Flinder Valve Case Study Essay

In early May 2008, talk began between president of Flinder Valves, Bill Flinder and Tom Eliot, chairman and CEO of RSE about a possible acquisition of Flinder Valves by RSE. The industrial manufacturing industry had taken a hit due to rough economic times and the acquisition made sense. Both leaders were very concerned about the challenges and risks of the deal. Flinder was a company that engineered and manufactured specialty valves and heat exchangers. These products required extensive research and development and they were one of very few firms working in these types of applications. A bullk to FVC’s sales came from defense and aerospace applications. They were known for their

FVC and RSE might establish a joint venture of some sort, though Flinder suspected that joint ventures faced the same kinds of integration problems as did acquisitions; as a result, he thought joint ventures were an inferior alternative. FVC could move forward alone, but that would require raising large sums of new debt and equity to finance the rapid expansion of the firm’s “widening gyre” program. Flinder was concerned that he might lose voting control of the firm regardless. It seemed to him that doing a deal with a known and friendly partner today would prepare the way for an orderly transition for himself and the firm.

Johnson Controls, Inc. is a global company that offers services and products aimed at optimizing operational efficiencies and energy of buildings, electronics, automotive batteries and interior systems for automobiles. The company’s headquarters are located in Milwaukee, Wisconsin and is listed on the New York Stock Exchange as a fortune 500 company. Johnson Controls predicts that it will be able to increase its capital expenditures investments by $1.7 billion approximately. Most of the planned capital spending by the company will go to financing margin expansion and growth opportunities. This essay highlights the importance of companies to be able to evaluate investment decisions so that current and capital expenditure on proposed projects and schemes can be done prudently to ensure the company’s success (Johnson Controls (2015).

According to the researchers the increased value results from an opportunity to utilize a specialized resources which arises solely as a result of the merger (Jensens & Ruback, 1983; Bradle, Desai and Kim , 1983). For creating operational and financial synergies managers believe that two enterprises will be worth more if merged than if operates as two separate entities. Thus, the two companies, A and B:

Analysts estimate that the $80 million in cost saving could be realized after the acquisition , however certain other costs associated with the integration approximately $130 million would occur .Hence, I take these cost savings and integration costs into consideration for the with-synergies valuation. Incorporating the effects of 80million cost savings for the merged firm (to be achieved by end of 2007 and assumed to incur in perpetuity then on) and 130 million integration costs (half of this accounted at the beginning years) in the estimated EBITs for Torrington, a new horizon value is estimated, the new FCF is discounted by acquiring company’s WACC 8.39%. Torrington company’s with- synergies valuation $1386.38 million exceeds the value as a stand-alone entity by approximately $286 million. sheet2: With-synergies Valuation of Torrington-DCF Method.

above, how much should CSX be willing to pay for Conrail? Support your answer with appropriate analysis. According to operating income gains we can value a firm’s market price as its pre-merger value and the present value of gains in operating income. Let’s assume that value of Conrail before the merger is equal to its market cap. Then taking Conrail share price as $71.94 (average of year end and high stock price) and number of shares outstanding as 90.5 million shares (Exhibit 6) we get Conrail market value equal to $6,510.57 million ($71.94 x 90.5 million). We assume G =3%, MRP = 7%. We take risk free as 30-year maturity US Bonds rate, which is 6.83% (Exhibit 8); merged CSX-Conrail equity beta as average of CSX and Conrail equity betas, which is 1.33. rE = rf + MRP βE = 6.83% + 7% x 1.33 = 16.11% Now we can find Conrail’s synergy value as present value of gains in operating income. 1997 Total Gain in Operating Income Total Gain in OI after 40% Tax Gain in OI (discounted @ rE) $ $ $ 1998 $ 88 $ 12.80 $ 7.15 $ $ $ 1999 396 237.60 176.26 $ $ $ 2000 550 330.00 210.84 2001 $ 567 $ 340.20 $ 187.21

Our choices led to a constant increase in net income over the three years. Short term debt increase by approximately 100% percent but steadily reduced over the next three years. We were happy with the positive growth of the company and the fact that we were able to pay off most of the initial short term funding required by the increase in working capital requirement. Overall the current situation of the company in 2018 is good, although the total value created is less than 20% of that created in phase 1. From this we learned that the value of the firm can be significantly increased more through a reduction in working capital requirement than through increasing the firm’s sales and net income.

The primary users will be the Japanese lumber company who is interested in purchasing CFCL, and the owner, Don Strom. The purchaser will depend on the financial statements to assess performance of the company. However, they will most likely focus on inspection of CFCL’s timber assets to value the company and the purchase price. Strom will be looking at the statements to ensure proper management performance, and that net income is not overstated, to reduce bonus and tax payouts. The Controller will also hold a bias to inflate net income to increase his bonus. Attention should be given to ensure his new policy suggestions are not for his own benefit, but the benefit of CFCL and Strom. Accounting alternatives and recommendations in relation to the issues and new policies will be discussed.

Moreover, Robert Gates’ estimation of the price increase (2.0%) differs from the information provided in the case (1.7%). This overestimates revenue and thereby FCF. To make better projections for the firms’ FCF, Robert Gates would also have to consider the opportunity cost of alternative investments, the risk exposure throughout the project and operational risks after three years.

Our estimated cost of capital, 20.81%, is lower than Ricketts’ expected return, 30%-50%, thus the investment is worthy. However, it’s higher than other pessimistic members’ expected return, 10%-15%, making the decision more complex and requiring further valuation。

1. Analyze the economic rationale of the Carborundum acquisition. Under what conditions an acquisition would be expected to add to shareholder value in general? Do any of these reasons apply to Carborundum acquisition?

The previous 959.6m Amoco shares will convert into 633.336m shares of BP ADS equivalent, with the previous 965.6m ADS shares, BP shareholders will take part 60% of the new company, still have majority control over the firm. In this deal, we paid for about 20% premium, which is quite standard and normal. Because synergies from revenue and chemical divisions’ combination are not estimated nor not expected to bring benefit, the main synergy from the merge is 2 billion dollars saving of pretax operating cost. The value we create for our shareholders is $14,840.06 million (Amoco stand-alone value $46,430 million+ synergy $2 billion – price paid for Amoco $33,538.94). But this number is quite sensitive to a lot of factors, such as future energy demand, oil and gas price, industry growth potentials, ultimately affecting Amoco’s stand-alone and synergy valuation. Please

The present value of the net incremental cash flows, totaling $5,740K, is added to the present value of the Capital Cost Allowance (CCA) tax shield, provided by the Plant and Equipment of $599K, to arrive at the project’s NPV of $6,339K. (Please refer to Exhibit 4 and 5 for assumptions and detailed NPV calculations.) This high positive NPV means that the project will add a significant amount of value to FMI. In addition, using the incremental cash flows (excluding CCA) generated by the NPV calculation, we calculated the project’s IRR to be 28%. This means that the project will generate a higher rate of return than the company’s cost of capital of 10.05%. This is also a positive indication that the company should undertake the project.

The upgrade of the Rotterdam plant involves implementing the Japanese technology and requires a capital expenditure of £8.0 million with £3.5 million spent today, £2.0 million on year one, £1.0 million on year two and £1.0 million on year three. This will also increase polypropylene output by 7% from current levels at a rate of 2.0% per year. In addition, gross margin will improve by 0.8% per year from 11.5% to 16.0%. After auditing the financial models, it is concluded that the static net present value of the upgrade is -£6.35 million using a discount rate of 10% and an expected inflation rate of 3% annually. The Rotterdam upgrade contains an option to switch to the speculated German technology being available in five years. The current value of the option is zero as it is deeply out-of-the-money. The total net present value of the upgrade is -£6.35 million. The incremental earnings per share of the upgrade is £ 0.0013, the payback period is 14.13 years, and the internal rate of return is 18.7%.

Second, if we look at the individual businesses of Suez Lyonnaise after the merger, all of them except for “Other” (non-core) have demonstrated a consistent increase in revenues, EBITDA, and net earnings, which again provides greater value to its shareholders. The “Other” businesses