Managerial Overconfidence and Accounting Conservatism*
Anwer S. Ahmed Ernst & Young Professor of Accounting Texas A & M University Scott Duellman Assistant Professor of Accounting St. Louis University March 2012
Abstract Overconfident managers overestimate predict that overconfident managers will tend to accelerate good news recognition, delay loss recognition, and generally use less conservative accounting. Furthermore, we test whether external monitoring helps to mitigate this effect. Using measures of both conditional and unconditional conservatism, we find robust evidence of a negative relation between CEO overconfidence and accounting conservatism. We further find that external monitoring does not appear to mitigate this effect.
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Thus, our first set of hypotheses predict a negative relation between overconfidence and both conditional and unconditional conservatism respectively.2 In addition, we examine whether these effects vary with the strength of external monitoring based on the argument in Kahneman and Lovallo [1993] that overconfidence or optimism is best alleviated by introducing an outside view. Thus, external monitoring could mitigate the predicted negative relation between overconfidence and conservatism. Our tests are based on a sample of 14,641 firm-years over 1993-2009 from S&P 1500 firms that have the available data needed to carry out our tests. Our primary measure of overconfidence is based on the timing of CEO option exercise following Malmendier and Tate [2005, 2008], Hirshleifer, Low, and Teoh [2010], and Campbell et al. [2011]. Intuitively, CEOs are under-diversified and should exercise their options and sell shares obtained from exercising options to minimize their exposure to idiosyncratic risk. However, an overconfident CEO 2
While we predict a negative relation between overconfidence and conservatism, we also note in section 2 that there are reasons why this relation could be positive.
2
believes that firm
Hilton, R. (2011). Managerial accounting: Creating value in a dynamic business environment (9th Ed.). McGraw-Hill. Hardcover ISBN: 9780073526928.
Day J. and Krakhmal V. (2006) fourth edition (2011), An introduction to accounting and finance in business, Milton Keynes, The Open University
Folk, M., J., Garrsion, H., R., & Noreen, W., E., (2002). Introduction to Managerial Accounting. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill/Irwin.
Historic cost depreciation is being used which leads to skewed numbers that misrepresent how well a product line will continue to operate in the future due to understated replacement value of fixed assets.
Company operates in the Industrial Sector – Services, and Industry – Regional Airlines. According to the Standard Industrial Classification System (SIC), company belongs to the industry group 451: Air
According to (Kreitner & Kinicki, 2013), overconfidence bias, relates to our tendency to be over-confident about estimates or forecasts. This bias is particularly strong when you are asked moderate to extremely difficult questions rather
By Thomas Ahrens (London School of Economics), and Christopher Chapman (University of Oxford), from The Contemporary Accounting Research Vol. 21 No. 2 (Summer 2004) pp. 271–301.
Chapter 2 of the text book begins with an exercise designed to test the reader’s knowledge. The reader is to have a bounded range where a 98% confidence level is reached. I failed miserably in this exercise, which is probably why the chapter led with it. Bazerman writes that overconfidence is “the most robust finding in the psychology of judgment.” (p. 14) It is appears to be an innate characteristic for much of the population. Overconfidence has been studied by psychologists and three characteristics of overconfidence commonly appear: overprecision, overestimation, and overplacement. I am glad to know that I am a part of much of the population.
Brian J. Franklin, BBA Accounting ‘12, College of Business and Public Policy, University of Alaska Anchorage, 3211 Providence Drive, Anchorage, AK 99508, 907-268-4233 Ext. 401, bfranklin@frontiertutoring.com
The author thanks Professors Martha Howe, Donna McConville, Ari Yezegel, participants at the 2013 North American Case Research Association Annual Conference, the 2013 American Accounting Association Northeast Region Annual Meeting, and 2014 American Accounting Association Annual Meeting for their comments and suggestions on the earlier versions of the case. Comments and suggestions of the editor, associate editor, and two anonymous reviewers are also gratefully acknowledged. Supplemental material can be accessed by clicking the links in Appendix A.
In the underlying paper the author re-examines the conservatism principle and its asymmetric effects on earnings. With samples consisting of all firm-year observations from 1963 to 1990 with returns data on the CRSP NYSE/AMEX Monthly files and respective accounting data on the COMPUSTAT Annual Industrial and Research files, he formulates and tests four major hypotheses to find evidence for his predictions. At first he chracterizes “conservatism in accounting as the more timely recognition in earnings of bad news regarding future cash flows than good news”.1 In his first hypothesis he predicts a more sensitive response of earnings towards bad news in comparison to good news, proxied by negative and positve annual stock returns. His second prediction is that earnings are more timely than cash flow, indicating a stronger association of accruals to conservative accounting effects. Hypotheses three and four account for a test on the
The Burns and Scapens framework for analyzing managerial accounting change was built on the study of old institutional economics, which sees "economics as a process of social provision, subject to multiple and cumulative causation." This view culminates in a model that argues that the managerial accounting practices at institutions are subject to a process of constant change, influenced by routines and rules. The institutions contribute to these routines and rules, but so do actions on the part of managers within the institutions. By combining multiple influences over time, we arrive at modern managerial accounting practice. In other words, Burns and Scapens tells us that managerial accounting practice changes over time, influenced by a number of factors including rules, routines and actions.
It has been become an issue of great concern that the accounting profession must find a common theory in order to address and put the issue at rest. This therefore, has called for the study of this topic under review “the demand for and supply of accounting theories: the market for excuses. As a result of this several questions have been raised. For instance, the question of why accounting theories are predominantly normative has been put forward by this article? Secondly, why no single theory in accounting profession that is generally or widely accepted? It has been argued that the financial accounting theories have been found to be ineffective most especially in the area of impacting accounting practice and policy, though, this has been
The literature on conservatism accounting is very limited. Watts (2003), has suggested that conservatism is related to debt contracts, while Gjesdal & Antle (2001) suggest that conservatism is the interaction between income measurement and dividend covenants. Even though conservatism may be most favorable, the result derives from shareholders trading off cash flows in different periods, not from the need to protect the interests of creditors.
and therefore with a low information asymmetry. Managerial opportunism behaviour, measured by a dummy variable for earnings smoothing, seems to