The Importance Of Moral Responsibility For Something We Do

Over the course of time, in the dominion of philosophy, there has been a constant debate involving two major concepts: free will and determinism. Are our paths in life pre-determined? Do we have the ability to make decisions by using our freedom of will? While heavily subjective questions that have been answered many different authors, philosophers, etc., two authors in particular have answered these questions very similarly. David Hume, a Scottish philosopher from the 18th century, argues in his essay “Of Liberty and Necessity” that free will and determinism are compatible ideas, and that they can both be accepted at the same time without being logically incorrect. Alike Hume, 20th century author Harry G. Frankfurt concludes in his essay “Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility” that the two major concepts are compatible. These two authors are among the most famous of Compatibilists (hence the fact that they believe free will and determinism are compatible ideas) in philosophical history. The question that then arises in the realm of compatibilism particularly, is one dealing with moral responsibility: If our paths in life are not totally pre-determined, and we have the ability to make decisions willingly (using free will), then how do we deem an individual morally responsible for a given decision? Frankfurt reaches the conclusion that we are held morally responsible regardless of

Suppose that every event or action has a sufficient cause, which brings that event about. Today, in our scientific age, this sounds like a reasonable assumption. After all, can you imagine someone seriously claiming that when it rains, or when a plane crashes, or when a business succeeds, there might be no cause for it? Surely, human behavior is caused. It doesn't just happen for no reason at all. The types of human behavior for which people are held morally accountable are usually said to be caused by the people who engaged in that behavior. People typically cause their own behavior by making choices; thus, this type of behavior might be thought to be caused by your own choice-makings. This freedom to make

Someone can argue that regardless of your genetics and upbringings, you will have consequences that you must take responsibility for. You can claim that you are in charge of the consequences that occur after you commit a certain action, so you take precaution for choosing things that you do as you are in control of the outcomes that take place after. An example of this is how we decide to live in the future like who you choose to surround yourself with and where you want to live. You can decide to live in a totally different environment because you want to, your past and your genetics do not have to be the reason why you want live a different lifestyle. The reasoning can be because you just feel like it. Thus, concluding that you are responsible for your actions.

A choice issues from, and can be sufficiently explained by, an agent’s character and motives, then to be ultimately responsible for the choice, the agent must be at least in part responsible by virtue of choices or actions voluntarily performed in the past for having the character and motives he now has (295).

The theory that I find true to the true nature of moral responsibility and its relation to human freedom and determinism would be compatibilism. Compatibilism is the claim that we are both determined and that we have moral responsibility (Lawhead 120).

Exposition: In Galen Strawson’s essay “The Impossibility of Moral Responsibility,” he presents the Basic Argument and argues it proves we cannot be held truly morally responsible for our actions, which is an invaluable argument in the free will problem. The Basic Argument is seen as an infallible argument. It claims that people are who they are based on the environment that they’ve been born. On the seventh page of the essay, Strawson breaks the ten part argument into five simplified premises. First, it is undisputable that

Determinism is the doctrine, that every event, as well as human actions is determined by causes that are independent to the will. From determinism, two opposing views were identified. The incompatibilists view that determinism implies no free will, or the compatibilists view that determinism still allows for free will. The incompatibilist philosophical thinkers have taken determinism as use of a scapegoat, identifying determinism to infer that human beings are unable to have any free will, thus no moral responsibility for taken actions. Whilst the compatibilist philosophical thinkers have taken a softer view of determinism, holding the view that an agents actions are pre-determined, although the agent is still to be held morally responsible for the agent’s voluntary actions. Determinism, as argued for the compatibilists, allows for an agent to hold free will and share equal responsibility for chosen actions.

When are people responsible for their actions? According to Simon Blackburn's theory of "Soft Determinism" people are responsible for their actions as long as true and available information is possessed. Blackburn's short story revises the compatibilist definition several times. The revised revised definition reads as follows:

is false, because there are cases where a person is morally responsible for what she has done even if she could not have done otherwise (835-6). Call such cases Frankfurt-style cases. A lot of literature thereafter has been targeted on these Frankfurt-style cases, particularly whether it’s really possible to construct them. Among critics of Frankfurt, David Widerker (2003) takes one step further and he grants, for the sake of his argument, that it is possible to construct Frankfurt-style cases ; however, he argues that even so, Frankfurt’s argument still fails because there are counter-examples to Frankfurt-style cases, which are in favor of PAP (60-2).

will and moral responsibility. I will argue, that Frankfurt makes an invalid implicit assumption that the

In “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives”, Philippa Foot argues against Immanuel Kant, that morality exists in hypothetical imperatives rather than categorical imperatives. For Kant, categorical imperatives alone serve as moral commands, and it would be impossible for a moral system to be based on hypothetical imperatives because such imperatives serve as means to ends and result from maxims that cannot be universalized into perfect duties. Despite this, Foot holds that acting on many hypothetical imperatives can be morally praiseworthy and can even serve as the basis of moral judgments. Although I agree with Foot that hypothetical imperatives can have moral worth, in this paper, I will argue that a morality based on the purposes that hypothetical imperatives are directed toward appears to be circular. To do this, I will explain Foot’s theory of how morality is known and binds. Then, I will argue that this theory is insufficient to explain the moral purpose that hypothetical imperatives must be directed toward, thus begging the question of what is the moral basis of the purpose directed toward in the hypothetical imperative.

Frankfurt presents counterexamples to PAP to prove its falsity. He tells us to assume that there is a universal controller that wants to ensure certain outcomes. The controller makes it impossible for an agent to act otherwise, which causes her to act exactly as the controller wishes. Frankfurt argues that in such a case it is true that agent is not responsible for her action and that she could not have done otherwise, but he thinks that the agent’s lack of responsibility does not follow from her inability to do otherwise.

Seeing as how Ben is the only moral agent in his choice to steal the fund or not, Ben is the only person who can be held morally responsible for his decision. The plan to potentially steal the fund is Ben’s plan alone, and requires him to act alone as well. Under these circumstances there is no doubt that is Ben solely morally responsible for his decision.

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility talks about the principle of alternate possibilities. The principle of alternate possibilities states that someone is morally responsible if they could have chosen to do otherwise. People who believe in free will are very supportive of the principle Free will is the power of acting without the constraint of necessity or fate; the ability to act at one’s own discretion. The principle of alternate possibilities, moral responsibility, and free will are all involved in this paper written by Harry Frankfurt. Frankfurt states that “its exact meaning is a subject of controversy, particularly concerning whether someone who accepts it is thereby committed to believing that moral responsibility and determinism

The theory of moral responsibility by Aristotle will be used as a foundation to analysis the moral responsibility on dream. The theory is used because Aristotle is the earliest philosopher who discuss about moral responsibility in Nicomachean Ethic. Aristotle concept of moral responsibility is focus on “the role of knowledge in taking the proper course of action” (Hsieh). According to Aristotle, moral responsibility is the notion that “it is sometimes appropriate to respond to an agent with praise or blame on the basis of her actions and/or dispositional traits of character” (Eshleman). This concept similar to Plato’s ideas that “the issue of moral responsibility primarily arises as a result of the investigations into the connection between knowledge, desire, and right action; his discussions generally center around whether those who desire evil do so knowingly or due to ignorance or error” (Hsieh). However, the notion of moral responsibility by Aristotle is more complex and details.