Operation iraqi freedom

STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM What were the causes for the excess and the abandonment of equipment for Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom? BACKGROUND Most logistical tacticians have a tendency to review historical documents before developing strategies to deploy and redeploy troops and equipment. This common practice is very successful to deploying soldiers and equipment, but historically there is a lack of emphasis on the redeployment, or retrograde of equipment. The soldiers

join ranks in the protest of the United States and Israeli strategic alliance. This decision that the Iraqi made once a country we were allies to a country we do not trust but we will deal with, a country

Operation Iraqi Freedom On August 2nd, 1990 Iraqi military forces invaded and occupied the small Arab state of Kuwait. The order was given by Iraqi dictatorial president Saddam Hussein. His aim was apparently to take control Kuwait's oil reserves (despite its small size Kuwait is a huge oil producer; it has about 10 per cent of the world's oil reserves ). Iraq accused Kuwait, and also the United Arab Emirates, of breaking agreements that limit oil production in the Middle East. According to

OPERATION IRAQI FREEDOM Introduction On March 20, 2003, the combined military forces of the United States and Britain crossed the southern border of Iraq and Kuwait with the intent of capitulating the government of Saddam Hussein. Over the course of 21 days, the joint task force moved quickly and decisively to seize major objective cities along the road to Baghdad using aviation, armor, artillery, and infantry. Following the overwhelming success of the primary combat operations of the

the United States (US) military’s Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) campaign plan. Using the OD framework, the US OIF campaign plan from 2002 to 2007 was poor at planning and execution. First, this essay evaluates how OIF planners and commanders understood the Operational Environment (OE) and defined the overall problem. Second, this dissertation assesses strengths and weaknesses of the initial operational approach using end state, supported objectives, Lines of Operation (LOO), center of gravity, anticipation

In March 2003, President George W. Bush announced that Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) began: a mission to rid Iraq of Saddam Hussein, ensure that Hussein has no ability to develop weapons of mass destruction, and pledge to employ direct, pre-emptive strikes against Iraq to protect the United States. The United States government claimed they wanted the Iraqi people to achieve a united, stable and free country which would require our “sustained commitment” (History). After the United States’ Government

nation, “My fellow citizens, at this hour American and coalition forces are in the early stages of military operations to disarm Iraq, to free its people and to defend the world from grave danger (CNN, 2003).” On that day a coalition of over 35 counties led by the United States of America began what we know today as Operation Iraqi Freedom. The more you research about Operation Iraqi Freedom the more you tend to realize that it began well before 19 March 2003. It dates back to the Iran-Iraq war

Operation Iraqi Freedom saw a new rise in media censorship for embedded journalists, before departing their country of origin and being embedded with a military unit journalists were required to undergo joint training and sign contracts vowing not to report information that could compromise unit position, future missions, classified weapons, and information they might find during their time in the field. When asked about the purpose of the embedded journalists and these new restrictions Lt. Col.

claimed responsibility and their base of operations in Afghanistan was the initial U.S. target. Following early success in Afghanistan, President Bush and Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld determined security from future attacks required defeating the global terrorist network. The Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein became the next target in the Global War on Terrorism and CENTCOM began planning Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF). The Administration insisted that this operation involve the smallest force and shortest

methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using