The Fischer Controversy. The Publication In 1961 Of Fritz

Through the book ‘Europe’s Last Summer’ David Fromkin tackles the issues of pre WWI Europe, and the surrounding political, economic, social, debacles that led paranoid countries to go to arms after nearly a full century of relative peace within the European continent. While Fromkin certainly points his fingers to all the nations of Europe his primary focus lies with Germany and Austria-Hungary. Though he continues to stress throughout much of the book that Kaiser Wilhelm II and Archduke Ferdinand were fervent keepers of the peace within their nations, the fault of the war ultimately could be laid at the feet of their two nations and their constant attempts at war-mongering. He claims the war could have been avoided for the moment, had all the nations of Europe wanted peace, but the two bad eggs of Europe drew them all into an unavoidable general war.

This essay analyses the origins of the Second World War by briefly summarizing the events from 1919-1939. However, most emphasis is put on the amount of responsibility the Treaty of Versailles deserves for the outbreak of war. Other than analysing the Treaty of Versailles on its own, it also analyses the effects of the 1929 Wall Street Crash on the world, the rise of Fascism and Nazism, as well as the rise of Adolf Hitler, the failure of the League of Nations and the appeasement of the Fascist and Nazi regimes by Britain and France throughout the 1930s. Hence the Treaty of Versailles plays a

Many historians argue that the reason for Germany going to war was due to the aggressive behaviour of Germany in the build up to the war. Throughout this essay I will be addressing this issue looking at whether Germany was responsible for the outbreak of a general European war in August 1914. There are many factors which contribute to the outbreak of the war from a short-term trigger such as the assassination of Franz Ferdinand to the long-term annexation aims Germany implemented in the years building up to the war, the most important reason was Germany’s aggressive foreign policy, they had provided

Promptly after the First World War had ended there were many debates about who or what caused the war. Historians such as Fritz Fischer argued that Germany was the to blame for the entirety of the war but there have been many more ideas of what was the cause of the war and therefore causing peace to fail. The main ideas amongst historians for the underlying causes of the war are the different balance in power due the formation of alliances, imperialism, militarism and also the July Crisis of 1914. This essay will argue that the alliances were the main cause of peace failing as with the constant conflict of interests and increasing tension it made it almost impossible to create peace in Europe in 1914.

During the summer of 1914 British politicians believed that Germany would not start war because, despite his angry outbursts, the Kaiser had peaceful intentions. The bureaucrats in Britain believed that Germany did not have the capability to go to war, and if it did go to war, France and Russia would quickly squash Germany. Perceptions of German intention did matter in British decision-making in the summer on 1914. Britain’s position on the war remained ambiguous long after they should have publically made a statement because they believe the tension would die down on it own when Germany eventually decided it would not go to war. This information, and the way politicians and bureaucrats reasoned through Germany’s intentions, follows the guidelines

Fischer argues that German imperialism bears the onus for the Great War, as he concluded that they had gone to war to achieve European and worldwide domination. He states that Germany had ‘confidence in the invincibility of her military strength,’ implying that Germany had been building up their forces. This indicates Germany must have already been preparing for war, strengthening her army until she saw that both France and Russia were ‘militarily weak’ in comparison - to the extent that German elites believed they would remain somewhat unhindered in their continuation of ‘aggressive intentions.’ This is significant for several reasons. First, it was controversial as these ideas challenged the pre-existing general consensus of historians’ outlook since the 1930s: that all involved European nations shared a collective war-guilt from the First World War. Fischer rejects this view. He references a document written by Bethmann’s private secretary on 9 September 1914, outlining the Chancellor’s plan for peace negotiations which he anticipated would soon take place, as according to the September Programme. Fischer extrapolated that these detailed plans (that already had the support of the wider political nation in Germany) must have existed in August and July, and that this was indication towards Germany’s

In 1961 German historian Fritz Fischer published a controversial book, Germany’s War Aims in the First World War. Fischer argued that the German’s had plans for war right from the start and that the assassination of the Arch Duke Franz Ferdinand was just an excuse for war. He believed that Germany encouraged Austrian war plans. The counter argument to Fischer’s view was presented by another German historian, Gerhard Ritter in his book, Staatskunst und Krieghandwerk: das Problem des ‘Militarism’ in Deutschland. Ritter believed that Germany was mainly motivated by the desire to keep Austria as a great power and to prevent Russian domination in the Balkans. Ritter stated in his book that Germany had no long term war plan and they were dragged into war by Austria. Furthermore, he believed that Germany miscalculated that Britain would not enter the war. Ritter strongly believed that military plans were necessary for Germany with Russia posing as a threat. This shows how two historians with same context use different methodologies in attempting to find ‘historical truth.’ Which leads to the question: To what extent is history discovered or invented? Objectivity is taken away when a historian has to select or identify different themes, causes and effects. The choice of language in which these selections are presented also impacts attempts to maintain objectivity when presenting historical

In the year 1961, Fritz Fischer had presented his book, which was known as Germany's Aims in First World War and it had been successful in launching a debate among German historians and scholars as older historians severely criticized and opposed Fischer and his book. However, his contemporaries and younger historians supported his book. The book draws a detailed and comprehensive picture of Germany and its aims during the World War I.

For Germany, 1914 would witness the enthronement of Kultur in Europe and the fulfillment of Germany’s historic mission. As Thomas Mann saw it, “Germans . . . deserved to be the most powerful, to dominate, to establish a ‘German peace’” (311). The French, for their part, in the face of growing German militarism given voice by the Kaiser himself, “possessor of the least inhibited tongue in Europe,” stoked up their furor Gallicae and awaited the moment that had seemed inevitable ever since the Treaty of Versailles had amputated her eastern flank. Aside from nationalistic scores to settle, many other nations were simply “sore-headed and fed up” with “Germany’s clattering of the sword” and saw in the coming conflict hopes for the “moral regeneration of Europe” (312-313). Tuchman sees the parts as well as the whole, and her discussion of cause as it relates to individual battles and the generals involved is psychologically astute without being limiting. She offers plausible explanations for General John French’s lack of will in the defense of Belgium (218) and shows how the breakdown of Plan 17 in the first weeks of the war paved the way for a long and brutal struggle (262), as did the final failure of the Germans’ Schlieffen Plan for a double envelopment of the enemy. The ensuing deadlock

Decisions for War, 1914-1917 by Richard Hamilton and Holger Herwig investigates the origins of the First World War detailing individual country’s reasons for entering the war. Historians at War by Anthony Adamthwaite explores how scholars have understood the origins of the Second World War throughout varying times and differing national view points. Both works share a common theme of determinism; a retrospective notion placed on historical events by historians that Europe was inescapably predestined to go to war and that nothing nor anyone could inhibit that. Both remark that this popular approach does a disservice into the explanation of war as it does not accurately depict the economic and social agency present in Europe at the time. In

The Schlieffen Plan is commonly – though misleadingy – identified with the German western offensive at the start of the First World War in August 1914, which began as a campaign of rapid movement but ended in deadlock and trench warfare. The plan is generally seen as a desperate gamble almost certain to fail, and its recklessness is counted as part of Germany’s war guilt – the plan held out the false promise of a quick victory, and so it underpinned the “short war illusion” that led Germany into a long war of attrition, ending with her defeat and collapse in 1918. This analysis confuses two quite different moments in history. The Schlieffen Plan was not designed to meet the strategic challenge Germany faced in 1914,

In order to fully understand how Britain’s decision to go to war against Germany is best explained one must engage into the debate revolving around the question of the extent to which Britain and other countries were responsible for causing war. This helps explain the intention Britain had for war which is vital in understanding their decision making process to cause war in the first place. Some schools of thought have come to the conclusion that it was everybody or nobody- the continent “slithered over the brink into the boiling cauldron of war without any trace of apprehension or dismay.”1 That analysis will be considered in this essay as will the widespread thesis that it was Germany’s aggression which not only created the preconditions for war, but also triggered Britain into war with the political imbalance of power being created from the growing naval and colonial expansion of Germany. Other factors that help explain why Britain went to war against Germany

November 1918 saw the result of WW1 though Germany's eyes. A crumbled economy, revolution and counter-revolution, the flailing of a government, and an angered mass population- searching for scapegoat in which to blame their

After the First World War (1914-1919), the world was faced with the questions - who was responsible and what was reason for the outbreak of the war. Ultimately it was agreed on the 28 June 1919 that “the Allied and Associated Governments affirm and Germany accepts the responsibility of Germany and her allies for causing all the loss and damage” from the First World War. However, there have been many other interpretations on whom and what was responsible for the war. On the one hand, some historians would agree with David Lloyd George’s notion of all “the nations slithered over the brink into the boiling cauldron of war”, however, on the contrary, others would agree with Fischer in arguing that Germany’s aggressive foreign policy was responsible for the First World War. Whether you agree with Lloyd George or Fischer, it is important to understand some of the other possible reasons for the outbreak of the First World War – including the growth of nationalism and imperialism, the alliances within Europe and the assassination of Archduke Franz Ferdinand. Although this essay will argue that Germany’s aggressive foreign policy was responsible for the outbreak of the First World War, it will also illustrate why other historians have argued against that notion.