The Body, Soul, And Brain

1426 Words6 Pages
When it comes to personal identity and survival of the self, it is difficult to say what defines a person throughout time. The three arguments are for the body, soul, and brain. These theories argue that each respective component of a person, must remain the same throughout time in order for a person to be unchanged. The brain theory is more plausible than its counterparts. To prove this, first, I will describe the soul and body theories, which I oppose, and then present an argument based on the brain transplant theory. A criticism for this is Perry’s third night argument that states the body donor is the surviving factor. My rebuttal for his counterargument uses Cohen and Miller’s Conventionalist Argument to support my original statement.…show more content…
Conversely, the body theory requires the physical person to be the same which does not allow for the immortality of the self to persevere after death, unless, one is resurrected with the same body. Each of these theories does not allow for the brain to be the defining feature of individual survival. To begin, my first argument is composed of Cohen and Miller’s use of the brain donor example. The illustration is primarily used against the body theory in order to support my thesis by using psychological factors to self-identify as the same person before and after a brain transplant. Cohen and Miller originally use this argument in rebuttal to Perry, who suggests it is the body donor that survives instead of the brain. However, the new body no longer hosts the previous brain it was born with, which first identified itself as the body. So the body’s individual has been completely removed and changed to the new brain’s identity. Therefore, the argument suggests that the seat of personal identity is within the brain. Since the brain itself remains unchanged, so does the individual. Perry, however, tries to counter the brain theory’s donor example. First, he argues moving the brain does not allow for it to identify as the same person as before the transplant. He states that since the memories are not genuine, or associated with the same body as before, they cannot be concluded as being real experiences.
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