Objectives Of The Operation Andreas

The purpose of this paper is to identify the uses and application of mission command within Operation Anaconda. Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan in early March of 2002. The ground commander selected to lead the operation was Major General (MG) Hagenbeck of the 10th Mountain Division, and for the purpose of this operation, Coalition and Joint Task Force (CJTF) Mountain. Due to the limited number of troops under his command currently available in Afghanistan, MG Hagenbeck was given command in addition to one of his own organic battalions, the 3rd Brigade, 101st Air Assault Division, some Special Operations Force (SOF) units, and Coalition Forces. This paper will identify MG Hagenbeck’s, his staff’s, and higher command’s use of the mission command principles during this operation. The principles of mission command are accept prudent risk, use mission orders, exercise disciplined initiative, provide a clear commander’s intent, create shared understanding, and lastly, build cohesive teams through mutual trust (Mission Command, 2014).

Operation Sealion was the German plan to invade England. They gathered ships and barges in Northern France ports to transport their invasion forces across the English Channel by ferries. Along with this, three Luftflotte, (air fleets) were assigned to the operation. What the Germans needed was to neutralize the Royal Air Force and gain air superiority in order to successfully invade Great Britain. The task was given to Hermann Göring, Air Marshall of the German Luftwaffe. However, there was one downside to this operation; the RAF must be neutralized before autumn storms made the crossing of the English Channel impossible.

The 8th Air Force arrived in England with one main mission, to destroy Germany’s ability to wage war over Europe. They were to do this by flying day bomb runs on a massive scale to compliment the night time raids that the RAF were conducting. These massive formations

Operation Anaconda took place in the Shahikot Valley of eastern Afghanistan. The mission began on March 2, 2001 and ended on March 16, 2001. A “hammer and anvil” attack, with 600 American and 400 Afghan troops, would rout, capture, or kill enemy forces. The operational timeline for a three-day battle projecting light combat took fourteen days to complete. During Operation Anaconda, Unity of Command planning did not fully anticipate the need for additional forces, inducing a stall in operations on the battlefield, and negating a timely victory.

The mission command system is expressed as the placement of individuals within a unit conducting operations with a specific set of procedures and principles in place to optimize the use of its equipment. What does it mean to recognize or comprehend the art of Command and the science of Control? There are six key principles of mission command in developing a cohesive team that support all aspects of a mission. The following essay will discuss these principles and examine examples of how the famous Operation Anaconda both endured victories and inadequacies.

Operation Anaconda was the first major joint combat operation against the war on terror that the US was committed to winning. This operation would test our military’s readiness for joint operations against a hardened and willing adversary. The primary mission was to kill/capture Taliban/Al Qaeda forces occupying towns and villages in the vicinity of Shahi Khot in order to gain control of the valley.1 The US needed the towns, villages, mountains, and more importantly, the intricate and hard to access caves cleared of enemy fighters. Units participating in the operation included elements of the 101st Airborne Division, 10th Mountain Division, Special Operations Forces (SOF), and Coalition forces from seven nations

The United States has involved itself in several missions shrouded in secrecy throughout the nation’s short history. Operations, like the Iran-Contra Affair, and the Central Intelligence Agency’s (CIA) role in Afghanistan are just two examples of these types of secret government missions, which have become public knowledge. Both operations occurred under the helm of President Reagan, who outlined a clear agenda, promising to fight the spread of the Soviet social influence of communism. Moreover, other similarities are observed between the two covert missions, like providing armaments, equipment, and training to foreign rebel forces to assist in combating communist influences (National Security Archive 2006, Johnson 2011). Moreover, various government agencies were used in the operations for distinct purposes. The comparison of the Iran-Contra Affair and the CIA’s role in the Afghanistan war, aid in revealing a picture of how covert operations were used in the 1980s, in combat communism, while achieving other presidential agenda items, like securing American hostages (PBS n.d.).

Operation Urgent Fury was a response by the U.S. government to the socio-political situation happening at the time on the island of Grenada. Due to anti-government upheaval, a growing communist presence in the area and a significant number of Americans on the island, the Reagan administration felt the need to intervene with military force to normalize the situation. Operation Urgent Fury could have been more successful if U.S. forces had sufficient intelligence to include enemy disposition, adequate maps and known locations of all the U.S. medical students located on and outside of the campus St. George’s University Medical

In order to develop effective solutions for complex military problems, the Joint Community within the US Military adopted the methodology of Operational Design in Joint Doctrine. This methodology addresses the concept of complex, ill-structured or “wicked” problems. In fact, Lessons Learned as a result of operations conducted over the last 15 years played an instrumental role in the continued development of this doctrine. Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) illustrates a perfect case study for evaluation utilizing this methodology. Therefore, the intent of this paper is to evaluate US Military campaign planning for OIF by using operational design as the framework for this analysis. First, this paper looks at how planners and commanders interpreted pre-invasion civilian policy guidance, their understanding of the current operational environment, and how these commanders defined the problem. Next, it identifies the strengths and weaknesses of the initial approach. After discussing this initial approach, this paper examines how commanders assessed the campaign and refined the approach – to include how the reframing occurred. Lastly, it provides examples of how these lessons learned shaped current joint planning policy and doctrine.

Tragedy stuck America on November 4th of 1979, when 52 hostages were seized at the American Embassy in Iran during the midst of the Iranian Revolution. Different policy approaches prompted a vast range of potential actions, and ultimately “Operation Eagle Claw” was carried out between April 21st and 25th of 1980. The two primary executive divisions in dispute during decision process were the National Security Council (NCS) and its advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski and Secretary of the Department of State (DOS), Cyrus Vance. The decision for the use of military force, rather than continuing economic sanctions and diplomacy, was due to Carter’s attempt at re-election and a lack of resistance from Congress.

The German government ordered the workers to strike as a form of passive resistance. To compensate these workers the German government printed huge amounts of new money. This led to inflation. German currency rapidly lost value. Many people were unemployed and on the brink of starvation.

Furthermore, as soon as the war broke out, the central bank (Reichsbank) declared its currency notes no longer redeemable for gold. This prevented a run on its gold reserves and allowed it to concentrate on helping the central government finance the war. However, by suspending the redeemability of its notes, the Reichsbank was no longer restricted in the amount of money it could print. With this restriction lifted, the German Government ordered the Reichsbank to print more and more money to finance the ever-increasing war expenditures. As the Reichsbank printed more money, the value of money already in circulation decreased, and people lost purchasing power as they indirectly financed their government’s debt.

During the Battle of Britain, Germany wanted to achieve air superiority but ultimately failed to defeat the Royal Air Force (RAF). Hitler ordered the Lufwaffe to destroy the RAF in preparation for Operation Sealion which was Germany’s invasion plan for Britain. Although numerous factors contributed to Hitler’s decision to attack Britain, in keeping with his “one front at a time” war methodology, Hitler wanted to secure the Western Front prior to invading the Soviet Union. Initially, directed by Hermann Goering (commander-in-chief of the Lufwaffe) Germany targeted Britain’s coastal areas and convoys, airports, and vital British air warning and radar

Cyber-attacks are common in the defense industry, but in January 2010, a sophisticated, advanced persistent threat hacked into the commercial sector forever changing the face of cyber security. Dubbed “Operation Aurora” by McAfee, the attack targeted specific high profile corporations to obtain valuable intellectual property. Google, Yahoo, Juniper Networks and Adobe Systems were also among the victims of this highly coordinated cyber heist. By manipulating computer codes the attackers were able to exploit the Microsoft Internet Explorer vulnerabilities to gain access and obtain valuable sensitive information from over thirty high profile companies. Operation Aurora proves that the world is entering into a high-risk era where

The standing practice was that currency would remain in the hands of the military administration while valuables had to be transferred to the