The Main Problem With This Type Of Bargaining Is They Are

1986 WordsMay 1, 20178 Pages
The main problem with this type of bargaining is they are harder to quantify as these negotiations are largely private talks that have taken place between representatives of the EU institutions. The considerable number of amendments gives credence to the view that the EP has an at least some influence during the co-decision procedure, as it has managed to alter the proposal even to a slight degree. Showing the key flaw within assessing the EP’s power owing to amendments ranging from corrections on technical grounds to seismic political differences. Michael Shackleton a former senior official in the Parliament administration perpetuates this view as the number of amendments does not directly correlate to the power of the EP (Hix and…show more content…
Germany could do this by dividing the European Parliament, this is shown by a tie with 273 votes for and against with 22 abstentions, meaning that ultimately the proposal was rejected (Hix, Noury & Roland, 2007). This is another key characteristic within the EP, the EP is made up of varying different nationalities who still have a close affiliation with their member state. Accordingly, power within the EP itself is not and can never be wholeheartedly supranational as previously argued due to this member state influence. Correlating with the theory laid out earlier in the essay, and as prescribed by Robert Thomson (2011) a divided and disjointed EP is not as strong as a united EP. Furthermore, it is important to consider that this is an obvious statement as there is typically a small number of abstention; small but enough to stop legislation when an absolute majority is needed. These abstentions in a close vote, as with the Takeover Directive, practically count as votes against. This is due to a fixed number of MEPs needed, 314 in the case currently being discussed to vote in favour of the legislation. Thus a close and divided vote gives a disadvantage to those who want to enforce the proposal. A second version of the Takeover directive was proposed after the failure of the initial one and unlike the
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