. Most Bengal tigers (Panthera tigris) are orange with black stripes. Occasionally, however, they can be white with black stripes. The white phenotype is recessive to orange. In one study, a white and an orange tiger were bred in a zoo. These 2 tigers eventually had 10 offspring: 4 white and 6 orange. What are the genotypes of the two parents? 6. If the orange tiger from the previous question is crossed with one of its orange offspring, what is the probability of obtaining a white tiger from the cross? 7. In snapdragons, a species of plant, red flower color is incompletely dominant over white, the heterozygotes being pink. If you want to produce seed that will yield only pink flowering plants, what would you cross? 8. George has type A blood and his wife Harriet has type B blood. They have a daughter with type O blood. What is the probability that their next child will have type AB blood?

. Most Bengal tigers (Panthera tigris) are orange with black stripes. Occasionally, however, they can be white with black stripes. The white phenotype is recessive to orange. In one study, a white and an orange tiger were bred in a zoo. These 2 tigers eventually had 10 offspring: 4 white and 6 orange. What are the genotypes of the two parents? 6. If the orange tiger from the previous question is crossed with one of its orange offspring, what is the probability of obtaining a white tiger from the cross? 7. In snapdragons, a species of plant, red flower color is incompletely dominant over white, the heterozygotes being pink. If you want to produce seed that will yield only pink flowering plants, what would you cross? 8. George has type A blood and his wife Harriet has type B blood. They have a daughter with type O blood. What is the probability that their next child will have type AB blood?

Principles of Economics (MindTap Course List)

8th Edition

ISBN:9781305585126

Author:N. Gregory Mankiw

Publisher:N. Gregory Mankiw

Chapter22: Frontiers Of Microeconomics

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 4PA

See similar textbooks

Similar questions

#3. Hannah gets 50 utils from visiting her family for Thanksgiving. But there is a 1% chance that she will get the coronavirus from them. If she gets the coronavirus, her utility is -6000 utils. Her total utility would be -5950 (i.e. 50 – 6000). She gets 0 utils from staying healthy (total utility = 50 + 0 = 50). If Hannah doesn't visit her family for Thanksgiving, then she gets -25 utils from eating turkey cold cuts alone in front of the TV. In that case, there is no risk of getting sick. What will Hannah do? a. Visit her family for Thanksgiving b. Not visit her family for Thanksgiving c. Visit her family if she is risk-loving, not visit if she is risk-averse d. Visit her family if she is risk-averse, not visit if she is risk-loving
Imagine that a zealous prosecutor (P) has accused a defendant (D) of committing a crime. Suppose that the trial involves evidence production by bothparties and that by producing evidence, a litigant increases the probabilityof winning the trial. Specifically, suppose that the probability that the defendant wins is given by eD>(eD + eP), where eD is the expenditure on evidenceproduction by the defendant and eP is the expenditure on evidence production by the prosecutor. Assume that eD and eP are greater than or equal to0. The defendant must pay 8 if he is found guilty, whereas he pays 0 if heis found innocent. The prosecutor receives 8 if she wins and 0 if she losesthe case. (a) Represent this game in normal form.(b) Write the first-order condition and derive the best-response function foreach player.(c) Find the Nash equilibrium of this game. What is the probability that thedefendant wins in equilibrium.(d) Is this outcome efficient? Why?
#4. Without a vaccine, there is a 10% chance that Steven will get the coronavirus in 2021. If he gets vaccinated, that risk falls to 1%. Without a vaccines, Steven gets -6000 utils if he gets covid and 0 utils if he stays healthy. Because of side effects, he gets -100 utils from the vaccine if he stays healthy and -6100 if he gets sick anyways. What will Steven do? a. He will get vaccinated b. He will not get vaccinated c. He will get vaccinated if he is risk-averse but not if he is risk-loving d. He will get vaccinated if he is risk-loving but not if he is risk-averse
Imagine a market for used computers. There are two types of computers: good and bad. Also imagine that there are 50% of each on the market. Buyers can imagine paying 5,000 for a good computer and 1,000 for a bad computer Sellers want at least 4000 for a good computer and 1500 for a bad computer -What would happen in the market if the buyer thinks that there is a 50% probability that the computers are of poor quality? What type (s) would be sold and what would the price be?
Suppose that an individual is just willing to accept a gamble to win or lose $1000 if the probability ofwinning is 0.6. Suppose that the utility gained if the individual wins is 100 utils. How much utility does one lose if one loses the gamble?
Subject 2 A bottle company ALPHA, is considering creating a new bottle of 0.25 lt. To decide whether to invest in this projector not, they performed market research that costed €5,000. The results indicated two possible scenarios that depend on the competitor's reaction to create a similar product and on the percentage of the faithful customers of ALPHA. ScenarioA has a 45% chanceto be realized, while scenarioB has a probability of 55%. For the project's realization the company must purchase specialmachinery that cost €80,000, while transportation and installation costs amount to €2,000. The useful life of the project is two years, and the machinery can be sold at the end of the useful life for €30,000.Table 1 presents the pertinenteconomic data. At the end of the second year the working capital is going to be recaptured. The tax rate is 25%, the weighted average cost of capital is 10% and the company fully depreciates fixed assets for tax purposes, using the straight-line depreciation…
Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $25. If I spends $5 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $18. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $4 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $4 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $2 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially-optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially-optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages to V. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages. What is the Nash equilibrium of this game under a rule of no liability? Question…
Assume that there are two parties, I and V. I engages in an activity that tends to injure V. V and I both can take care to reduce the expected harm from accidents. Specifically, suppose that if I takes no care (i.e., spends $0 on accident precautions), expected injury to V is $250. If I spends $40 on accident precautions, however, the expected injury to V is reduced to $175. Further suppose that V has a choice between taking no care or spending $50 in care to avoid accidents. If V spends $50 in care, V’s expected harm falls by $20 regardless of the level of care that I takes. Assume that courts adopt the socially‐optimal level of injurer care as the negligence standard. That is, if I takes less than the socially‐optimal level of care, she will be found negligent and must pay for all damages to V. If I takes at least the socially optimal level of care, she will not have to compensate V for his damages. 1. Under a negligence standard, what is I’s dominant strategy? a) I does not have a…
A thousand used cars are for sale in Boston. Some of the cars are of good quality (“plums”), and some are not (“lemons”), but the buyer cannot tell the difference between the two qualities; of course the seller knows whether the car is a lemon or a plum. Suppose that consumers are willing to pay $4,000 for a lemon and $6,400 for a plum; and sellers are willing to sell a lemon for $3,500 and a plum for $5,600. a. If there is a 40% chance that a car is a lemon, how many cars will be sold? And what is the maximum consumer surplus in this case. b. If there is a 10% chance that a car is a lemon, how many cars will be sold? And what is the maximum consumer surplus in this case? Kindly answer in detail with all steps and answer should b typed not hand written.
A thousand used cars are for sale in Boston. Some of the cars are of good quality (“plums”), and some are not (“lemons”), but the buyer cannot tell the difference between the two qualities; of course the seller knows whether the car is a lemon or a plum. Suppose that consumers are willing to pay $4,000 for a lemon and $6,400 for a plum; and sellers are willing to sell a lemon for $3,500 and a plum for $5,600. a. If there is a 40% chance that a car is a lemon, how many cars will be sold? And what is the maximum consumer surplus in this case. b. If there is a 10% chance that a car is a lemon, how many cars will be sold? And what is the maximum consumer surplus in this case? Kindly answer in detail with all steps
Hedonics setup 1: In class we introduced a case where people have heteroge-neous preferences in our sorting exercise. The types of households, their value of environmental quality, and the number of each type are repeated here for reference. We will ignore school quality in this problem. Neighborhood A will have a price of 0 regardless of the number of people living there, whereas the price equals the number of households in all other neighborhoods. The utility of a person living in a neighborhood is U = aEQ — P. This is the same setup as in class. Card type x Number of HH yellow 6 5 green 5 15 orange 4 10 pink 3 5 blue 2 25 red 1 15 Consider the case below, where all neighborhoods have EQ of 6, except neighbor-hood A which has an EQ of 1. EQ A 1 B 6 C 6 D 6 E 6 F 6 Answers the following Q1. List the equilibrium prices in each neighborhood. Q2. Is this marginal valuation revealed in this equilibrium an overestimate, an under-estimate, or an…
If your worker works hard there is a 3/5 possibility that revenues will be $150 and a 2/5 probability that revenues will be $50. If she works at a lower level of effort, there is a 50% chance of each revenue outcome. Working hard costs her $6. Working moderately costs $3. Her outside utility is zero. She is risk-neutral, with utility equal to W - C , where W is the wage and C is the Cost of Effort (3 or 6 depending on whether she works with low or high effort, resp.) If you could contract for effort, would it be profitable to induce high effort? Explain why. What would your profits be? If you cannot contract for effort, find an incentive-compatible pay scheme that will induce high effort. Set up the incentive and participation constraints and find the z (payment when revenue is 150) and y (payment when revenue is 50) where both are exactly satisfied. Would it be profitable to use this scheme? Why? Now suppose that y can never be negative. What incentive compatible scheme will give…