What Are The Five Errors In Anaconda-A Flawed Joint Planning

Mission Command is the framework used by the U.S. Army to ensure key leaders receive clear direction from commanders. Clear commander’s guidance allows subordinates to make disciplined and informed decisions to best accomplish assigned tasks. Ideally, application of mission command principles ensures all elements integrate and sync actions, thus creating a shared understanding and purpose. Analysis of Major General (MG) William Garrison’s decision making during the Battle of Mogadishu demonstrates how mission command principles must be applied to gain and maintain a position of advantage during military ground operations. As commander of Task Force Ranger (TFR), MG Garrison demonstrated both successful and failed application of mission command principles. Four principles will be discussed in the

MG Hagenbeck was presented a problem during the early planning development process. He commanded an already smaller division of two brigades, with three being the standard size. Of his division, half of his division headquarters as well as one of his brigades was deployed in Kosovo, as well as two maneuver battalions assuming Task Force (TF) roles in Bosnia and Sinai, and neither of his assistant division

The court ruled that Feather River Anesthesia Medical Group has breached its oral employment and awarded him.

The United States of America, one of the most powerful nations in the world at the time, was completely unprepared for the war that it had joined in Vietnam. The terrain was unlike any we had ever fought in. From mountains to jungles to rice paddies, it was wet, hot, cold, and completely unforgiving. To say that the political situation was tenuous would be a drastic understatement. Not only could officials not make up their minds, neither could the general populace. The media had an influence in this war that was heretofore unseen. All of these factors were a great obstacle in and of themselves and then we put into play the greatest obstacle of all: the enemy. This was an enemy like we had never seen. The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and the Vietcong (VC) were fast, agile, adaptable, and extremely unpredictable. The VC hid among the common populace and fought like demons. The NVA were well supplied, well organized, and did not restrict themselves the way many large armies do. This forced us to have to rapidly adapt and develop new tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) in order to counter all of these obstacles. Due to these needs and the rapidly advancing technology and versatility of helicopters, the Air Cavalry was born. The Air Cav was composed of several types of airframes including transport aircraft, attack aircraft, and reconnaissance aircraft. The reconnaissance aircraft were also known as Aeroscouts and were known for their boldness, audacity,

inadequate communication; lack of supporting firepower; and in the final hour before the raid, absolute

What might have been the setback we previously faced in making decisive, clear or sound effective decisions? Was it a defect in how Commanders and Leaders led units or troops, or perhaps the philosophy in which we chose to command and control every aspect of the battlefield? What does it mean to recognize or comprehend the art of Command and the science of Control? The six principles of mission command are key in developing a cohesive team that will support all aspects of the mission. Asking “why” is now encouraged when it pertains to certain situations or missions. Understanding the purpose of why a course of action or desired outcome is necessary, leads to mission success and a cohesive unit with thinking leaders. Thinking clearly usually isn’t an issue for most leaders, but position an individual in a situation of extreme stress or complexity, then there might be a reason to be concerned. Through

Air support had planned to bombard enemy positions for 55 minutes; however, miscommunication between Texas 14 and higher led to a short bombardment and a total of six bombs being dropped. TF HAMMER was unsuccessful in entering the valley due to a heavy amount of small arms fire and mortar attacks. The lack of air support triggered by bad communication frustrated Afghan and Special Forces alike and led to Afghan trucks being hit heavily by pre-registered mortar fire on known choke points by Taliban and al Qaeda fighters. Unity of command is crucial in conducting a successful military operation: communication flows smoothly through a unified command, but unfortunately for a non-unified command, the reverse effect holds true.

However, the Marines failed to scout the woods. As a consequence, they missed a regiment of German infantry dug in, with a network of machine gun nests and artillery.[7]

In early January 2002, American intelligence received evidence of a large volume of enemy forces assembling in the Shahi Kot Valley in Eastern Afghanistan. Central Command (CENTCOM), led by General Tommy R. Franks, was directing combat operations in Afghanistan through the Coalition Forces Land Component Command (CFLCC) and Coalition Forces Air Component Command (CFACC). As the interest in assaulting the Shahi Kot Valley amplified, General Franks reached a conclusion that a U.S. tactical commander was a need in Afghanistan. The decision was to assign the 10th Mountain Division Commander, Major General (MG) Franklin Hagenbeck, as the tactical commander. In an effort to strengthen MG Hagenbeck’s command authority, CENTCOM named his headquarters Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain and gave it command and control authority over Operation Anaconda. By having command and control authority, MG Hagenbeck would encounter challenges with the command structure. The challenges of command structure were due to CJTF Mountain not having tactical control (TACON) of multiple Special Operation Forces, the Joint Special Operations Air Component (JSOAC), and friendly Afghanistan forces. These misunderstandings were resolved during the execution phase, but rectifying the command relationships prior would have avoided lost time and resources needed on enemy forces and positions. In this paper, I will identify the challenges of command structure during Operation Anaconda.

Are failures simply undesirable or a beneficial for future experiences? On August 19, 1942, the Raid at Dieppe is considered a failure due to the significant casualties and the incompletion of the planned objectives. The Raid at Dieppe is said to have failed due to multiple reasons. One of the primary factors to cause the failure of the operation is the absence of effective communication, both before and during the raid. Furthermore, the operation incorporated various fatal strategic errors. As well, the backup for the landing troops was limited during the raid. In summary, the Raid at Dieppe was a failure due to errors in communication, strategy, and backup.

Improving System Performance: The Evolution of Concepts Designed to Optimize System Performance Over the Past 25 Years

To understand how some of the soon to be discussed failures arose, all of the key commanders need to be identified. When Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) began General Tommy Franks was the CENTCOM Combatant Commander in Tampa, Florida. Events on 9/11 lead to us having forces in Afghanistan soon after. From the beginning of the war Special Forces (SOF) were the primary assets utilized. As time went on conventional units were joining the forces in theatre. This caused the need for the Command and Control (C2) structure to adapt to the

Due to the sensitivity of the mission, the Department of Defense chose to bypass already established Joint Task Forces (JTF) that existed. Instead, an ad-hoc JTF was created specifically for Operation Eagle Claw. The newly created JTF encountered problems defining areas of responsibility and areas of focus. The JTF included three branches of the military in the operation the Navy, Army, and Air Force. The operation rehearsed for five months prior to its execution. The JTF never conducted a rehearsal during the five months. All elements conducted individual rehearsals only joining on the night of execution. Problems that were encountered on the night of Operation Eagle Claw were never identified prior which ultimately contributed to the failure of the mission.

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

When it comes to succeeding at anything, it is important to plan, prepare, and rehears the outcome. In a combat zone, this becomes even more important because lives and the success of the mission depend on it. This was not the case however, during a fight called Operation Anaconda. The purpose of this paper is to point out what went wrong with the lack of planning, coordination, rehearsal, and preparation between Air and ground communications, and how it proved to be critical during Operation Anaconda. The ending results were a delayed execution and several friendly casualties.