1) Bargaining Adam has a car in good condition that he uses daily and that he values at 4000$. Blair values the same car at 4300$. Blair has 5000$ to spend. Adam has received an offer for 3500$ from a third party. a) What are the threat points for Adam and Blair? What is the surplus they could get from cooperating? What is the range of prices for the sale of the car that can support that cooperative outcome? b) Now suppose that the offer from the third party is 4200$. What are the new threat points? What is the new surplus of cooperation between Adam and Blair? c) Finally, suppose that the seller of a car has to pay a tax of 200$ and the buyer of a car has to pay registration fee of 150$. There is no offer from a third party. What are the threat points? What is the new surplus from cooperation? What is the range of prices that

1) Bargaining Adam has a car in good condition that he uses daily and that he values at 4000$. Blair values the same car at 4300$. Blair has 5000$ to spend. Adam has received an offer for 3500$ from a third party. a) What are the threat points for Adam and Blair? What is the surplus they could get from cooperating? What is the range of prices for the sale of the car that can support that cooperative outcome? b) Now suppose that the offer from the third party is 4200$. What are the new threat points? What is the new surplus of cooperation between Adam and Blair? c) Finally, suppose that the seller of a car has to pay a tax of 200$ and the buyer of a car has to pay registration fee of 150$. There is no offer from a third party. What are the threat points? What is the new surplus from cooperation? What is the range of prices that

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter18: Asymmetric Information

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 18.7P

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2.- Assume that consumers are uniformly distributed along a one-mile stretch of a beach. N ice cream vendors are pondering where to position their carts. The price that they are allowed to charge is fixed by the EACAC (Equal Access to Coolness for All Coalition). (Also, each consumer will buy exactly one ice cream.) (a) Show that there is no equilibrium (in locations) if N=3. (b) Suppose N=5 and vendors position their cart each at one of the (mile) points ( 1/6, 2/6, 3/6, 4/6, 5/6 ) is that an equilibrium?
1. Write situations that can present the different barriers at communicationand ways to avoid these.BarriersExample SituationPossible Strategy that canbe used to AvoidMisunderstanding1. Physical Barier2. Semantic Barrier3. PsychologicalBarrier4. Mechanical Barrier5. Cultural Bonet II Identity the nonverbal cues present in eoch situation and underline thewords that links to it. 1. She always wears her bracelet when she joins any contest._2. The reason of avoiding her because of ourmisunderstanding3. Brion likes to pinch my cheeks all the time.-4. The aroma of his cottee wakes her up in the morning_5. Her dance moves really prove that she's a dancer6. Those students who are wearing long sleeves and grayskirt are Tourism students.7. She received a lot of medals in her graduation8. Her parents told him to wait Celine reaches 18 years old,so that he can finally court her.9. Jenna and Kaye can't be separated in their classroom10. His smiles can brighten up my day!
Apply a PESTEL analysis to BMW, Mercedes Benz or Audi (note: the same opportunities and threats will apply to each of them)(300 words) Case is in the link below https://learn-ap-southeast-2-prod-fleet01-xythos.s3.ap-southeast-2.amazonaws.com/5bfdd02798410/310708?response-cache-control=private%2C%20max-age%3D21600&response-content-disposition=inline%3B%20filename%2A%3DUTF-8%27%27German%2520Performance%2520Cars%2520mini-case%25282%2529.pdf&response-content-type=application%2Fpdf&X-Amz-Algorithm=AWS4-HMAC-SHA256&X-Amz-Date=20200514T150000Z&X-Amz-SignedHeaders=host&X-Amz-Expires=21600&X-Amz-Credential=AKIAIW5OVFIUOTV36DNA%2F20200514%2Fap-southeast-2%2Fs3%2Faws4_request&X-Amz-Signature=04fc70b3525f262f45e3fd538055629312c31235de61816a9a1794793d02294c
a) What is the pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcome if there is one? (solved)b) Is this a socially optimal outcome? If not, which outcome is preferred? (solved)c) Do all three solution approaches for simultaneous games work independently (not together)? If not, which do not? (solved) d) Draw the game as a game tree (extensive form). (to be solved)e) Switch the payoffs in cells (A, A) and (D, D). What is the pure strategy Nash equilibrium outcome if there is one? (to be solved)
1.4. Suppose you are against one of two alternatives but 90% of theelectorate disagrees with your position and favors that option. Is there avoting method that is anonymous, neutral, and monotone that preventsthat option from being selected as the winning alternative?
53. The Indiana University basketball team trails by twopoints with eight seconds to go and has the ball. Shouldit attempt a two-point shot or a three-point shot?Assume that the Indiana shot will end the game and thatno foul will occur on the shot. Assume that a three-pointshot has a 30% chance of success, and atwo-point shot has a 55% chance of success. Finally,assume that Indiana has a 55% chance of winning inovertime.
Five roommates arc planning to spend the weekendin their dorm room watching movies, and they arcdebating how many movies to watch. Here is theirwillingness to pay:Quentin Spike Ridley Martin StevenFirst film $14 $10 $8 $4 $2Second film 12 8 4 2 0Third film 10 6 2 0 0Fourth film 6 2 0 0 0Filth film 2 0 0 0 0Buying a DVD costs SIS, which the roommates splitequally, so each pays $3 per movie.a. What is the efficient number of movies to watch(that is, the number that maximizes total surplus)?b. from the standpoint of each roommate, what isthe preferred number of movies?c. What is the preference of the median roommate?d. (f the roommates held a vote on the efficient out~come versus the median voter's preference, howwould each person vote? Which outcome wouldg~ a majority?c. lf one of the roommates proposed a differentnumber of movies, could his proposal beat thewinner from part (d) in a vote?f. Can majority rule be counted on to reach efficientoutcomes in the provision of public go<Xis?
Five roommates are planning to spend the weekendin their apartment watching movies, and they aredebating how many movies to watch. The tablebelow shows each roommate’s willingness to pay foreach of the movies:Ava Ridley Spike Kathryn QuentinFirst film $14 $10 $8 $4 $2Second film 12 8 4 2 0Third film 10 6 2 0 0Fourth film 6 2 0 0 0Fifth film 2 0 0 0 0A movie on their streaming service costs $15, which theroommates split equally, so each pays $3 per movie.a. What is the efficient number of movies to watch(that is, the number that maximizes total surplus)?b. For each roommate, what is the preferred numberof movies to watch?
64. (This problem assumes knowledge of the basic rulesof baseball.) George Lindsey (1959) looked at boxscores of more than 1000 baseball games and foundthe expected number of runs scored in an inning foreach on-base and out situation to be as listed in the fileP09_64.xlsx. For example, if a team has a man on firstbase with one out, it scores 0.5 run on average untilthe end of the inning. You can assume throughout thisproblem that the team batting wants to maximize theexpected number of runs scored in the inning.a. Use this data to explain why, in most cases,bunting with a man on first base and no outs isa bad decision. In what situation might buntingwith a man on first base and no outs be a gooddecision?b. Assume there is a man on first base with one out.What probability of stealing second makes an attempted steal a good idea?
18.7 Suppose 100 cars will be offered on the used-car market. Let 50 of them be good cars, each worth $10,000 to a buyer, and let 50 be lemons, each worth only $2,000. Compute a buyer’s maximum willingness to pay for a car if he or she cannot observe the car’s quality. Suppose that there are enough buyers relative to sellers that competition among them leads cars to be sold at their maximum willingness to pay. What would the mar- ket equilibrium be if sellers value good cars at $8,000? At $6,000?
Splitting Pizza: You and a friend are in an Italian restaurant, and the owner offers both of you a free eight-slice pizza under the following condition. Each of you must simultaneously announce how many slices you would like; that is, each player i ∈ 1, 2 names his desired amount of pizza, 0 ≤ si ≤ 8. If s1 + s2 ≤ 8 then the players get their demands (and the owner eats any leftover slices). If s1 + s2 > 8, then the players get nothing. Assume that you each care only about how much pizza you individually consume, and the more the better.What outcomes can be supported as pure-strategy Nash equilibria?
If a) the government uses a tradable permits program for pollution emissions, b) polluting firms are heterogeneous in terms of their marginal abatement costs (MACs), and c) each firm is initially allocated an equal amount of permits, it must be the case that: Select one: a. Firms with higher marginal abatement costs will pay firms with lower marginal abatement costs to abate more. b. Firms with lower marginal abatement costs will end up with more permits than firms with higher marginal abatement costs after trading. c. All firms will end up abating the same amount of emissions. d. All of the above are true. e. All of the above are false.