Strategies For Developing A C2 System

Current capability set fielding along with future fielding 's including Bradley engineering change proposal (ECP), Armored Multi-Purpose Vehicle (AMPV) Engineering, Manufacturing, and Development (EMD), and full rate production (FRP) radio variants are the Army 's answer to brigade combat team modernization. The tactical environment is the tip of the spear, a challenging space where effectiveness, survivability, and sustainability provide the keys to success. That success is becoming increasingly reliant on data. Data drives our missions, from operations, intelligence, and fires, to other areas such as medical and logistics. Consumption of data is being fueled by the introduction of new communication systems. Warfighter information tactical (WIN-T) has begun to bring this data down to the Brigade and Battalion level with the Point of Presence (POP), and the Battalion and Company level with the Soldier Network Extension (SNE). New radio waveforms are providing conduits for data down to the tactical edge. WIN-T and Handheld, Manpack, and Small Form Fit (HMS) radios are being integrated into Infantry Brigade Combat Team (IBCT) vehicle platforms now. The Mid-Tier Networking Vehicular Radio (MNVR) is just around the corner in FY17.

Goal A: Students will be able to “Explain human development processes and those factors which encourage and/or discourage full development within the various contexts or development.”

This is an initial counseling for the 106th Signal Brigade S-3 Land war net team. I will be your new first line NCO, in the following points below we will discuss the land war net mission, your duty, and how you I expect you to conduct yourself.

Analysis: Ineffectual utilization of the Incident Command System (ICS) created gaps in tracking resource requests. Assignments of roles and responsibilities within the ICS structure would have allowed the on-scene commander to have more people helping him to make and track decisions. Establishment of a liaison between the on-scene operations and the operations section of the EOC would have facilitated more control of the scene.

The potential of providing information or sharing information with agencies or personnel without proper authorization can be detrimental to the mission and the personnel involved. Working in a Joint/Combined nature of the Contemporary Operational Environment (COE) leads to numerous considerations of security when it comes to information sharing and intelligence productions. COE is the combination or current and near term operational environment variables with capabilities. It is based on the composite of potential adversaries in order to create a wide array of conditions necessary for full spectrum training and leader development. Sea, land, air, and space make up the COE in both the physical and technological aspect (Headquarters

CPT XXX served as the assistance operational contract support (OCS) Officer-In-Charge, Area Support - Kuwait for the execution and the management of billion dollars Theater Support Contracts, Systems Support Contracts and External Support Contracts, augmenting uniformed capabilities ISO Iraq and Afghanistan AORs. CPT XXX provides guidance and oversight for OCS matters supporting CENTCOM tenanted units in the requisitioning and procurement process of commercial resources/services throughout CENTCOM AOR. CPT XXX actively anticipates CENTCOM combatant commander operational requirements, comprised of 20 countries, to include 37 coalition countries contributing to the war against

Mission command “…enables military operations through decentralized execution based on mission-type orders.” Effective C2 through mission command requires a clear commander’s intent, mutual trust, and understanding. The command structure leading HUSKY failed to exemplify these attributes, resulting in weak C2 through the planning and execution phases of the

- He directly enhanced battle space awareness by forming an interdisciplinary team in which he identified design criteria, user constraints such as operations and manpower requirements, and sustainment costs for the Electronic Harbor Security System and Enterprise Land Mobile Radio System for four waterfront bases. The design provisioned a netted reliable, robust, and protected intranet-of-things consisting of surface based smart sensors, cameras, thermal imagers, and video analytics equipment that transport essential data. This rapid delivery of information content impacted aggregate force protection and low-level surface intelligence collection which was used by area Commanders to maintain coherent maneuverability and coordinated actions to combat threats inherent in the Forward Deployed Naval Forces. Additionally, his team operated and maintained 50 information delivery systems providing

All these systems change as new technology advances into the way we do business. Every year, increasingly, military occupational specialties will encompass information technology to enhance performance, speed, and reliability for real-time situational awareness. The military is on the cutting edge in conceiving, testing, and adapting information

The US Central Command’s planning for Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) was not the all-inclusive plan that joint operations require. Joint operations are no longer limited to major combat operations, but encompass a wide range of actions. Planning for joint operations requires input from many sources to produce a successful campaign plan to meet the desired end state. Operational design provides a concept and a construction framework that underpins a campaign and its execution. (JP GL13). Evaluating the planning process by using the operational design identifies some of CENTCOM’s shortfalls. US military planners’ lack of understanding of the operational environment led to an inadequately defined problem that resulted in a faulty operational approach. CENTCOM’s approach did not have the right assessment to gauge the effectiveness of the plan such as alerting planners when and if the plan needed modification. Current joint planning policy incorporates several of CENTCOM’s shortfalls in an attempt to provide a better planning process for future joint operations.

The 513th Field Support Staff has a particular computer skill set and troubleshooting knowledge that was demonstrated during the initial integration of a 3.7.4.1.1 Stack into the Datacenter. The teams’ latest ventures assisted in the identification of configuration issues unique to Fixed Sites that were documented for future development. The real challenges for the individuals involved were to complete the system integration within a limited time period. The team not only was able to meet the timeline, they were able to identify problems while implementing corrective actions allowing for the Theater Ground Intelligence Center – Central (TGIC-C), to meet their operational requirement in support of ground forces. Such an implementation had never been performed anyway else successfully thus displaying the technical expertise of the Team.

This setup allows multiple partnerships to work together as a team to complete the common goal. Some of the structures are comprised of the Command Section, Operations Section, Planning Section, Logistics Section, and Finance/Admin Section. Each section has their own unique missions, functions, and tasks that connect back to each other to have a successful emergency operation. The Command Section includes CFAY’s Commanding Officer, other local agencies, and tenant command to articulate Emergency Public Information (EPI) and strategic goals to the situation. The Operation Section is primarily the ICP and dispatch. They carry out the EOC’s IAP with concurrence from the Incident Commander. The Planning Section manage all the incident related information. With this information they generate contingency plans, meetings, update situational unit logs, and prepares the IAP for

Organization. To provide relative information to deploying Special Operation Forces (SOF) and other government agencies outside of the Group, 5th SFG will develop a streamlined the access request method to establish an expedited information flow of historical data related to mission and emerging challenges within the 5th Group area of responsibility. This information will be made available to other SOF units and government angencies outside 5th SFG and access can be coordinated through the unit’s S-2 and the knowledge manangers office.

"The first step of formal COA development is to review and update facts, assumptions, and forces available that were identified during mission analysis. The second step is to generate conceptual possibilities to support the [mission]" (Artillerization, n.d., "Step 3: Course of Action Development" section, ¶ 1). It is recommended that several COAs be developed during this step. During this step the author would identify which type of equipment was needed to support the CLP to ensure that C3 was available amongst the members of the CLP and between the leadership of the CLP and higher headquarters.

I have led the development and execution of several technology strategies and roadmaps for the USCG, Army, Special Operations Command (SOCOM), and USPTO that have improved operations, reduced costs, and expanded business and technology capabilities. The Army strategic plan and roadmap were developed engaging the mission leaders and DOD CTOs to develop a maturity plan to sustain production infrastructure capabilities while controlling exponential growth of an aged infrastructure backlog ($300M+) while reducing infrastructure operations