Manoeuvrist Approach, Mission Command And OODA Loopist Theory Analysis

Six principles comprise the philosophy of mission command: (a) build cohesive teams through mutual trust; (b) create share understanding; (c) provide clear commander’s intent; (d) exercise disciplined initiative; (e) use mission orders; and (f) accept prudent risk. When combined together, these six principles assist the commander in balancing the aforementioned art of command and science of control. To understand how General Robert E. Lee’s performance at Gettysburg lacked the marks of a great mission commander necessitates a deeper understanding of the individual principles of mission command.

General Patton did an outstanding job demonstrating the four of the six steps of Mission Command during the Battle of the Bulge. The forces that General Patton led were subjected to a stern leadership and instilled tighter discipline than any other American field forces in World War II. General Patton lived by a few principles daily and one of those include a quote he made of his own “say what you mean, and mean what you say.” An example of his quote he enforced in his soldiers that he made sure that regulations concerning uniforms were rigidly enforced, and on many occasions he imposed fines or other punishments when he found his men on front lines violating the rules he

Operational leaders down to the platoon and squad level have recently faced increasingly complex missions in uncertain operational environments. Accordingly, Army doctrine has shifted to officially recognize mission command, which enables leaders at the lowest level feasible to “exercise disciplined initiative” in the accomplishment of a larger mission. The operational process consists of six tenants: understand, visualize, describe, direct, lead, and assess. During the battle of Fallujah, LtGen Natonski understood the intent two levels up, visualizing courses of action for both allies and the enemy, and leading his organization into combat while directing his officers and soldiers to meet his intent. He visualized that Marines alone could not accomplish the mission. He understood that without the support of Iraqi police and a task force from the Army with

Mission orders may be understood by the leader’s subordinates, however poor training and development amongst other practices may hinder the execution of the commander’s intent. Everything starts with training. Rehearsals are key in knowing what to do and how to react when the time comes. The team may know what to do through the orders, however they will not know how to perform tasks if

Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 6-0 defines mission command as “the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (U.S Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Combined Arms Center, Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, 2015, p. 1). The six principles of mission command direct leaders to build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk. These principles enable subordinates that understand their commander’s intent to accomplish missions by adapting to the situation and taking advantage of opportunities as they arise (U.S Army, Training and Doctrine Command, Combined Arms Center, Center for the Army Profession and Ethic, 2015, p. 2). Various battles throughout history provide examples of the application of the principles of mission command as well as the failure to adhere to them. The Battle of the Little Bighorn is an example of the latter and marks the “most decisive Native American victory and the worse U.S. defeat during the long Plains Indian War” (History.com Staff, 2009).

The concept of maneuver warfare has very little to do with where the fight happens or how forces arrive to that fight, but how we attack the enemy system and establish a tempo that drives the enemy into a “deteriorating situation with which the enemy cannot cope” (MCDP 1, page 73). The key to creating the conditions for that deteriorating situation is to orient on the enemy understanding the enemy’s strength, weakness, and disposition by orienting ourselves to the enemy and “turning the map around” to exploit that established enemy system. Whether the enemy is on a fortified high ground or is a littoral nation, our goal is the same take the enemy system and destroy it. MCDP 1 gives several examples of what orienting on the enemy means to the various warfighters; a pilot examining the integrated air defenses that must be penetrated or the rifle

Mission command consist of the following six principles: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create sheared understanding, provide clear commander’s

Successful leadership on a battlefield can be measured in different ways. It is possible for a good, successful leader to lose a battle. Conversely, it is possible for an ineffective leader to win a battle, given the right circumstances. What distinguishes a successful leader from an unsuccessful one is his/her ability to oversee an operation using effective mission command. In ADP 6-0, mission command as a philosophy is defined as “as the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations” (ADP, 1).

According to Army ADP 6-0, mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander, using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent, to empower agile and adaptive leaders in the conduct of unified land operations (CAPE, 2012). Effective mission command can generally be analyzed according to the six principles outlined in ADRP 6-0. The six principles of mission command are to: build cohesive teams through mutual trust, create shared understanding, provide a clear commander’s intent, exercise disciplined initiative, use mission orders, and accept prudent risk (CAPE, 2012). This paper provides a brief overview of the

What might have been the setback we previously faced in making decisive, clear or sound effective decisions? Was it a defect in how Commanders and Leaders led units or troops, or perhaps the philosophy in which we chose to command and control every aspect of the battlefield? What does it mean to recognize or comprehend the art of Command and the science of Control? The six principles of mission command are key in developing a cohesive team that will support all aspects of the mission. Asking “why” is now encouraged when it pertains to certain situations or missions. Understanding the purpose of why a course of action or desired outcome is necessary, leads to mission success and a cohesive unit with thinking leaders. Thinking clearly usually isn’t an issue for most leaders, but position an individual in a situation of extreme stress or complexity, then there might be a reason to be concerned. Through

Commanders at all levels face increasingly challenging scenarios as the operational environment changes. Some instinctively motivate and empower their subordinates to think and act independently, thereby influencing actions during combat. However, those who understand the commanders' activities of mission command will influence not only subordinates, but the outcome of the battle as well. Mission command is the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander’s intent to empower agile and adaptive leaders.1 Commanders who understood the importance of mission command was Major General Horatio Gates. General Gates at the Battle of Saratoga successfully

This should be a welcome help, since the “line” ODAs are undermanned. ODAs, a fighting DoD unit, should focus on the Gs, because of the common ground as combat units. I think the statement that SF achieves strategic results through tactical operations does not apply here to the ODA. A battalion size G-force with ODA advisors, should strive to achieve operational goals. We should not forget that ODA should also prepare to link-up and assist regular forces once US commits conventional DoD assets to the conflict. This is the specific point in the campaign where ODA alone will achieve operational

Arranging operations is an operational design element used to develop the synergy of effects against the adversary as well as anticipate and mitigate risks in the operational approach. The dual operation in response to the Kuwait invasion offers very clear examples of this element. Concepts used in arranging operations include phasing, sequel, timing and tempo, branches, simultaneity, and depth.

The post WW1 militaries had to make immediate changes in their postwar organization in order to increase their effectiveness and readiness. For example, the German army developed mechanized and amour units called Panzer divisions, which during the WW2 crushed their opponent armies. In addition, they focused on redesigning the officer core in order to be more innovative and have critical thinking skills. After invading Poland, the Germans made AAR, and made immediate organizational changes and created the Squads as a more effective unit. The Soviet Union made quality AAR from the WW1 and other so-called Small Wars before the Great War and used the gathered experience to make peacetime innovation into their military organization in which they developed motorized and mechanized units. Furthermore, militaries were focused on aviation and as an example is the development of air force as an independent and their use in combined-armed concepts, which was initiated by Giulio Douhet, an artillery officer who realized the importance of Air power. Giulio added the airpower component as an asymmetric piece that will change the war and forced the idea that to have command of the air it means that it will achieve victory. The US developed and organized amphibious units to conduct “Plan Orange” which was developed during the interwar period, and during the Banana Wars, in which they practiced their technology, TTPs and Doctrine and used lessons learned to improve in peacetime

In closing, ULO and operational art exist today because of evolution. ULO provides a framework that accounts for the complexity and unpredictability of the operational environment as well as the requirements of the Nation. Operational art serves to adapt ULO, as needed thereby facilitating a continuous advantage. With that, does it really matter if the Army has it right? Yes, in the sense, that if the Army gets it wrong, it takes time to adapt and therefore, life and treasure is potentially lost for naught. Furthermore, the unintended consequences can lead to making a long war even longer as seen in Iraq and Afghanistan. On the other hand, it does not matter if Army doctrine fails to predict the future as doctrine simply “accounts for the constants