(1) Write down each player's best response functions and find all the Nash equilibria. (2) For each action of each player, determine whether it is strictly, weakly, or not domi- nated by any other actions. Justify your answer. (3) Find the set of rationalizable action profiles by iteratedly eliminate strictly dominated actions. Clearly show the steps.

(1) Write down each player's best response functions and find all the Nash equilibria. (2) For each action of each player, determine whether it is strictly, weakly, or not domi- nated by any other actions. Justify your answer. (3) Find the set of rationalizable action profiles by iteratedly eliminate strictly dominated actions. Clearly show the steps.

Microeconomic Theory

12th Edition

ISBN:9781337517942

Author:NICHOLSON

Publisher:NICHOLSON

Chapter8: Game Theory

Section: Chapter Questions

Problem 8.1P

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(1) Write down each player’s best response functions and find all the Nash equilibria.(2) For each action of each player, determine whether it is strictly, weakly, or not domi-nated by any other actions. Justify your answer.(3) Find the set of rationalizable action profiles by iteratedly eliminate strictly dominatedactions. Clearly show the steps.
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