action? If yes, which action(s)? Any dominated action(s)? If yes, which ones? Answer the same questions for player 2, too. (c) If player 1 moves first (and player 2 moves next), what would be the sequentially rational equilibrium (draw the game tree and use backward induction)?What if player 2 moves first (and then player 1 moves next)? (d) Looking at your findings in (c), would player 1 want to move first or second or is she indifferent (the order doesn’t matter)?Suppose that two players are playing the following game. Player 1 can choose either Top or Bottom, and Player 2 can choose either Left or Right. The payoffs are given in the following table: Player 1 Player 2 Left Right Top 6 1 9 4 Bottom 2 4 5 3 where the number on the left is the payoff to Player 1, and the number on the right is the payoff to Player 2. D) What is Player 1’s maximin strategy?E) What is Player 2’s maximin strategy?F) If the game were played with Player 1 moving first and Player 2 moving second, using the backward induction method we went over in class, what strategy will each player choose?Prove that in the variation on the centipede game given in figure 14.5(b) the unique sequential equilibrium described is, in fact, the unique Nash equilibrium. (Hint: Take some presumed Nash equilibrium and suppose information set 2n+ 1 [for player 2] is the first unreached information set. Derive an immediate contradiction. Then suppose that node (2n) t is the first unreached information set and derive a contradiction that is one degree removed from immediate.)
- Two players bargain over $20. Player 1 first proposes a split of(n, 20 - n), where n is an integer in {0, 1, ..., 20}. Player 2 can either accept or reject this proposal. If player accepts it, player 1 obtains $n and player 2 obtains $(20 - n). If player 2 rejects it, the money is taken away from them and both players will get $0. Question: Find two subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this game and state clearly each player's equilibrium strategies (recall that in a dynamic game, a player's strategy is a complete-contingent plan). Explain why the strategy profiles form a subgame perfect equilibrium.Two individuals each receive fifty dollars to play the following game. Independently of each other, they decide how much money to put in a common pot. They keep the rest for themselves. As for the money in the pot, it is increased by 80% and then distributed equally among the two individuals. For instance, suppose that the first individual puts $10 in the pot while the second individual puts $20. Increasing the total pot of $30 by 80% gives $54 to share equally between the two individuals. So the first individual’s payoff in this case is $(40 + 27) = $67, while the second individual’s payoff is $(30 + 27) = $57. (a) Compute the Nash equilibrium. (b) Is the Nash equilibrium Pareto efficient? Explaina) Find the Nash equilibria in the game (in pure and mixed strategies) and the associated payoffs for the players. b) Now assume that the game is extended in the following way: in the beginning Player 1 can decide whether to opt out (this choice is denoted by O) or whether to play the simultaneous-move game in a) (this choice is denoted by G). If Player 1 opts out (plays O) then both Player 1 and Player 2 get a payoff of 4 each and the game ends. If Player 1 decides to play G, then the simultaneous-move game is played. Find the pure-strategy Nash equilibria in this extended version of the game. (Hint: note that Player 1 now has 4 strategies and write the game up in a 4x2 matrix.) c) Write the game in (b) up in extensive form (a game tree). Identify the subgames of this game.