Voluntarists and non-voluntarists have had intense debate on the issue of religion and morality. The underlying central argument of the debate is whether the morality requires a religious foundation or not. While the voluntarists claim that morality does require a religious foundation, non-voluntarists assert that it doesn’t. David Brink and George Mavrodes argues with this theme of voluntarist and non-voluntarist. My essay will largely focus on the strengths and weakness of both voluntarists and non-voluntarists associating with Mavrodes and Brink’s idea on this issue.
Voluntarists are the people who insist that it is the will or the attitude of god that determines morality and its qualities, while the non-voluntarists argue that moral
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What Brink argues is that if the natural properties of a situation determine its moral properties, then its moral properties can’t depend on god’s will. He further states that if voluntarism were true, then two situations could have different moral properties even if there were no natural differences between them, i.e. , if god’s attitudes to the two tokens of the same type were different, one system could be unjust, but an absolute same one of that system don’t have to be unjust. Therefore, the second argument against to the voluntarism is that voluntarism implies a rejection of supervenience of the moral properties of natural ones, which rejecting supervenience is counterintuitive and thus voluntarism has a counterintuitive implication.
The third opposition is a substantive claim argument. This argument explains that if the god merely selects whatever he or she wants to be good or right, then when people say “God is good”, this notion becomes trivial and non-substantive. This argument implies that if voluntarism is true, then praise of god as good or right wouldn’t be meaningful. For example, we can pick our own grades for the work we had done but don’t consider their quality which are independent of our choice of grade. It would genuinely not count as substantive praise if one person says to another “you got an A. You did very well”.
On the contrary, there are also arguments against non-voluntarism. To begin
Therefore, the only reason one has to behave ‘morally’ is because god, the bible or Jesus says you should. Moreover, the consequences of behaving in contradiction to Christian values or behaving ‘immorally’ involve punishment by god whether it be in this life or the after-life. This philosophy sheds some light on why atheism is feared, despised and misunderstood as well as why atheists are persecuted in America. If there is no god to answer to or no consequences for ‘bad behavior’, why then, would anyone behave in a good moral fashion? What is to prevent deviant behavior, if there is no god? These questions are the main basis for the Christian argument which maintains that atheists are untrustworthy, immoral or amoral, social deviants and therefore lesser human beings. Some have gone as far to say that atheists are unpatriotic, un-American and do not even have the right to be acknowledged as citizens of the United States.
Curlin, F. A., Lawrence, R. E., Chin, M. H., & Lantos, J. D. (2007). Religion, Conscience, and
Anselm argues in support of (4) by comparing a non-existent God with an existent God. An existent God, says Anselm, is greater than a non-existent God. If God were non-existent, therefore, then we could imagine a God greater than he, namely an existent God, (5) follows simply from (3) and (4).
In examining the relationship between religion and morality, there are many equally important topics that should be considered. One topic, nonetheless, that I think is essential in beginning to discuss the philosophy of morality in the context of religion is that which is concerned with whether religion has a significant role in the definition of morality. Religion does have a significant role in the defining and understanding of morality, and this is important for ethics. The aim of this paper is not to argue whether it is possible for one to be moral without being religious, for this I assume is more or less evidently possible, but rather whether a general concept of religion and God is needed in the proper interpretation of morality. I will refer to Plato’s Euthyphro and its focus on piety and the dilemma it generates, in guiding this discussion.
There are also those who would believe in the divine command theory, otherwise known as voluntarism. One philosopher named Duns Scotus held the opinion that the ten commandments do not all follow the natural law. In other words not everything God commands the world to obey is inherently morale to the world. Scotus believed that while
Martin uses a functionalistic approach to understand the role religion plays in society, exploring each object with hermeneutical suspicion, believing, for the sake of this study, that any supernatural claims are false. By exploring such concepts as classification, structured society, and habitus, Martin explains how “we, as humans, are a product of society”. He focuses on answering questions such as “what’s going on” and “whose interests are served” by skeptically looking at the way in which people use legitimation, authority, and authenticity to push their own agendas.
The belief that morality requires God remains a widely held moral maxim. In particular, it serves as the basic assumption of the Christian fundamentalist's social theory. Fundamentalists claim that all of society's troubles - everything from AIDS to out-of-wedlock pregnancies - are the result of a breakdown in morality and that this breakdown is due to a decline in the belief of God. This paper will look at different examples of how a god could be a bad thing and show that humans can create rules and morals all on their own. It will also touch upon the fact that doing good for the wrong reasons can also be a bad thing for the person.
At the beginning of the semester, I wrote: “Religion is the institutional manifestation of feeling and believing in something beyond yourself” (Kelley 2016). Twelve weeks later, I consider this definition incomplete and problematic; nevertheless, it reveals how religious thinkers such as James Frazer, Emile Durkheim, William James, Mircea Eliade, Jeffrey Kripal, and Bruce Lincoln infiltrate our quotidian definitions of religion. In this paper, I hope to develop a new conception of religion, recognizing the impact of such historical thinkers on personal conclusions. In other words, I hope to show that we are
This will be based on the chapter 4 Religion as "Truth-Claims", posted on Blackboard. First of all, Dianne L. Oliver makes a preface about her writings saying that religions claim to get the truth, and followers of diverse religions say that their truth is the only one true, and cannot be compare with any other. Also, she remarks that many of those religion followers use violence to uphold their own version of truth. Moreover, she let us know that she is going to consider the "True-Claims" of different religions, and show how those claims can influence the practices, behaviors, and ideas of religion followers. Next to the introduction, she considers that religion is very essential for understanding the fundamental questions in our daily lives.
In William James’ 1902 book “The Varieties of Religious Experience” he opens with depicting the approach of his review. He clarifies that it would be of little advantage to construct the examination with respect to regular people who have bound religious encounters and emulate customs which have been passed on to them. Rather, he centers the review around 'religious virtuosos '. In addition, as he clarifies in his second address, the attention must be on individual religious experience instead of corporate, in light of the fact that it is more central. Actually, it is out of the extreme encounters of a little few that most religious developments (or "factions" as he terms them) have created. Part 3 builds up that individuals appear to have the ability to encounter the concealed furthermore an inclination to see it as being more genuine than things seen, listened, touched or tasted.
The Divine Command Theory is the assertion in ethics that an action is morally right if, and only if, it conforms to God’s will. This premise ties together morality and religion in a manner that seems expected, since it provides a solution to arguments about moral relativism and the objectivity of ethics. On the other hand, in Plato’s Euthyphro, Socrates questions whether something is right because God commands it, or whether God commands it because it is right. The ethical implications of the Euthyphro problem suggest that the relationship between morality and religion might not be as straightforward as suggested by the Divine Command Theory.
There are some questions in the religious domain that reason cannot answer because there are situations in every religion that cannot logically be explained. Religions are not rational; therefore, reason alone is not adequate enough to validate religious truths. In this paper, I will demonstrate how reason and faith aren’t separate entities and how both are needed in order to explain all religious truths by examining the ideas of Kierkegaard and Pascal. I will also give a detailed explanation of fideism, show examples of irresponsible fideism and responsible fideism and then argue in favor of responsible fideism; faith fills in the gaps that are left void by reason.
Christian initially accepts this suggestion, for he is told by Mr. Worldly-Wiseman that Legality is a man who is known for his good works (Bunyan, 19). Christian them embarks on the trip to the Village of Morality, but in transit he encounters a hill that proved an insurmountable obstacle, along with the reappearance of Evangelist who shames him for trusting in the earthly qualities of morality and legality (Bunyan, 20-22). Therein we see confirmation of the notion that justification is by faith alone. For Christian, via the instruction and teachings of Evangelist, discards the knowledge and virtues of the concepts of morality and legality as nothing more than a fruitless diversion in comparison to seeking the Celestial City (Bunyan, 22).
One of the reasons being that, apart from the western cultures, If considerations are made on the diversity thesis of other cultures, and their different moral requirements, could lead individuals into making moral decisions based on the intended outcome, or even experience and not by some unknown moral duty. To support this, Mangena’s PhD titled towards a hunhu/ubuntu dialogical moral theory, argues that normative theories centralise their main
Korsgaard says that humans naturally have the instinct to do what is right and not do what is wrong. She goes on to explain the four conceptions for the “sources of normativity of morality.” I’d like to go over voluntarism and see how or if it aligns with moral obligation being directional in structure. The first part discussed, is the that obligations derive from God. God is the relevant authority. It’s saying, “I must act because God commands me to act. God, I believe, does not have anything