Irregular Warfare Strategy for Somalia

Somalia has been torn by conflict for most of its 48 years of independence. The collapse of the state itself came in 1991 when President Mohammed Siad Barre was overthrown. “Following the collapse of the Siad Barre regime in 1991, various groupings of Somali factions sought to control the national territory and fought small wars with each other.” (Business World Complete p.5) My analysis is that without any formal, structured government, the Somalia people went to what they value, clans and kinship. Unfortunately, they were all vying to be the clan in control. The inter-clan fighting prevented people from planting and harvesting crops and caused the death of several hundred thousand Somali. Ultimately this constant fighting led to a total breakdown of public services. Remember that Somalia culture is based on traditions and their ideology of kinship. Coalitions among clan warlords led the central government to crumble and it’s these same clan rivalries that prohibit

His approach attempts to consider deeper causes of intrastate violence than traditional case-studies have done (Newman 2014, 63). Newman identifies four general types of civil war: ethnic, political-ideological, weakened or failed state, and resource-based (Newman 2014, 63-65). Most intrastate conflicts can be characterized by a combination of these classifications and their influences. Newman defines four loose requirements for a conflict to be considered using this model. First, a conflict must mainly occur within the borders of an internationally recognized state to be considered “civil” rather than interstate (Newman 2014, 62). Secondly, civil wars are fought between organized groups rather than individuals or unorganized affiliates (Newman 2014, 62). Governmental military forces fit this mold, but are not required for a conflict to be deemed as intrastate. Third, there must be evidence of sustained violence. Newman defines this threshold as 1,000 fatalities (Newman 2014, 62). Last, belligerents must be fighting with a political objective in mind (Newman 2014, 62). This requirement is given a wide range of applicability, as almost any objectives of a group can be defined as political. The Nigerian civil war of the late 1960s fits all of these parameters, and can therefore be analyzed using the typologic system devised by

Successful examples of insurgency intervention that made strategic sense can be observed during Athen’s support of the Helot revolt against the Spartans, France’s support of the American revolutionaries against Great Britain, and the United States’ support of the Afghan tribal militia uprising against the Taliban.

The country of Somalia has undergone massive amounts of armed violence, yet not many people have attempted to stand up for them. The Basic Human Rights, if followed, could turn the downfall of this country overtime into a thriving community repairing itself. The country is so infested with anti-government militias. The country can't help itself but to cower in fear in hope for a

Somalia is a small country in the eastern part of Africa, known as “The Horn of Africa”. According to the CIA World Factbook (2016), Somalia has a population of roughly 10.4 million, and 85 percent of people are Somali. Additionally, a significant part of the population is Muslim, (CIA World Factbook, 2016), whom have contributed to the current conflict. In this report, we analyze the recent violent conflict and U.S. intervention in Somalia.

The United States has three main interests in Somalia. The first interest is the abundance of untapped natural resources, especially the oil reserves. Estimates have shown that Somalia could produce as much as 110 billion barrels of oil.4 The second US interest is Somalia’s strategic location. Its coast is a short distance from the sea lane that connects the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean Sea. This sea lane has seen many attacks from pirates originating in Somalia, so multiple nations have taken action to protect ships in the area.1 Finally, the U.S. has an interest in Somalia because of the presence of the terrorist organization, al-Shabaab. Al-Shabaab is an al Qaeda affiliate, and their primary goal is to turn Somalia into a fundamentalist Islamic State.5 The United States provides support to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) whose main mission is to reduce the threat from al-Shabaab and create a stable government in

In the 1960s the country of Somalia had finally gained it’s independence from Britain. (“aaregistry”) By 1969 a man by the name of Siad Barre who was chief of state at the time led a military coup or a soldiers act without knowing which political objectives will be achieved because of their actions and used it to abolish Somali democracy and began the a Islamic communist in close friendship with the USSR which is now Russia. The USSR sold him enemies to use against foreign and domestic enemies. Somalia declared war against Ethiopia to try and gain the Ogaden desert back for the Ogaden tribe which Siads mother had belonged too. Somalia had lost tragically which had caused an economic crisis and caused tensions between the people and the Somali government. In 1988 tensions between the Isaaq tribe and the government rose and caused a mass genocide which resulted in thousands of deaths and fleeing refugees. (“Combatgenocide”)

2. Located in the horn of Africa, Somalia was created in the year 1960 as a result of the merger between the Italian colony and the British Protectorate. During the cold war, the Soviet and US were interested in Somalia due to its proximity with the gulf oil shipping routes. For more than two decades, the country has lacked a national government since the fall of Siad Barre dictatorship in 1991. President Barre, a military dictator ruled the country from 1969 to 1991. He seized power through a bloodless coup through the assistance of the Soviet’s who provided him weapons in return

In 2006, Ethiopia, with the backing of United States, invaded Somalia and ousted the Islamic Courts Union, a union of Islamic courts that had assumed power to restore stability. The Transition Federal Government or the TFG took control of the government of Somalia. Despite the fact that it was still in its early stages and

“Poor economic health frequently breeds political conflict and potential civil war in a state.” Somalia’s coastal waters are abundant in sea life. Fishing is an industry ripe for growth and is a prime choice with which to stimulate the economy. Economic backing and direct aid is necessary but is only as effective as the security in region. Fishing vessels and processing facilities could be funded or leased by other countries as beginning options. However, if aid cannot be guaranteed to reach those in need, it should not be delivered. In some cases, due to the lack of security, foreign aid flows directly to the terrorist groups instigating violence on the area. Accordingly, economic aid must be used with discretion. Similar to President Obama’s accord with Pakistan, conditional economic and developmental aid is the way forward. The conditions set must focus on the ability for a developing government to commit to security as outlined in the Military IOP discussion earlier in this

Afghanistan and Somalia have had many terrorists emerge over the span of twenty years in order to evoke disorder in the world. The United States (U.S.) has been attempting to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat terrorists (A person, group, or organization that uses violent action, or the threat of violent action, to further political goals; frequently in an attempt to coerce a more powerful opponent) associated with al-Qaida and its affiliates ("U.S. Relations With Afghanistan"). For example, during the Battle of Mogadishu the U.S. attempted to capture Mohamed Farrah Hassan Aidid’s foreign minister Omar Salad Elmi and his highest political advisor, Mohamed Hassan Awale. In Afghanistan, the U.S. made a long-term commitment to help Afghanistan build a secure state with a democratic government that respects human rights ("U.S. Relations With Afghanistan"). In both Afghanistan and Somalia the U.S. has intervened sequentially to provide assistance and aid and has successfully done so.

Armed with a militia of young Islamic zealots, a fully fledged intelligence service, and a government that is complete with propaganda and taxation departments, the terrorist cell of Al Shabaab poses a legitimate and durable threat to Somalia. With its sophisticated level of organization and management, Al Shabaab has been able to absorb setbacks and still persist; they astutely navigated the Somalian Civil War and emerged strong enough to capture vast swaths of territory. Consequently, even though they have ceded some territory since then, Al Shabaab now enjoys a deeply entrenched position of influence in Somalia and Mogadishu. Essentially, while Al Shabaab’s control in Mogadishu has been mitigated by the African Union’s forces they still

Somalia has a lot of internal problems, such as diseases, ethnic conflicts and civil war. Since 2009, the civil war which was brook between the government against different Islamic groups has caused such a huge problem to the country.

This article talks about the ongoing tension between AMISOM (the largest peace support operation), and a violent Islamist group known as Al-Shabaab. Recent attacks in Somalia, has shed light on some of the vulnerabilities facing AMISOM and their allies. Al-Shabaab, once controlled the capitol city and most of south-central Somalia, but most of their fighters were driven out of the capitol and many other towns. Al-Shabaab has claimed responsibility for the recent attacks that killed More than 100 Kenyan soldiers deployed in Somalia. Their main objective is to create a caliphate across eastern Somalia. The AMISOM are not prepared to fight against these rebels because when they do fight back, the rebels flee and take minimal damage. This is due

By 1975 the UF came to be so strongly controlled, organized and equipped by Mogadishu, that it was considered “an arm of the Somali army” (Gilkes 1994b:722). In January 1976, the movement was split for logistical and propaganda reasons into the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) and the Abo-Somali Liberation Front (ASLF) (Compagnon 1995:378). Aiming to keep militancy on either side of the Somali-Ethiopian border at bay, Barre not only restricted the WSLF’s activities (Gilkes 1994b:722), but even avoided mentioning their existence to the Somali population (Markakis 1987:227; Lockyer 2006:5).