Vivendi: Revitalizing a French Conglomerate Essay

When considering GSA’s strategic direction, we should first build an understanding of its relative position within the private equity market. GSA’s current value proposition to its clients is: 1) Greater accessibility to private equity firms through GSA’s customized services, allowing less sophisticated clients to progress from a passive fund-of-funds investor into a direct private equity investor, removing the intermediation between the GP and the client; 2) A strategy of “vintage-year diversification”, whereby GSA contributes to funds over a number of different years in order to gain access to many different types of funds; and 3) A compensation structure that is weighted towards carried interest at the expense of fees, ensuring an alignment of interests between GSA and its clients. These strategies have helped the fund retain large and important

With an increase in business, the firm recruited widely. The firm, which had employed 2,000 people in 1982, tripled to 6,000 people by 1987.” Due to excessive focus on generating revenues, one insider put it as, “competing fiefdoms replaced interconnected businesses.” and “Making money was mostly what mattered.”

Cervus’ future approach in the execution of a diversification growth strategy, in the construction and industrial equipment markets.

Paulson E. (2001). “Inside Cisco: The real story of sustained M&A growth”, John Wiley & Sons, Inc.

Financial management over time has become the most important aspect of business decisions in funding the enterprise. Thus, the term “financial services” became more popular in the United States partly as a result of the Gramm-Leach-Biley Act of the latter 1990s. This act has enabled all companies to operate in the U.S. financial services industry. Companies usually have two different approaches to this new type of business, insurance, and investment banking. Whether the firm keeps the original brands or adds the acquisition to its holding company

1. From early 1990s to 2004, the Lego Group, a long successful toymaker with a world-renowned brand, fell into the edge of bankruptcy. Compared with the highest revenue in 1999, the revenue in 2014 decreased by 35.6% while the net profit was negative, seven times less than that in 1999, the lowest in the past ten years. Its net profit margin and ROE were also the lowest. The gross margin and inventory turnover were all lower than its competitors. The strategic moves in the two main periods “growth period that wasn’t” (1993-1998) and the “fix that wasn’t” (1999-2004) lead to its poor performance.

While it was foreseen that the company would initially take financial setbacks because of the reorganization, it was not believed that the financial risks would be drastic. However, the impending report that Mr. Elesser has to present to the board will detail a net income that will be nearly 26 million dollars in the red for 2004 (see exhibit 2)3. The blunt force restructuring met resistance on numerous fronts. First of all, the various components of the company did not operate under the same uniformed leadership objectives. Each division was set up to look out for their own interests and markets. When the restructuring plan that focused on a more centralized management process, many of the things that worked for one division did not necessarily work for other divisions of the company. This left some divisions at a severe disadvantage. Another obstacle that worked against the restructuring was the employee unions in which the company had to deal. The unions were not on board with the various downsizing and restructuring methods. In addition, the company had to deal with a couple of different unions which posed a problem with negotiating tactics. Benefit costs were also a significant investment that did not hold up well under the auspice of restructuring.

CGC had to be on the leading edge of the latest technology and also exceed the customer’s expectations. Research and development was a critical part of its success and future success that CGC had to place major focus on. They had to maintain their market edge plus solidify their hold as the market leader by consistently releasing new models that differentiated it from competitor’s products and CGC’s own products as well. If a product stayed in the market too long, the sales would eventually peak and then start a downward trend, so getting out at the peak is the key.

The company evolved through an elaborate series of mergers and divestitures, and financed its acquisitions through debt.

After several failed attempt of internal diversification, they realized the lack of knowledge of their management about businesses outside the automotive area. so acquisition brought them quick fix where it brought already knowledgeable people in respective areas in their payroll.

Moreover, Cooper’s corporate strategy is diversification through acquisitions and mergers. This diversification is in both related and non-related

Nevertheless, MD was in financial disarray in 1990, as a consequence of the strong competition and rapidly dropping demand for its products; the strong emergence of Airbus squeezed MD's market share. This was the main reason for which the company in the future decides to make a joint venture with other companies in order to avoid its financial problems.

So with business going so well for Solectron, how did everything go wrong for the company starting in 2001? Revenue fell from $6.5 billion in 3rd quarter 2000 to $2.2 billion in the same quarter of 2001. The company laid-off 20,000 employees; its stock plummeted; it was faced with plant closures, excess inventory and reduction of floor space. Was it a case of poor planning and management or just the company a victim of an economic downturn? This case analysis will explore what Solectron did wrong and what they could have done and offer some suggestions. It is also interesting to note the Solectron foresaw a pending boom in the Asia (China & India) markets and that if it was able to weather the prevailing storm, Solectron stood a chance of rising up again and succeed.

Cooper also divested many less profitable businesses over an eighteen year period from 1970 to 1988. The benefit added by the Cooper conglomerate to its business units justifies the costs associated with a corporate / centralized control. Furthermore, Cooper’s corporate management effectively managed and invested in the best opportunities for growth with little political bias.

company started an incentive system in 1997, under which the pay of the managers of