1 boo In an isolated town, there are two distinct markets for cars. Buyers will pay up to $12,000 for a high-quality car or $8,000 for a low-quality car. There are 100 high-quality cars for sale, and the sellers have a minimum acceptable price of $11,000. There are also 100 low-quality cars for sale at a minimum acceptable price of $5,000. The supply of automobiles is perfectly inelastic above the reservation price. a) If there is perfect information (i.e., the buyer knows what is a high and low quality car as does the seller), how many high-quality and how many low-quality cars will be sold? b) Suppose that the quality of a car is known to the seller, but not to the buyer. What price will prevail in the marketplace if buyers correctly estimate the chance of acquiring a low-quality car at 50%? What happens to the number of high-quality cars for sale at that price. c) After sellers make all adjustments, what will the equilibrium price of cars be? What proportion of those cars will be high-quality cars?

Managerial Economics: A Problem Solving Approach
5th Edition
ISBN:9781337106665
Author:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Publisher:Luke M. Froeb, Brian T. McCann, Michael R. Ward, Mike Shor
Chapter17: Making Decisions With Uncertainty
Section: Chapter Questions
Problem 10MC: You are considering entry into a market in which there is currently only one producer (incumbent)....
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In an isolated town, there are two distinct markets for cars. Buyers will pay up to $12,000 for a high-quality
car or $8,000 for a low-quality car. There are 100 high-quality cars for sale, and the sellers have a minimum
acceptable price of $11,000. There are also 100 low-quality cars for sale at a minimum acceptable price of
$5,000. The supply of automobiles is perfectly inelastic above the reservation price.
a) If there is perfect information (i.e., the buyer knows what is a high and low quality car as does the seller),
how many high-quality and how many low-quality cars will be sold?
b) Suppose that the quality of a car is known to the seller, but not to the buyer. What price will prevail in the
marketplace if buyers correctly estimate the chance acquiring a low-quality car at 50% ? What happens
to the number of high-quality cars for sale at that price.
c) After sellers make all adjustments, what will the equilibrium price of cars be? What proportion of those
cars will be high-quality cars?
Transcribed Image Text:In an isolated town, there are two distinct markets for cars. Buyers will pay up to $12,000 for a high-quality car or $8,000 for a low-quality car. There are 100 high-quality cars for sale, and the sellers have a minimum acceptable price of $11,000. There are also 100 low-quality cars for sale at a minimum acceptable price of $5,000. The supply of automobiles is perfectly inelastic above the reservation price. a) If there is perfect information (i.e., the buyer knows what is a high and low quality car as does the seller), how many high-quality and how many low-quality cars will be sold? b) Suppose that the quality of a car is known to the seller, but not to the buyer. What price will prevail in the marketplace if buyers correctly estimate the chance acquiring a low-quality car at 50% ? What happens to the number of high-quality cars for sale at that price. c) After sellers make all adjustments, what will the equilibrium price of cars be? What proportion of those cars will be high-quality cars?
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