The Impact Of Post 9 / 11 Attack On The World Trade Center ( Wtc )

Many of the current differences we see today between the federal, state and local law enforcement intelligence stemmed from prior to the September 11 attack. Prior to this attack many states lacked a robust intelligence capability, as it was the primary role of federal agencies to protect the United States from both foreign and domestic terrorist threats. In an attempt to mitigate future attacks of this nature state, local, and

September 11, 2001 showed that there were weaknesses in communication and emergency response. It also significantly changed the role police have with the prevention of terrorist acts. As Oliver stated, “... policing in the post-September 11 environment is not only a response to the specific events...but also an amalgam of change brought about by various political, economic, and social factors in the United States...” (Homeland Security for Policing, 2007, p. 43).

The horrific events of September 11, 2001, profoundly altered the way law enforcement agencies conducted business. The creation of new agencies arose, strategies, procedures, and training for law enforcement was necessary to prepare and combat terrorism. In this paper, I will analyze the before and after effects, the events of 9/11 caused in law enforcement agencies in the U.S. and what improvements I feel are needed to keep our nation safe from terrorism.

“Prior to September 11th intelligence agencies and law enforcement failed to communicate with each other about terrorist hijackers… This lack of communications had its roots deep in the culture of government… Fortunately, in the Patriot Act, congress began to tear down the walls that cut off communication between intelligence and law enforcement officials” (Gerdes 36)

There has been much less consideration in the role of state and local government, which play a major role in preventing and responding to a terrorist attack. Community policing and other federal agencies can share many strategies such as transforming the agencies to take on new mission should be part of the homeland security strategy because fighting local crimes is the more effective approach in dealing fear and social disorder. When law enforcement are being trained toward a national role in homeland

Before 9/11, law enforcement possessed the primary responsibility for combating terrorism in the United States. Law enforcement relationships and responsibilities have continued to be evaluated and redefined at all levels of government. They will evolve because of the continuous changing nature of terrorist threats, prevention needs and transforming operations and strategies. Terrorist groups continue to advance and pose threats in new ways each day. In the fourteen years since the worst terrorist attack on United States territory, citizens have undoubtedly become more cautious and accustomed to the inconveniences that result from the precautions and added security law enforcement agencies are now having to provide.

2). Domestic terrorism is usually committed by citizens of the United States, and documentation of terrorist activities on American soil have dated back to the 1950s. The 1970s heighten domestic terrorism by a “rash of skyjacking”, that is, taking a commercial airline hostage (Sauter & Carafano, 2012). Skyjacking incidents compelled the FBI and CIA to develop undercover strategies to enforce terrorist groups; however, these tactics lead to civil right violations. The federal agencies covert tactics and aggressive intelligence collection, “prompted congressional hearings and led to dramatic restrictions on domestic intelligence operations, including the creation of a bureaucratic wall between intelligence gathering and law enforcement” (Sauter & Carafano, 2012, p. 25). The “wall” that was previously stated halted information sharing between the intelligence community and local law enforcement. Communication and information sharing prevents redundancy in high priority investigations, and it could also provide first responders advance notice in life threatening

By disregarding cues of possible terrorist attacks and constant mistakes within the American Intelligence for not planning ahead, the United States failed to achieve its number one goal as a governing body: not keeping its citizens safe. It is important to dig into the issue of the disaster of 9/11 and completely understand the reason for failed prevention efforts. Moreover adding to these issues was the lack of communication and information shared between the two agencies, the Federal Bureau of Investigations and Central Intelligence Agency.

The terrorist attack that occurred on September 11, 2001 (9/11) is arguably the greatest tragedy the United States has ever faced. This attack was widespread, coordinated and devastating in nature. Many people claim that the government failed to protect us from this event and that it should have been prevented. Over the Course of this paper, we will examine that claim. We will examine how the Intelligence community failed to prevent the 9/11 terror attack. This paper will also examine how the Intelligence community could have used its assets more effectively. The two biggest factors in this attack were the lack of information sharing and lack of action taken on received intelligence. After discussing how those two factors facilitated the 9/11

The attack on the World Trade Center on 9/11 was the worst terrorist attack in U. S. history. Prior to 9/11, the U.S. had dealt with intermittent attacks on American soil with limited experience on emergency preparedness. Since 9/11, Homeland security was formed within the next year with a goal to safeguard the country against future terrorist attacks. The United States was faced with additional challenges other than just providing a response plan to terrorist attacks. There has been a debate if the United States is better prepared or is in the same position as before the 9/11 attack.

The events of September 11, which are partly associated with errors in the work of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), raised the issue of reforming the agency both in the countries of the old democracy and in the countries of the new democracy. Most of the discussions about reforming the work of the special services in the fight against terrorism are reduced to the exchange of information between the structures of power. However, it is only by understanding the nature of the tasks of the special services in combating terrorism that it is possible to develop the necessary "architecture" or organizational structure suitable for the solution of the task. The task of the special services at this stage

Throughout Intelligence Community’s history, there has been multiple attempts to input reform measures into various agencies. Often met with pushback, the reform attempts typically fail or are weak in merit. Being unaccepting of reform and showing little adaptation towards newer strategies and technological advancements, the IC was caught unprepared to thwart the September 11, 2001, terrorist attack on the twin towers and the Pentagon. Some governmental reports, those that have assessed the IC’s actions regarding the devastating attack, have noted that greater cooperative efforts between various agencies may have halted the terrorist attack. The creation of a Homeland Intelligence Organization could be the start of implementation of a reform to bring the IC closer together.

In the heat of extremist organizations rising up across America, ranging from white supremacy to Islamic extremism, investigating organizations as well as intelligence offices are looking for greater ways of being able to access information to preserve public safety. In the wake of September 11, 2001, the country based one of its most disastrous mishandling of intelligence in decades. It was well-documented that the information presented that Osama bin Laden was planning an attack on America had been presented and yet nothing was done.

After 9/11, a realization emerged that there was a disconnect between domestic intelligence related to criminal investigations and foreign intelligence. This disconnect manifested due to erroneous perceptions and beliefs within national security circles that foreign intelligence could not be shared with criminal investigators (The 9/11 Commssion, 2004, p.79). The result of this disconnect was that relevant information from the CIA and NSA related to terrorism was not disseminated to criminal investigators (The 9/11 Commission, 2004, p.79). Al Qaeda was able to exploit the discordance between domestic and foreign intelligence as evidenced by the successful execution of the 9/11 attacks. The intrinsic connection between domestic and foreign intelligence is illustrated by what is referred to as the “lone wolf” terror threat. While an Islamist lone wolf terrorist may become self-radicalized on the U.S. mainland, what inspires and motivates such terrorists is not indigenous in origin. Although terror attacks executed by lone wolf terrorists are not directly coordinated by Islamist terror entities, their points of origin can be traced overseas because Islamist terror entities that are catalysts for such attacks are based in foreign countries. Thus, the CIA and other agencies that produce foreign intelligence on the Islamist terror threat must pass on that information to the FBI, DHS, and other federal agencies that deal with domestic intelligence. In turn, federal domestic intelligence agencies must provide that information to agencies at the state, local, and tribal levels via fusion centers, JCAT, and other related entities. The integration of foreign and domestic intelligence cannot be achieved without substantial information-sharing and coordination among government

Intelligence was known about the terrorist locations. The article by Jones brings attention to the laws of government agencies sharing information between themselves. In reference to the 9/11 Commission Report it was recommended that more sharing of information take place. Suggesting that this would allow agencies to work together more cohesively. Allowing a larger spectrum to be aware of important aspects of watched individuals, groups, cells, militia, etc. The author, Jones, outlines advantages of agencies both local, state, and federal working together. He puts insight on the history of sharing information before 9/11, and after September 11th. The changes that were brought as a result of the attacks are reviewed as well. Each individual intelligence agency can be applauded for the information they have individually collected. The information is sorted, stored, and then becomes what? A notch in the belt of the agency? A job well done of sorts. “The 9/11 Commission Report recommended there be “unity of effort” in the sharing of intelligence” (Jones, 2011).