Summary: The Importance Of Congressional Oversight

Account of the work of the CIA, discussing in some detail the nature of the relationship between the intelligence-gatherer and the policy-maker. Since the 1970s the CIA has provided intelligence to Congress as well as to the executive, so that it now "finds itself in a remarkable position, involuntarily poised nearly equidistant" between them. It has not however abused this freedom of action, probably unique among world intelligence agencies, so as to 'cook ' intelligence. CIA deputy director.

In the intelligence community, there are some collection challenges, redundancy is one of the issues always to be mentioned. Redundancy can affect the core of the intelligence work ethics, resources management, budging, work force, future planning, and development methods. Also, the capability of the intelligence agencies and departments to predict attacks, analyze the indications and warning (I&W). The congress oversight of the intelligence community and the operations of the sixteen agencies imbedded in the community, to regulate the funds and allocate proper budget, also to monitor that the rights of US person are not violated in any collection method.

In this paper the subject of interest is the role of congress in the oversight of strategic intelligence, or the lack there of. Does congress have a proper role in the oversight of strategic intelligence? If not what should the proper role be? These are the questions best answered by looking at the history of congressional over sight and where it is at today. The next few pages will cover the topics above and shed light on what it is congress calls oversight.

Congress built upon the reforms of the 1970s by passing the Intelligence Oversight Act in 1980. This Act was an amendment to the Hughes-Ryan Act and obligated the IC to report covert actions to both the SSCI and the HPSCI prior to their implementation, unlike the ambiguous previous requirement of a timely manner. The Intelligence Oversight Act was noteworthy in that it constrained the intelligence community more than any previous legislation (Riley 2010). The two biggest shortfalls I see to the system is the number of contributors there are to the system on such a large scale. When I think about all of the redundancy built within the system, I think about all of the possible breakdown in communications that could take place. The second shortfall I see is the legislative leverage that is held over the Intelligence community. I personally believe this to be a mistake because this power could be held in a negative manner and to gain a political stance or agenda. The Congress can withhold money and resources, can leak information to the media and which could cause a mission or operation to

Congress has for a long time has tried in various ways to oversee the intelligence community which have shown to be sometime controversial, and a very difficult responsibility. What make this task so hard is the secrecy and sensitivity intelligence information finding, the sources, and the methods in which the information is obtain. Congressional oversight has evolved since the mid-1970s and a lot more since the 9/11 attacks on the World Trade Center. The critics about Congressional oversight by some as being inadequate, ineffective, or worse, while at the same time proposal that was made in the 9/11 commission report was met with challenges from within the Legislature Branch and from the Executive Branch

Hello, Kevin. I am agree with your point that intelligence oversight is working but not at optimal. For example the 9/11 Commission concluded that many aspects of congressional oversight of the IC were “dysfunctional.” And it suggested several reforms they assessed would increase Congress’s capabilities: abolishing term limits for members of the intelligence committees so that they build their expertise to enhance their oversight abilities, combining the authorization and appropriation functions thus limiting the number of lawmakers involved and further increasing the efficacy of congressional oversight. Congress has tremendous power since it approves the fund; However, this also created opportunity for congress to abuse it if willing. Congress

Congress develops a more cohesive domestic intelligence program to counter radicalization and prevent terrorist attacks in America

According to the Office of the Director of National Intelligence “post 9/11 investigations proposed sweeping change in the Intelligence Community, resulting in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (IRTPA). The IRTPA created the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) to oversee a 17-organization Intelligence Community (IC) and improve information sharing and ensure integration across the nation's IC.” The efforts of the ODNI and the IC to find and kill Usama bin Laden (UBL) following the events of 9/11 were more than sufficient in achieving their mission. It may have taken the IC 10 years of working together to successfully track down the location where UBL was hiding in Pakistan, but they did it and

Legislative enactment of 1980, granted executive branch power to limit its notification channel to the minimum of eight members of congress—Gang of Eight. Erwin stated that limiting notification to the Gang of Eight should occur only in situations involving covert actions of such extraordinary sensitivity or risk to life that knowledge of such activity should be restricted to as few individuals as possible. The intention would ensure strong oversight while share President’s burden on difficult decision concerning significant activities. (Erwin 2013, 2).The issues I see in congressional oversight of the strategic covert action program is how and it what degree intelligence committee should know about covert actions. The congress’ concern is

One of the core regulatory requirements that the CIA operates under are the Presidential directives, in which Congress determines the activities that the organization can participate in. Initially, at the formation of the organization in 1957, Congress was the legal body that provided oversight authority over the CIA. However, in the mid-1970s, this changed as it was delegated to the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) and the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence (SSCI) to carry out the tasks. This move was guided by the Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980. Therefore, legally, the operations of the CIA are defined and guided within the realms of this Intelligence Oversight Act of 1980.

Throughout Intelligence Community’s history, there has been multiple attempts to input reform measures into various agencies. Often met with pushback, the reform attempts typically fail or are weak in merit. Being unaccepting of reform and showing little adaptation towards newer strategies and technological advancements, the IC was caught unprepared to thwart the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the twin towers and the Pentagon. Some governmental reports, those that have assessed the IC’s actions regarding the devastating attack, have noted that greater cooperative efforts between various agencies may have halted the terrorist attack. The creation of a Homeland Intelligence Organization could be the start of implementation of a reform to bring the IC closer together.

In 2004, through the Intelligence Reform and Terrorist Prevention Act (IRTPA), Congress outlined specific duties and authorities for the DNI. These duties include: providing timely intelligence to the President and other senior level decision makers, developing and executing the National Intelligence Program Budget, and numerous other duties and authorities, but perhaps the most relevant to this discussion is the intelligence information sharing section. “The Director of National Intelligence shall have principal authority to ensure maximum availability of and access to intelligence information within the intelligence community consistent with national security requirements” (IRTPA, 2004). If we break this statue further, we will see that Congress identifies even more specific tasks which will enable better communication flow and collaboration between agencies within the IC; however, some of those will take years to institute and will requires organizational and cultural changes.

The intelligence community itself has made a major shift of how it operates, what are its priorities and its ability to protect the nation in the entry of the 21st century. The attacks on 9/11 greatly changed the way we see the world now and has shown major flaws within the intelligence community. Those events led the creation of the Department of Homeland Security and with it pooled federal agencies into in umbrella for it to be centralized in order to be effective. There are three categories in which the Homeland Security Intelligence face in the 21st century. Those categories are technological, political, and cyber security.

In order to provide an efficacious frame work to amend the quality of analytical products and conclusions, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) efforts must derive around maintaining a structured methodology and intuition, rely on critical thinking, eliminate cognitive bias, support intelligence analysis as a profession, improve the analysts/policymaker relationships, and effectively measure analytic quality. The Intelligence Community Directive (ICD) established the Intelligence Community (IC) Analytic Standards that govern the production and evaluation of analytic products; articulates responsibility of intelligence analysts to strive for excellence, integrity, and rigor in their analytic thinking and work practices; and delineates the role of the ODNI Analytic Ombuds.

Intelligence collection and apprehension of criminals have occurred for many years; however, with the exception of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, these actions were performed by different organizations. Nonetheless, roles and responsibilities have changed since the attacks on September 11, 2001. Intelligence-led policing and the National Criminal Intelligence Sharing program were incorporated, and fusion centers were established to help gather intelligence from different levels of the government. Although law enforcement at the local, state, and tribal levels aid in intelligence collection, it is important to ensure that intelligence gathered to protect national security and law enforcement