3Q6Q7Q8: all questions have a correlation towards each other. Use the following to complete them. Question Q7Write down society's formal objective in this model. Be specific as to the particular elements ofthat objective.Question Q8At the market equilibrium in the above graph, write down the appropriate marginal decision rulethat applies. Make sure to use all the appropriate units.7/14 10:30fc0d1ceb77ac3158faaca00...5/14400Question Q6Using the graph below, shade in the appropriate part of your graph that represents the totalexternal costs that occur at the market equilibrium. Be precise in your shading, especially atthe edges.Marijuana (lbs)6/14Done100Question Q7Write down society's formal objective in this model. Be specific as to the particular elements ofthat objective.

External cost is the cost that is not included in the price and is born by the third party. Given…

Answered: Using the graph below, shade in the…

Using the graph below, shade in the appropriate part of your graph that represents the total external costs that occur at the market equilibrium. Be precise in your shading, especially at the edges.

Micro Economics For Today

10th Edition

ISBN:9781337613064

Author:Tucker, Irvin B.

Publisher:Tucker, Irvin B.

Chapter14: Environmental Economics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 17SQ

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

1. Consider the market for trees in a public park. These trees are a public good that give benefits to multiple groups of people, as described below. Each Marginal Willingness to Pay curve represents the aggregation of all the individuals in that group, and those groups make decisions collectively. Additionally, the cost of planting trees is given. Consider Q to be the number of trees in the park. Note that no one is ever worse off from additional trees. Arborists: MWTP = 2000 – 5Q Total WTP = 2000Q - 2.5Q2 Environmentalists: MWTP = 1500 – 10Q Total WTP = 1500Q – 5Q2 Casual Park Visitors: MWTP = 800 – 10Q Total WTP = 800Q – 5Q2 Park Haters: MWTP = 500 – 50Q Total WTP = 500Q – 25Q2 MC = 1400 Total Cost = 1400Q a. If the government does not intervene into the market, how many trees will be planted? a. What is the socially…
Table: Security in a Residential Community Quantity ofSecurityGuards TotalCost Total IndividualBenefit toEach Resident 0 $0 $0 1 $150 $10 2 $30 $16 3 $450 $18 4 $600 $19 Reference: Ref 17-3 Table: Security in a Residential Community (Table: Security in a Residential Community) Use Table: Security in a Residential Community. Suppose that the residential community has 100 residents. The marginal cost of hiring the second security guard is _____, and the marginal social benefit is _____. Select one: a. $150; $600 b. $450; $1,800 c. $450; $600 d. $150; $200
19.6 Suppose there are only two individuals in society. Person A’s demand curve for mosquito control is given by qa = 100- pfor person B, the demand curve for mosquito control is given by qb= 200-p Suppose mosquito control is a pure public good; that is, once it is produced, everyone benefits from it. What would be the optimal level of this activity if it could be produced at a constant marginal cost of $120 per unit? If mosquito control were left to the private market, how much might be produced? Does your answer depend on what each person assumes the other will do? If the government were to produce the optimal amount of mosquito control, how much will this cost? How should the tax bill for this amount be allocated between the individuals if they are to share it in proportion to benefits received from mosquito control?
Monopoly Equilibrium Suppose a firm operates as a monopoly in an unregulated market. The firm's total cost function for producing quantity, Q is given by the equation: TC 2000+200Q + Q^2. The market demand curve is given by the equation: Q = 220 0.5P. a. What is the firm's marginal cost curve? Show graphically. b. What is the firm's marginal revenue curve? Show graphically. c. Calculate the monopoly's profit maximizing price and quantity. Show graphically. d. What is the socially efficient price and quantity? Show graphically. e. When moving from the socially efficient price and quantity to the monopoly solution: a. How does consumer surplus change? b. How does producer surplus change? c. What is the social cost of the monopoly solution? f. Calculate the monopoly rents.
Consider the market for trees in a public park. These trees are a public good that give benefits to multiple groups of people, as described below. Each Marginal Willingness to Pay curve represents the aggregation of all the individuals in that group, and those groups make decisions collectively. Additionally, the cost of planting trees is given. Consider Q to be the number of trees in the park. Note that no one is ever worse off from additional trees. Arborists: MWTP = 2000 – 5Q Total WTP = 2000Q - 2.5Q2 Environmentalists: MWTP = 1500 – 10Q Total WTP = 1500Q – 5Q2 Casual Park Visitors: MWTP = 800 – 10Q Total WTP = 800Q – 5Q2 Park Haters: MWTP = 500 – 50Q Total WTP = 500Q – 25Q2 MC = 1400 Total Cost = 1400Q (a) If the government does not intervene into the market, how many trees will be planted? (b) What is the socially…
Suppose the demand and supply curve for crude oil at any given period is: Pd= =380−3Q and Ps=28+1Q Where price is measured in dollars and quantity is measured in barrels. Furthermore, for each barrel of oilproduced, there is $32 worth of negative externality. The market currently unregulated and produces 88 barrels of oil and the market price is $116. Externality, Part A: What is the Total Social Welfare before government regulation?
You are an industry analyst who specializes in an industry where the market inverse demand is P = 200 − 4Q. The external marginal cost of producing the product is MCExternal = 6Q, and the internal cost is MCInternal = 12Q. a. What is the socially efficient level of output? b. Given these costs and market demand, how much output would a competitive industry produce? c. Given these costs and market demand, how much output would a monopolist produce? d. Discuss actions the government might take to induce firms in this industry to produce the socially efficient level of output.
Firms in a polluting industry can be classified in two groups: newer firms with a cleaner technology that can abate pollution at a lower marginal cost MCLA = (1/2)aL and older firms with dirtier MCHA = aH, where ai is the level of abatement undertaken by firms of type i = L, H. The social marginal benefit of abating pollution from this particular industry is MBA = 120 - A, where A is the aggregate level of abatement in that industry. Suppose instead that the government uniformly allocates tradable emissionís permits. What abatement allocation will prevail after the permits are traded among firms? Is this allocation efficient?
QA and QS are the pollution levels for Arrow and Solow Industries, respectively. Profits (benefits) associatedwith polluting activity, πi(i = A, S) are πA=10QA−0.5QA2 and πS=20QS−QS2. The marginal benefits (profits) for each firm are MBA=10−QA and MBS=20−2QS. 2.9 Suppose Arrow is located in a remote rural area, with very low pollution levels (marginal damage = 6), while Solow is located in an urban area, with other pollution sources and many more people exposed (marginal damage = 12). What is the efficient pollution allocation in this case? Note: question puts us back in the world of economic efficiency (i.e., where we maximize net social benefit) as opposed to the world of cost- efficiency where we minimize costs associated with reaching an environmental target. So here net benefit is equal to Benefits from pollution minus Pollution Damages. Since locations are not interdependent, you can find the pollution levels which maximize net social benefits from A’s pollution and then…
Show the market for cigarettes in equilibrium, assuming that there are no laws banning smoking in public. Label the equilibrium private market price and quantity as Pm and Qm. Add whatever is needed to the model to show the impact of the negative externality from second-hand smoking. (Hint: In this case it is the consumers, not the sellers, who are creating the negative externality.) Label the social optimal output and price as Fe and Qe. On the graph, shade in the deadweight loss at the market output.
Firms in a polluting industry can be classified in two groups: newer firms with a cleaner technology that can abate pollution at a lower marginal cost MCLA = (1/2)aL and older firms with dirtier MCHA = aH, where ai is the level of abatement undertaken by firms of type i = L, H. The social marginal benefit of abating pollution from this particular industry is MBA= 120 - A, where A is the aggregate level of abatement in that industry. Suppose that in order to avoid the costly obtention of disaggregate information about individual firms' costs, the government just implements a uniform standard aui = A* / 2. Is this allocation efficient? If not, what is the deadweight loss?
problem 1: coase theorem Suppose UBP textiles can dispose of its waste for free Without filter With filterWithout filterUBP250400Fisherman20050Bird watchers15025 1) What is the daily net costs or net benefits of the filter to each of ubp textiles, fisherman, and watchers 2) What is the total net social cost of not installing the filter? 3) How much would fisherman and birdwatchers be willing to compensate ubp textiles for operating with a filter? 4) If all 3 parties can communicate and negotiate with each other will ubp textiles use a filter? 5) Suppose that ubp textiles only negotiates with one of the effected groups, will UBP operate with the filter? Skip Start Solving