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Vyaderm Case

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EVA – A CATHARTIC CHANGE?!

Prof. Zhaoyang Gu

Course
45-701

By:
Neha Arya
Marc Brands
Anil Konjalwar
Alok Satyawadi
EVA: North American Dermatology Division

We will first calculate the 1999 actual EVA retroactively and if our figure matches Vyaderm’s then we will use that method to calculate EVA for 2000 and 2001.

1999 EVA Calculation:

|In ‘000s |1999 |
|Operating earnings |20,000 |
|add R& D expense |20,000 |
|minus R & D amort. |14,972.8 |
|add ad expense |45 |
|minus ad amort. |41.34 |
|add goodwill |2500 |
|NOPBT …show more content…

The systems might actually work if they are set-up sensibly. For a manager who has been consistently meeting/exceeding her targets, the targets could be revised appropriately to keep her challenged. As shown in Exhibit 4, the cap does not need to be a flat line starting from point X, as seen in Figure 1. It could be set to have a gradient (Figure 2) after achieving a certain target.

2. Thresholds encourage short-term decision making Agree o Just like a cap is a limit on the bonus axis, threshold is like a floor (opposite of cap) on the performance axis. Any situation where there is a good chance of not meeting the threshold levels, managers will have a very short-term vision. The natural tendency will be to make decisions that get them above the thresholds for that period and worry about future later. Again, referring to Exhibit 4, Figure 1, a manager at a performance level Z2, trying to meet a threshold (Y) will try to do anything to be at (Y). o For managers who are way below the threshold may just ‘give-up’ and perform even worse. This refers to performance level Z1 in Exhibit 4, Figure 1. If the managers knew before hand that there was no possible way to meet their targets (due to controllable or un-controllable factors like changing market conditions), they would have absolutely no incentive to maximize their performance.

3. Negotiated targets promote sandbagging Agree o

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