Columbia Disaster Research Paper

The first perceptual bias that is relevant to the Columbia disaster is the escalation of commitment. This bias in the Columbia disaster was observed when NASA found out about the crater in the shuttle and found the serious risks in landing the shuttle back on earth. However, NASA was already too committed to the mission and didn’t listen to the negatives they simply followed through with their campaign. The second bias is the availability bias. This bias is shown when NASA doesn’t push for additional pictures of the crater and doesn’t look for ways to gain additional information from the astronauts themselves. The final bias is the anchoring bias. This bias plays a part in the disaster when the threat of the crater was deemed as not a problem

Seventy three seconds into its 10th flight, on January 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle Challenger broke apart over the Atlantic Ocean, killing the seven crew members on board [1]. The Challenger was the second space shuttle constructed by NASA and had completed nine successful missions prior to the disaster. Following the accident, the shuttle program was suspended for 32 months as President Ronald Regan appointed a Commission, chaired by William P. Rogers and known as the Rogers Commission, to investigate the cause of the accident [1].

On January 28, 1986, a day that was supposed to be filled with excitement and exploration, suddenly turned into a day filled with tragedy and sadness. The space shuttle Challenger was supposed to carry a seven member crew into orbit with one unique member along for this particular mission. Christa McAuliffe was supposed to be the first teacher to go into space as a member of the Teacher in Space Project. Due to this occasion, the media coverage and the number of viewers of this mission was extensive, particularly in schools across the nation. The Challenger lifted off shortly after 11:30 A.M., but tragically only seventy three seconds after takeoff it exploded sending debris and the seven crew members back to earth and into the Atlantic

On January 28, 1986, as millions of Americans watched on live television and in person, the Challenger space shuttle exploded and broke up over the Atlantic Ocean just moments after its launch. This space mission was significant for several reason, among them was that it would be the first time where the space shuttle would carry a civilian into outer space. Also, there was a frenzy of interest for Americans as the U.S. and Russians were locked in a space race for space exploration supremacy. Instead. President Ronald Reagan was left with the unenviable duty of consoling a nation that had just witnessed the most significant disaster in American history.

The Columbia mission, STS-107, was interesting because the public was more aware of the risk that was being taken upon re-entry. During the launch a piece of insulating foam broke away from the external tank surface, striking the left wing. In previous missions there had been evidence of this occurring which to engineers was seen as minor. In the case of the Columbia craft failure, it was more serious because the damaged section of the wing was damaged to the extent of which it allowed hot atmospheric gases to penetrate the structure of the wing, pulling it apart, rendering the craft unstable.

odds of disaster were realized. Every shuttle has a 1/24 chance of disaster. NASA 's

Ronald Dittemore, manager of Shuttle Program, received reports directly from Wayne Hale (manager of Launch Integration) and Linda Ham (manager of Space Shuttle Program Integration). It is clear that decision about foam issue was made based on communication with Linda Ham, stating that in previous flights had no critical problems with foam. Dittemore did not attempt to receive a professional opinion from the engineers. Furthermore, Rocha sent an e-mail to Dittemore in order to determine whether Columbia’s crew could make a space walk to perform an inspection of the wing. Answer to this e-mail was never received suggesting that communication attempts directly from engineers to high-level managers were rejected. NASA is a complex organization that maintains strict reporting relationship. Information exchange is built on hierarchy and rules did not facilitate fast informal communication between employees and high-level management. This filtering process diminished the information flow to the key decision-makers. To solve this hierarchical structure managers like Dittemore should exaggerate their ambiguous threats, avoid status differences and build trust among employees. Managers ought to communicate with specialists in order to obtain reliable information and understand the situation.

Shuttle Challenger exploded just moments after liftoff on national television. Approximately 74 seconds into its flight, the shuttle erupted into flame and “was totally enveloped in the explosive burn” before breaking apart, killing all seven astronauts aboard. The Rogers Commission, appointed by President Ronald Reagan to investigate the disaster, later concluded that the accident occurred due to the failure of an O-ring seal in the right solid rocket booster of the shuttle.1 Saddened by the event, Reagan postponed his annual State of the Union address and instead gave a national address on the disaster the night of the incident.

President Regan ordered an immediate postponement of the Space Shuttle Program. The U.S. Congress then authorized an investigation of the Challenger disaster. It was a cold morning when Challenger was supposed to fly into space. Several NASA officials urged that the launch be postponed for warmer weather conditions. Since the NASA Launch Decision Team had okayed several space shuttles launches at and below that present temperature and had gotten away with it, the order was ignored (Howell). Seventy-three seconds later NASA realized that their luck had finally run out. President Ronald Regan tasked the Disaster Authority Commission with the investigation of the destructive incident. They concluded that there was two causes leading to the Challenger

A timeline of the events leading up to the explosion of the Challenger Space shuttle:

On January 28th 1986 the space shuttle Challenger was set to be sent into space with teacher Christa McAuliffe from New Hampshire as part of its crew. It was colder than normal on that day and engineers from NASA were concerned about possible failure of the O rings of the shuttle. However, their supervisors ignored them and let the shuttle embark on schedule. As a result the challenger exploded before it even exited the atmosphere

Each of the four orbiters in the armada - Columbia, Challenger, Discovery and Atlantis - were flown. Be that as it may, 1 minute, 13 seconds after liftoff - amid the 25th dispatch - on Jan. 28, 1986, the Space Shuttle blasted. The orbiter Challenger was obliterated and its team of seven murdered. The mishap had an extensive effect on the Space Shuttle program. Launchings were suspended for over 2 years, while proposals of a Presidential Commission which researched the mishap were executed, alongside changes called for by NASA

On 1st of February, 2003, the space shuttle Columbia exploded when it re-entered the Earth’s atmosphere after finished a 16 days mission in space. All seven astronauts were dead because of this incident. The National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had stopped the space shuttle program for more than two years to investigate this tragedy. In the 16 days period, the astronauts did approximately 80 experiments on different categories, for example, life science and material science [1]. An investigation later has found out that the disaster was caused by a problem on the day that took off on 16th of January.

On February 1, 2003, the Space Shuttle Columbia was destroyed and the lives of all seven of its crew were lost. Within 2 hours of the loss of signal from the Columbia, a commission was formed to investigate, thanks to procedures that had been established following the Challenger disaster 17 years prior. That commission, known as the Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB), conducted an extensive process of diagnosis of the causes of the Columbia disaster. The Commission's report concluded that the loss of Challenger was caused by a failure of the joint and seal between the two lower segments of the right

One of the greatest tragedies in history occurred on January 8, 1986. Shortly after it was launched, the space shuttle Challenger exploded, killing seven astronauts, including Christa McAuliffe, a New Hampshire schoolteacher chosen to be the first teacher in space (“Challenger Disaster, n.d.). The explosion was caused by a failure of the O-rings of the solid rocket boosters. The O-rings were unable to seat properly, causing the leaking of hot combustion gases, which burnt through the external fuel tank. The malfunction was not any one person’s or organization’s fault; it was caused by many factors including the decision to launch despite the cold weather, the poor communication between management levels of the National Aeronautics and