Introduction In 1915 the Allied and German forces were both seeking a decisive victory to end the war. The German army decided that the location of this victory would be the city of Verdun. Verdun is located 150 miles from Paris, France were the French Army headquarters was located. General Falkenhayn believed that the French Army would never accept the loss of a major defensive city so close to the headquarters. Operation Judgment became the code name for this battle which was to bleed the French Army of Soldiers through the defense of Verdun. The result of this operation was the longest and most gruesome battle of World War 1.
History
General Falkenhayn replaced General Von Molke in 1914 because Von Molke’s offensive in France and
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The French headquarters believing these forts worthless removed most of the artillery pieces and Soldiers to be reassigned to locations that were believed to be a higher priority to the German Army. The largest weapons they left at these forts were 155mm artillery and heavy machine guns to combat the 420mm guns of the Germans located less than ten miles away.3
The French Army realized that the Germans were preparing for an offense operation when they villages surrounding Verdun began to be evacuated. General Herr, the commander of Verdun, requested additional Soldiers and equipment from General Joffre, the French Commander and Chief. General Joffre did not believe the Germans would attack Verdun, but sent on of his aides to investigate the situation at Verdun. When it became apparent that Verdun was the target, two divisions were sent to General Herr which would not arrive until 12 February 1916.
General Falkenhayn briefed his commanders that they were to attack the city of Verdun in a battle of attrition. The commanders appeared to believe that the intent was to capture the city itself. When they presented General Falkenhayn with Courses of Action he agreed to the plan believing the troops would be more motivated by an offensive attack. General Falkenhayn did not believe they could attack both the west and east
The German Command, in planning for a short and swift war, found themselves in a bind when the war started to prolong itself. From the very beginning, their plan started to fall apart, as Belgium, who they assumed would just let them march through to France, took up arms in resisting their approaches (Hull, 2005). The war would get longer and longer and seemed farther away from its conclusion as the months grew colder. As a result of this as well as their Prussian roots, they resorted to dangerously risky and destructive tactics, trying to bring the war to a quicker end while putting more of their resources in jeopardy, a move that eventually did not pay off and ended up leading to the German Empire’s demise (Hull, 2005).
The Schlieffen Plan was a German battle plan to fight a two front war devised in 1905 by Alfred von Schlieffen as the Chief of the General Staff for Germany. The plan called for the German army to apply overwhelming force in France to capture the capital of Paris within six weeks before changing focus to Russia. The plan intended to achieve a quick and decisive victory by sweeping a line of armies through neutral Belgium and into France. In actuality, Helmuth von Moltke made significant changes to Schlieffen’s original plan before and during World War I. Ultimately, the plan ended in failure when the German advance halted at the First Battle of the Marne (Limbach, 2014).
The Allies rallied an offensive for the liberation of France in late September 1915. This resulted in a stalemate between the powers, inflicting heavy casualties on the Allied and Central Powers. This fierce battling with no progression continued into late 1916, when the Germans became concerned at the amount of the allied forces on the western front and the invention of the tank - technology that Germany
Lieutenant-General Sir Arthur Curries was not pleased at the prospect of going to Passchendaele. Currie, like many Canadian soldiers, had grim memories of the Ypres salient, and grim memories to he Ypres salient, and admitted that his “experience in the salient in 1915 and in 1916 were such that I never wanted to see the place again.” Unfortunately, on 3 October, Currie was warned that the Corps might be sent north, to take part in the offensive in Flanders. Currie could make no sense of Passchendaele, and he was furious. “Passchendaele!” he raged in front of his staff. “What’s the good of it? Let the Germans have it--keep it--rot in it! Rot in the mud! There’s a mistake somewhere. it must be a mistake! It isn’t worth a drop of blood.” Although Currie was not at all happy that the Canadians had been told to take Passchendaele. One of Currie’s first moves was to assign intelligence officers to the various headquarters with which the Canadian Corps would be associated: Second Army, II Anzac Corps, which was responsible for the sector the Canadians would be taking over, and its front-line divisions, the New Zealand and 3rd Australian. These officers, and the general staff were to acquire
Source one is a primary source with interviews elucidating the strategies undertaken at the Battle of Verdun and the soldier’s perplexing encounters of war. The perspective of this source varies with differing speakers with the first is that of the narrator, describing the history of of the German armies, with mention of Allied responses, giving it the main perspective that of a German history. Due to the first perspective not having a name identified, it therefore reduces the reliability. German solider Ernst Weckerling is that of the second perspective, reiterating his duties and events during his time in Verdun. The final perspective is that of Marcel Batreau, and is analogous to Weckerling’s perspective, with Batreau, a French soldier, telling his version of events during the battle.
On the Western Front, the Germans quickly invaded Belgium and moved efficiently to put the Scheiffen Plan into effect. The Scheiffen Plan was created so that the German army would not have to fight on two- fronts. By mid September, the plan had failed for a number of reasons. Because Belgians were able to hold up the Germans at their forts, the British Expeditionary Force was able to then mobilize and began to arrive in France by August 15. The French then had plenty of time to move north to confront the German
General Pershing, in command of the U.S. 1st Army, set the rail line near Sedan, France as the main objective. This was a vital supply route for German forces (Stewart, 2005), and the direction of attack to the north of the front line through the Argonne Forest would expose the flank of German forces being attacked by the French from the west. Support for the American forces consisted of over 800 aircraft, nearly 190 tanks, and approximately 2,700 pieces of artillery, and over 600,000 men (Stewart, 2005).
The post D-Day Allied assault that swept through France was halted by Hitler’s unexpected counter-attack through the Ardennes, resulting in a confrontation named the Battle of the Bulge.
Nearing the end of World War II and after the successful D-Day invasion by Allied Forces, Adolf Hitler would personally plan a counteroffensive he believed would turn the tied of the war in his favor and prevent his unconditional surrender. Historically known as the Battle of the Bulge, the Ardennes Counteroffensive, from 16 December 1944 to 25 January 1945, would showcase the power of a full-scale German offensive while highlighting the ingenuity and heart of the United States Army as they encountered a seemingly undefeatable foe.
Good morning/afternoon class. Today I will be talking to you about the Battle of Verdun. The Battle of Verdun was the longest battle during WW1 fought from 21 February to 18 December 1916, fought on the Western Front. The Western Front was one of the main battle grounds in WW1 located in France. The battle was fought between the German and French armies and caused over 700,00 casualties.
In 1916 witnessed the commencement of the battle of the Somme. Through the course of that one battle, a million British men were slaughtered compared to the combined number of American casualties in both the first and Second World War. The Battle of the Somme was planned as a joint French and British operation, approved by Haig. However, the German attack on Verdun in February 1916 turned the Somme offensive into a large-scale British attack. Haig accepted responsibility for the action and with the help of Rawlinson who devised his own plan of
Leading into the Fall of 1914, tactics on both sides of the line involved the rapid mobilization, maneuver and envelopment of the opposing side.10 Pre-1914 doctrine took little into account the effects of emerging new technology and their impact on both defensive and offensive operations. This disconnect between doctrine and technology contributed to the failure of early offensive operations in the Fall of 1914 and resulted in staggering casualties.11 Both sides developed doctrine that took into effect the unique terrain and technology that had been developed prior and during World War I. However by the end of the war, a combination of flexibility, decentralized control, and counterattack at every echelon made the German defensive system the most effective.12 This “elastic defense” had three unique characteristics; dedicated counter-attack force at all levels, decentralized command and control, fluid defensive belts and integrated artillery support at the Division level. Under this new doctrine, Corps headquarters had the role sustaining subordinate units, but not directing their actions during battle.13 This defense-in-depth and the lessons learned during the Verdun battles of 1918 were so successful that British forces adopted many of the German tactics with a special emphasis on their counterattack capability.10 Utilizing the new doctrine, by August 1918, Germany had made substantial gains, however had
On 17 December, 1944, five German divisions were able to push through the VIII Corps’ defensive line 100 miles east of Bastogne nullifying
Germany did not have a numerically superior force on the western front, but bold strategy, careful planning and blitzkrieg tactics set the foundation for the French defeat. In June 1940 Hitler invaded Paris, eight days later the French surrendered. After the French surrender, Hitler attempted to end the war with Britain. Speaking to the Reichstag in June, he said, “I can see no reason why the war need go on.” But Hitler was already had his sights set on invading Russia. He now aimed to end the war in the west so he could concentrate on attacking communist Russia in the east. Hitler knew that invading Britain would be difficult, but still he informed his military to leaders to prepare for the operation, Operation Sea Lion, and proceeded in planning a landing operation against Britain.
Men who retreated were even mowed down by their own machine gun fire. General Nivelle, of the 2nd Army that was defending Verdun issued the order: No surrender; no retreat, not even an inch: die where you stand.' Imagine being in a battle where the only way you might survive is by running forward into machine gun fire because you know if you run back you'll for surely be killed. Some may consider this to be barbaric and a violation of rights and freedoms but think what may have resulted if it was not done. Perhaps during WWII Stalingrad would have fallen to the Germans and which eventually might have led to the entire eastern front to be taken and German occupation of soviet territory. This would have allowed them to re-concentrate their armies to the western front and perhaps led to a defeat of the allies. The same goes for Verdun. If the Germans had succeeded in taking Verdun the French would have completely lost their spirit. Since France was also an important British ally if the French were to lose morale and essentially give up, it may have led to different outcomes in the battle of the Somme and other important battles that may have changed the course of history.