Challenger Space Shuttle Disasters

Ethics should always be the base of any engineering project. There are some instances where people, like Jerry Mason, become self-interested and forget that at the core of engineering, lies the responsibility to act with the public’s welfare in mind, above all else. The Challenger incident shows us how Jerry Mason acts contrary to the standards that the public expects professionals engineers to stand by. His sole comment to Bob Lund, “to take off your engineering hat and put on your management hat,” speaks greatly about what the Challenger meant to him. Jerry Mason viewed the launch as a business transaction that would allow him and Morton-Thiokol to benefit greatly at the midst of a contract renewal. Success brings advancement in managerial positions, but in this

The analysis in this report will include a summary of the sequence of events leading up to the disaster, analysis of the professional ethical behaviours and responsibilities that were

Assume you are an M-Global field engineer working at the construction site of a nuclear power plant in Jentsen, Missouri. For the past three weeks, your job has been to observe the construction of a water-cooling tower, a large cylindrical structure. As consultants to the plant’s construction firm, you and your M-Global crew were hired to make sure that work proceeds properly and on schedule. As the field engineer, you are supposed to report any problems in writing to your project manager, John Raines, back at your St. Louis office. Then he will contact the construction firm’s office, if necessary.

The case study of the two shuttle disasters, the Challenger occurred on January 28th 1986, and the Columbia occurred on February 1st, 2003. Both majestic and yet mournful due to the loss of life on both mission. The Challenger shuttle flight, OV-099 mission STS-51-L, broke apart 73 seconds into its flight, leading to the deaths of all crew members which included five astronauts and two payload specialists. The Challenger disaster was especially traumatic because young students watched television that were placed in their classrooms so they could watch the launch that day. It was fascinating that a school teacher was on-board as a payload specialist (NASA, 1986.) With a school teacher aboard the flight, it had sparked many interests because at several at young age, understood that education was vital as to why there was such a failure and prevent future disasters.

Ronald Dittemore, manager of Shuttle Program, received reports directly from Wayne Hale (manager of Launch Integration) and Linda Ham (manager of Space Shuttle Program Integration). It is clear that decision about foam issue was made based on communication with Linda Ham, stating that in previous flights had no critical problems with foam. Dittemore did not attempt to receive a professional opinion from the engineers. Furthermore, Rocha sent an e-mail to Dittemore in order to determine whether Columbia’s crew could make a space walk to perform an inspection of the wing. Answer to this e-mail was never received suggesting that communication attempts directly from engineers to high-level managers were rejected. NASA is a complex organization that maintains strict reporting relationship. Information exchange is built on hierarchy and rules did not facilitate fast informal communication between employees and high-level management. This filtering process diminished the information flow to the key decision-makers. To solve this hierarchical structure managers like Dittemore should exaggerate their ambiguous threats, avoid status differences and build trust among employees. Managers ought to communicate with specialists in order to obtain reliable information and understand the situation.

The article includes background information on the event as well as many quotes from people who followed the Challenger mission and remember the tragedy. Many of the quotes express the viewer’s shock at the disaster while others convey a sense of loss. The article also touches on the complacency of NASA leading up to the disaster and refers to a quote which states that “one of the biggest outcomes from the tragedy was the recommendation that NASA needed a stronger safety organization.”

It is important for any engineer to understand what they are doing, and the consequences that can occur if they make mistakes or take shortcuts. This case with the levee system is a perfect example of how engineers need to be aware. It was shown that certain decisions had helped save the government close to $100 million, but had dramatically dropped durability and reliability of the system. This shows that, had they been more ethical and self-aware, then the Hurricane Katrina disaster would have been less of a

After the collapse of the dam, many independent investigators were hired to inspect the dam site for damages. They discovered that the dam was not constructed accordingly to the design specifications. According to reports they noticed that the dam width did not exceed 140 feet as it was specified in the design. This suggests that the bottom portion of the dam may not have been adjusted to be proportional to the height. During the initial stages of construction, cracks appeared on dam, however Mulholland did not seem to be concerned. When the dam was completed, Mulholland inspected the dam by himself without any support. Even prior to the collapse of the dam, Mulholland was notified of cracks along the dam in which he concluded to be safe. As a result, the dam collapsed and took the lives of hundreds to his poor judgement. Furthermore, deputy district attorneys discovered that there were changes made on the dam by Mulholland and individuals who worked on the project. Unfortunately, these changes were not properly documented, which the district attorney’s found it difficult to understand and complete the construction process. Civil Engineers must strive to be transparent in the design and execution of a project, but Mulholland failed to do so as a chief engineer. District attorneys could not obtain documents that they requested because Mulholland failed to record enough details about the construction process, which shows Mulhollands lack of leadership as an

Weather can play an enormous role in historical events that are remembered decades, and even centuries, after they happen. It can turn small events that would go unnoticed in history to events that are remembered as some of the most important in world history. Until relatively recently, when the Weather Bureau was formed in 1870, we lacked the capability to forecast the weather and prevent incidents like these (Robbins). Even though weather reporting from that moment on would become widespread across the country, it would not be enough to prevent disasters such as the Challenger disaster that rocked the country on a chilly day in 1986.

On 1st of February, 2003, the space shuttle Columbia exploded when it re-entered the Earth’s atmosphere after finished a 16 days mission in space. All seven astronauts were dead because of this incident. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had stopped the space shuttle program for more than two years to investigate this tragedy. In the 16 days period, the astronauts did approximately 80 experiments on different categories, for example, life science and material science [1]. An investigation later has found out that the disaster was caused by a problem on the day that took off on 16th of January.

According to Luth (2000) there were many opportunities throughout the construction and design phase for the design flaw to be recognized by the engineers and there should have been a better review system in place as the changes that were made were not properly reviewed by a structural engineer. This disaster could have been avoided if someone would have taken the time to make sure all the designs were safe and would work

With the constant discovery of scientific principles and new engineering designs, the responsibility often lies in the hands of engineers to decide what is in the best interest of the public. Millions of people around the world use products and structures developed by engineers, every day. Before accepting work from a client, it is important that engineers have a good understanding of their own personal limitations. If work is accepted that they are “not competent to perform by virtue of [their] training and experience” , there is a clear disregard for public welfare and potential for a serious safety hazard. It is again evident that the

The case study I chose to analyze was the Space Shuttle Challenger Explosion by Ronald C. Kramer. Kramer discussed four main components that led to the catastrophic explosion. These components include the societal context, the final flaw, the persons behind the final decision to launch, and lastly the failure of social control mechanisms. There was not just one factor that led to the failure of the launch. As Kramer discusses the different concepts that led to the failure point to state-corporate crime as a private business and government agency interacted.

William LeMessurier and the Citicorp Tower controversy provide examples of engineering ethics. He followed the NSPE Code of Ethics when dealing with the tower’s faults. The decision to tell his employers and ultimately fix the tower showed that he acknowledged his errors, acted as a faithful agent to his employers, and that he held paramount the safety of the public as seen in professional obligations 1 and the fundamental canons 4 and 1. Even when faced with the moral decision of risking his reputation by fixing the tower, he still thought that the safety of the public was more important than his own personal gain. He was willing to admit his errors and fix the tower.

The series of ethical issues that took place leading to the disaster are complex, and other factors such as economic and political issues arose after the catastrophe happened. The purpose of this paper is to discuss the ethical issues that took place before the disaster happened, and investigate the moral obligations, social responsibility and justice at an individual and organizational level. The ethical dilemma is broken down into three categories, which include the company’s management priority to reduce costs and time, neglecting safety issues addressed by staff, human misjudgment and errors in neglecting pressure reading; and finally, overlooking the technical design flaws that were not tested by BP before installing to use. The